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AN INQUIRY
INTO
THE ACCORDANCY OF WAR
WITH THE
PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIANITY;

AND
AN EXAMINATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL REASONING BY
WHICH IT IS DEFENDED;

WITH
OBSERVATIONS ON THE CAUSES OF WAR AND SOME OF ITS
EFFECTS;

BY JONATHAN DYMOND.

WITH A
DEDICATION TO SUNDAY-SCHOOL TEACHERS AND SCHOLARS,
AND NOTES,

BY THOMAS SMITH GRIMKÉ,
Of Charleston, South Carolina.

Together with An Appendix,

CONTAINING EXTRACTS FROM SEVRAL OF HIS WRITINGS, VINDICAT-
ING OR ILUSTRATING THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACE.



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ADVERTISEMENT.



It seems necessary in presenting this work to the Public, to state under what disadvantages it has been publishd, in order that the errors, if there be any, may be chargd to us, who have had the supervision of it, and not to the departed Editor. In the 9th month, when paying a short visit to this city, his time was so closely occupy'd, as to preclude the possibility of his arranging and correcting the original parts of this volume, so that this duty was confided to us; and we had fondly hop'd that on his return from Ohio, he would again hav visited Philadelphia, which would hav afforded him an oportunity of juding for himself, whether all things had been executed acording to his wishes. Soon after he left us, the book was put to press, so that the printing was completed before the intelligence of his death ariv'd, except the first sheet, which was detain'd with the expectation of his adding the extract of a letter, which is aluded to in the Dedication, but which has not been found among the papers.

After paying a visit of love and duty to a brother from whom he had been separated for sixteen years, and delivering an Oration at Oxford, a Lecture at Cincinnati, and some Addresses on the benevolent enterprizes of the day, he was suddenly call'd from his "labor of love and works of faith," to be an inhabitant of that city, whose walls ar salvation and whose gates ar prais. On his way to Columbus to meet his brother Judge Grimké, he was taken ill of cholera, and

after an illness of twelve hours, his career of usefulness was terminated by the hand of Death. Whilst we deeply deplore the loss of one of the best of brothers, our hearts are often filled with thanksgiving and praise, to "the God of all consolation," for the sweet assurance we confidently feel that he is now one among that multitude who "have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb." Yes! our prostrate souls are bowed in gratitude for the gift of so precious a brother, father and friend; and altho' that gift has been recalled, yet do we reverently adopt the language of Job, "The Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away, *blessed be the name of the Lord.*" Blessed be his holy name, *ours* is the loss, *his* the eternal gain—we weep *not* for him, but for ourselves, for his bereaved widow, for his aged mother, and for his fatherless children.

That the blessing of Almighty God may rest upon this his last effort in the Christian Cause of Peace, is the fervent prayer of

HIS AFFLICTED SISTERS.

Philadelphia, 10th Mo. 26th, 1834.

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TO THE READER.

HAVING been long satisfy'd that the Orthography of the English Language not only admitted but requir'd great changes for the better, I hav for sevral years been making alterations in the different pamphlets, which I hav publishd from time to time. Thus far they hav consisted chiefly, 1. in the omission of the silent *e* in such classes of words, as disciplin, respit, believ, abhord, publishd, remaind—evry, sevral, volly: 2. in the suppression of the *e*, and the substitution of a comma for the silent *e*, after the manner of the poets, in words where the simple omission of the *e* would change the vowel sound from long to short, as in requir'd, deriv'd, refin'd. 3. In the retention of the *y* at the end of nouns ending in *y* and the addition of *s* to make the plural, instead of changing *y* into *ie*, and then adding the *s*, as in variety's, beauty's, plurality's. 4. In the retention of the *y* in verbs, ending in that letter, and the addition of *s* or *d*, instead of changing the *y* into *ie*, and then adding *s*, as in bury's, vary's, varyd. 5. In retaining the *y* in similar words, where the *y* is long, (and the simple addition of *s* or *d* would make the *y* short) and adding the comma after the manner of the poets, as in multiply'd, multiply's, diversify'd, diversify's. 6. In the transposition of the *e* in such words as scepter, battel, center. 7. In the suppression of one of two letters (being the same) where the

accent is not on them : as in necessary, excelent, illustrious, recomend, efectual, iresistible, worshipers. 8. In the uniform rejection of the *u* in all such words, as favor, honor, savior, neighbor, savor. 9. In the retention of *y* in adjectives ending in *y*, and the addition of *er* and *est* to form the comparativ, so as not to change *y* into *i*, as easier, prettyest, holiest.

To those who know me, I need hardly say that the resolv to pursu such a cours has been founded on a principle of duty. I hav been, acordingly, willing to encounter ridicule, contempt, abuse—acting not at all from any principle of caprice, or singularity, or ambition. I hav set the example, because it was the best mode in which the subject could be at first presented. But I hope it will not be long before the propriety and advantage of these and various other changes will become more and more obvious. My great object is to simplify eventually the spelling of our language, so that evry distinct sound, whether vowel or consonant, shall hav its separate, exclusiv representativ. It must be manifest, that a most important object will be gaind by this plan ; for then all the time now spent in teaching children to spell will be sav'd, and they will learn it, by simply learning the specific sound of each symbol for a vowel, diphthong, or consonant. I hope it will not be long before I shall be able to lay my views at large before the public.

THOMAS S. GRIMKÉ.

DEDICATION.

TO THE TEACHERS AND SCHOLARS* OF SUNDAY SCHOOLS.

MY CHRISTIAN FRIENDS,

IN presenting you with an American edition of Dymond on War, I feel assur'd that I am rendering an important service to the cause of religion, of our country, and of mankind. Whatever may enlighten and strengthen your sense of duty, correct and purify your affections, enlarge and elevate your standard of usefulness, must be valuable to you. Those who look at the existing state of things, and contemplate with Christian seriousness the prospect before them, must be sensible that the character, progress, and influence of the church in future years, depend to an *incalculable* extent upon *you*. In your hands are, in my opinion, the destiny, not only of the Christian church, but of the institutions of your country. What that country shall be, on the first centennial anniversary of American independence, depends upon you, as I firmly believe, in a greater degree, than upon the combin'd efforts of all other persons in the United States. If you should be faithful to the principles

* Those in the higher classes, and all after they have completed the course, as here intended.

taught and the affections cultivated in the Sunday-school, (and to the reproach of Christians, taught and cultivated only there,) your country will be, on the 4th of July, 1876, a more lovely and glorious object than the Christian world has ever beheld. Believing, as I do, that the Sunday-school system is one of the most important branches of the moral government of God, for the regeneration and perfection of society, through all its institutions, I regard you as eminently privileged and blessed in the enjoyment of this divine confidence. Let me exhort and implore you to be faithful to this high trust. Realize the dignity and sanctity of your station; the awful and solemn character of the power with which you are invested: and the truly Christian enduring influence, which you may exercise if you choose; and must exercise if you are faithful. Yours is the only system of education, whose sole object is to fit the young to be, what all systems of education, in Christian lands, should labor to make them, the children of God, and the brethren of all mankind. Thus, not only religion and your country have a deep interest in you, but the whole world looks to you, as engaged in a work of infinite value to the human race. In truth, you cannot estimate too highly the magnitude of your obligations to the whole family of Adam; and the extent of the influence which you are preparing to exert at a future day, throughout the habitable globe. Would that I could speak with the tongue of an angel and the authority of a prophet, to constrain you to treasure up in your hearts these solemn and momentous truths. Thousands of you, I know will do it: and may God grant, that, in the next generation, tens of thousands may do the like, throughout all our land.

The great object of republishing Dymond on War, is to lead you to think on a subject, upon which few have ever thought, the Accordancy of War with the Principles of Christianity. The Sunday-school is the only seminary (and I speak it to the dishonor of Christians) in which the young

ar taught, that humility, forbearance, forgivnes, and love, ar indispensable to the Christian character. *Now, these ar Christian virtues: the opposit of these ar Pagan virtues. War is utterly irreconcilable with the former: it cannot subsist without the latter.* Yet the practical tendency of the poetical and historical studys pursu'd in all other seminaries but the Sunday-school, is *to recomend and extol the Pagan, and to discountenance and condemn the Christian virtues.* Suffer me to say to you, that the correction of this mighty evil depends upon you more than upon all the other classes of society put together. To Christianize education in all its departments, to make the instruction of Christian children, from beginning to end, as it ought to be, consistent with the belief and practice of humility, forbearance, forgivnes, love, is one of your chief dutys, as it will be one of your noblest triumphs. This duty, this triumph is reserv'd for you. Go on, then, in the fear of God, in good will towards man, and the blessing of Heaven will be assuredly yours. Should this volume succeed in convincing you of the unchristian character of War and the Warrior, let me then urge upon you the duty of making it *the subject of conversation* whenever you shall find a favorable opportunity. Thus will you continually exercise a wholesome influence on all around you, as long as you liv, and entitle yourself to the chief blessing in the sermon on the Mount, "Blessed ar the peace-makers, for they shall be called the children of God."

In the year 1832, a distinguishd militia officer in South Carolina, requested a copy of my Address on Peace, deliverd in May, 1832, before the Connecticut Peace Society. I sent it to him with some such remarks as these. "You may smile at the sentiments containd in my address, but if we liv twenty years longer, when a million of Sunday-school children shall hav been brought to bear on public sentiment and on all the institutions of society, you will find,

where a dozen agree with me now, thousands will agree with me then." And who can doubt it, if Sunday-school teachers and scholars ar faithful and zealous in the cause of Christian humility, forbearance, forgivnes, love? There ar now, at least, one hundred thousand instructors, and a million of pupils in the Sunday-schools of the United States. They possess the power, and I trust that God will put it into their hearts to exercise the influence, which is able to make so mighty and glorious a change. Let Sunday-school teachers make it an especial business to teach, *not only the peculiar doctrins, BUT THE PECULIAR VIRTUES* of the Gospel. Let Sunday-school pupils, when they come to be men and women, neither be *asham'd to avow, nor afraid to practis* **THOSE PECULIAR VIRTUES**. Let it be the business and glory of instructors and scholars thus to act: and you will do more in a single generation to make the standard of private and public sentiment, *truly Christian*, than all the Colleges and secular schools of the Union could acomplish in ten generations. For myself, I do not believ they ever could acomplish it, with such systems of education as they hav hitherto had. All the experience of the past testify's against them: and no one can doubt it, who is aware, that it is **NO PART OF THEIR SCHEME** to teach *the peculiar virtues of the Gospel*. Whether the absence of this branch of instruction in those seminaries be a defect or an advantage, this is neither the time nor the place to examin. I refer to it as **A FACT**. Hence, I argu the absolute necessity of some other system to supply what is indispensable in the education of Christian children. That other system is the Sunday-school. Thus, my Christian friends, you see what dutys ar allotted; what power is entrusted to you; what a vast and all-important revolution you ar fitted, and as I trust, destined to acomplish.

Let me conclude, by recommending to you the cause of Peace, in the various forms, in which it is now adressing

itself to the public sentiment of our beloved country, and striving to reform it. Let me recommend to you to become members of Peace Societys, wherever they are formed; to attend their anniversaries, to read their publications, and especially the periodical of the American Peace Society:* to peruse a "Solemn Review of the Custom of War;"† Mr. Wm. Ladd's two little volumes, called Philanthropos, first and second series;‡ and, lastly, Hancock on Peace;§ which is the most convincing testimony in favor of the beauty, value, and authority of Peace principles that is to be found any where. Of this book, a gentleman of the first respectability in New York, writes to me thus, under date of 17th August, 1833: "An Irish gentleman, with me on a visit, who was well conversant with the state of Ireland during the rebellion, tells me he has no doubt of the truth of every fact related by Hancock."

I had thought of writing a preface to Dymond's work, but this dedication and the extract of a letter|| to a friend which follows it, will be accepted, I trust, instead of an introduction.

I have thus set before you my objects and wishes: your duties and prospects. I ask nothing from gratitude on my own account; but I ask every thing of your love, fidelity and zeal in the cause of God, of your country, and of mankind.

Your sincere friend, in the Christian bonds of love and duty.

THOMAS S. GRIMKÉ.

* The Calumet, conducted by Richard M. Chipman, and published every other month at New York.

† By the Rev. Noah Worcester, of Brighton, Massachusetts, the Patriarch of the Peace Cause.

‡ Consisting of a series of numbers first published in the Christian Mirror, a religious newspaper of Portland, Maine.

§ Second American edition, printed at Philadelphia, in 1832, by Thomas Kite & Co. in 18mo.

|| This Extract could not be found among the papers which were left in Philadelphia, and as the Editor never returned, the deficiency cannot now be supplied.

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BY JONATHAN DYMOND.

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PREFACE.

THE object of the following pages, is to give a view of the principal arguments which maintain the indefensibility and impolicy of war, and to examine the reasoning which is advanced in its favour.

The author has not found, either in those works which treat exclusively of war, or in those which refer to it as part of a general system, any examination of the question that embraced it in all its bearings. In these pages, therefore, he has attempted, not only to inquire into its accordancy with Christian principles, and to enforce the obligation of these principles, but to discuss those objections to the advocate of peace which are advanced by philosophy, and to examine into the authority of those which are enforced by the power of habit, and by popular opinion.

Perhaps no other apology is necessary for the intrusion of this essay upon the public, than that its subject is, in a very high degree, important. Upon such a subject as the slaughter of mankind, if there be a doubt, however indeterminate, whether Christianity does not prohibit it—if there be a possibility, however remote, that the happiness and security of a nation can be maintained without it, an examination of such possibility or doubt, may reasonably obtain our attention.—The advocate of peace is, however, not obliged to avail himself of such considerations: at least, if the author had not believed that much more than doubt and possibility can be advanced in support of his opinions, this inquiry would not have been offered to the public.

He is far from amusing himself with the expectation of a general assent to the truth of his conclusions. Some will probably dispute the rectitude of the principles of decision, and some will dissent from the legitimacy of their application. Nevertheless, he believes that the number of those whose opinions will accord with his own, is increasing, and will yet much more increase; and this belief is sufficiently confident, to induce him to publish an essay which will probably be the subject of contempt to some men, and of ridicule to others.—But ridicule and contempt are not potent reasoners.

“Christianity can only operate as an alterative. By the mild diffusion of its light and influence, the minds of men are insensibly prepared to perceive and correct the enormities, which folly, or wickedness, or accident have introduced into their public establishments.”* It is in the hope of contributing, in a degree however unimportant or remote, to the diffusion of this light and influence, that the following pages have been written.

For the principles of this little volume, or for its conclusions, no one is responsible but the writer: they are unconnected with any society, benevolent or religious. He has not written it for a present occasion, or with any view to the present political state of Europe. A question like this, does not concern itself with the quarrels of the day.

It will, perhaps, be thought by some readers, that there is contained, in the following pages, greater severity of animadversion than becomes an advocate of peace. But, “let it be remembered, that to bestow good names on bad things, is to give them a passport in the world under a delusive disguise.”† The writer believes that wars are often supported, because the system itself, and the actions of its agents, are veiled in glittering fictions. He has, therefore, attempted to exhibit the nature of these fictions, and of that which they conceal; and to state, freely and honestly, both what they are not, and what they are. In this attempt it has been difficult—perhaps it has not been possible—to avoid some appearance of severity: but he would beg the reader always to bear in his recollection, that if he speaks with censure of any class of men, he speaks of them only as a class. He is far from giving to such censure an individual application: Such an application would be an outrage of all candour and all justice. If again, he speaks of war as *criminal*, he does not attach guilt, necessarily, to the profession of arms. He can suppose that many who engage in the dreadful work of human destruction, may do it without a consciousness of impropriety, or with a belief of its virtue. But truth itself is unalterable: whatever be our conduct, and whatever our opinions, and whether we perceive its principles or not, those principles are immutable; and the illustration of truth, so far as he has the power of discovering it, is the object of the inquiry which he now offers to the public.

* Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy.

† Knox's Essays, No. 34.

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DYMOND ON WAR.

PART I.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE CAUSES OF WAR.

Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.—VIRG.

IN the attempt to form an accurate estimate of the moral character of human actions and opinions, it is often of importance to inquire how they have been produced. There is always great reason to doubt the rectitude of that, of which the causes and motives are impure; and if, therefore, it should appear from the observations which follow, that some of the motives to war, and of its causes, are inconsistent with reason or with virtue, I would invite the reader to pursue the inquiry that succeeds them, with suspicion, at least, of the rectitude of our ordinary opinions.

There are some customs which have obtained so generally and so long, that what was originally an effect becomes a cause, and what was a cause becomes an effect, until, by the reciprocal influence of each, the custom is continued by circumstances so multiplied and involved, that it is difficult to detect them in all their ramifications, or to determine those to which it is principally to be referred.

What were once the occasions of wars may be easily supposed.—Robbery, or the repulsion of robbers, was probably the only motive to hostility, until robbery became refined into ambition, and it was sufficient to produce a war that a chief was not content with the territory of his fathers. But by the gradually increasing complication of society from

age to age, and by the multiplication of remote interests and obscure rights, the motives to war have become so numerous and so technical, that ordinary observation often fails to perceive what they are. They are sometimes known only to a cabinet, which is influenced in its decision by reasonings, of which a nation knows little, or by feelings of which it knows nothing: so that of those who personally engage in hostilities, there is, perhaps, not often one in ten who can distinctly tell why he is fighting.

This refinement in the motives of war, is no trifling evidence that they are insufficient or bad. When it is considered how tremendous a battle is, how many it hurries in a moment from the world, how much wretchedness and how much guilt it produces, it would surely appear that nothing but *obvious* necessity should induce us to resort to it. But when, instead of a battle, we have a war with many battles, and of course with multiplied suffering and accumulated guilt, the motives to so dreadful a measure ought to be such as to force themselves upon involuntary observation, and to be written, as it were, in the skies. If, then, a large proportion of a people are often without any distinct perception of the reasons why they are slaughtering mankind, it implies, I think, *prima facie* evidence against the adequacy or the justice of the motives to slaughter.

It would not, perhaps, be affectation to say, that of the reasons why we so readily engage in war, one of the principal is that we do not inquire into the subject. We have been accustomed, from earliest life, to a familiarity with all its "pomp and circumstance;" soldiers have passed us as at every step, and battles and victories have been the topic of every one around us. War, therefore, becomes familiarized to all our thoughts, and interwoven with all our associations. We have never inquired whether these things should be: the question does not even suggest itself. We acquiesce in it, as we acquiesce in the rising of the sun, without any other idea than that it is a part of the ordinary processes of the world. And how are we to feel disapprobation of a system that we do not examine, and of the nature of which we do not think? Want of inquiry has been the means by which long continued practices, whatever has been their enormity, have obtained the general concurrence of the world, and by which they have continued to pollute or degrade it, long after the few who inquire into their nature,

have discovered them to be bad. It was by these means that the slave trade was so long tolerated by this land of humanity. Men did not *think* of its iniquity. We were induced to think, and we soon abhorred, and then abolished it. In the present moral state of the world, therefore, I believe it is the business of him who would perceive pure morality, to question the purity of that which now obtains.

“The vices of another age,” says Robertson, “astonish and shock us; the vices of our own become familiar, and excite little horror.”—“The influence of any national custom, both on the understanding and on the heart, and how far it may go towards perverting or extinguishing moral principles of the greatest importance, is remarkable. They who [in 1566] had leisure to reflect and to judge, appear to be no more shocked at the crime of assassination, than the persons who committed it in the heat and impetuosity of passion.”* Two hundred and fifty years have added something to our morality. We have learnt, at least, to abhor assassination; and I am not afraid to hope that the time will arrive when historians shall think of war, what Robertson thinks of murder, and shall endeavour, like him, to account for the ferocity and moral blindness of their forefathers. For I do not think the influence of habit in the perversion or extinction of our moral principles, is in any other thing so conspicuous or deplorable, as in the subject before us. They who are shocked at a single murder in the highway, hear with indifference of the murder of a thousand on the field.† They whom the idea of a single corpse would thrill with terror, contemplate that of heaps of human carcasses, mangled by human hands, with frigid indifference. If a murder is committed, the narrative is given in the public newspaper, with many expressions of commiseration, with many adjectives of horror, and many hopes that the perpetrator will be detected. In the next paragraph, the editor, perhaps, tells us that he has hurried a second edition to the press, in order that he may be the first to glad the public with the intelligence, that in an engagement which has just taken place, *eight hundred and fifty of the enemy were killed.*‡ By war, the natural impulses of the heart seem to be suspended, as if a fiend of blood were privileged to exercise a spell upon our sensibilities, whenever we contemplated his ravages.

* History of Scotland.

† Note A.

‡ Note B.

Amongst all the shocking and all the terrible scenes the world exhibits, the slaughters of war stand pre-eminent; yet these are the scenes of which the compassionate and the ferocious, the good and the bad, alike talk with complacency or exultation.

England is a land of benevolence, and to human misery she is, of all nations, the most prompt in the extension of relief. The immolations of the Hindoos fill us with compassion or horror, and we are zealously labouring to prevent them. The sacrifices of life by our own criminal executions, are the subject of our anxious commiseration, and we are strenuously endeavouring to diminish their number. We feel that the life of a Hindoo or a malefactor is a serious thing, and that nothing but imperious necessity should induce us to destroy the one, or to permit the destruction of the other. Yet what are these sacrifices of life in comparison with the sacrifices of war? In the late campaign in Russia, there fell, during one hundred and seventy-three days in succession, an average of two thousand nine hundred men per day. More than five hundred thousand human beings in less than six months! And most of these victims expired with peculiar intensity of suffering. "Thou that teachest another, teachest thou not thyself?" We are carrying our benevolence to the Indies, but what becomes of it in Russia or at Leipsic? We are labouring to save a few lives from the gallows, but where is our solicitude to save them on the field? Life is life, wheresoever it be sacrificed, and has every where equal claims to our regard. I am not now inquiring whether war is right, but whether we do not regard its calamities with an indifference with which we regard no others, and whether that indifference does not make us acquiesce in evils and in miseries which we should otherwise prevent or condemn.

Amongst the immediate causes of the frequency of war, there is one which is, indisputably, irreconcilable in its nature with the principles of our religion. I speak of the critical sense of national pride, and consequent aptitude of offence, and violence of resentment. National irritability is at once a cause of war, and an effect. It disposes us to resent injuries with bloodshed and destruction; and a war, when it is begun, inflames and perpetuates the passions that produced it. Those who wish a war, endeavour to rouse

the spirit of a people by stimulating their passions. They talk of the insult, or the encroachments, or the contempts of the destined enemy, with every artifice of aggravation; they tell us of foreigners who want to trample upon our rights, of rivals who ridicule our power, of foes who will crush, and of tyrants who will enslave us. These men pursue their object, certainly, by efficacious means; they desire a war, and therefore irritate our passions, knowing that when men are angry they are easily persuaded to fight.

In this state of irritability, a nation is continually alive to occasions of offence—and when we seek for offences, we readily find them. A jealous sensibility sees insults and injuries where sober eyes see nothing; and nations thus surround themselves with a sort of artificial tentacula, which they throw wide in quest of irritation, and by which they are stimulated to revenge, by every touch of accident or inadvertency.

He that is easily offended will also easily offend. The man who is always on the alert to discover trespasses on his honour or his rights, never fails to quarrel with his neighbours. Such a person may be dreaded as a torpedo. We may fear, but we shall not love him; and fear, without love, easily lapses into enmity. There are, therefore, many feuds and litigations in the life of such a man, that would never have disturbed its quiet, if he had not captiously snarled at the trespasses of accident, and savagely retaliated insignificant injuries. The viper that we chance to molest, we suffer to live if he continues to be quiet; but if he raise himself in menaces of destruction, we knock him on the head.

It is with nations as with men. If, on every offence we fly to arms, and raise the cry of blood, we shall of necessity provoke exasperation; and if we exasperate a people as petulant and bloody as ourselves, we may probably continue to butcher one another, until we cease only from emptiness of exchequers, or weariness of slaughter. To threaten war, is therefore often equivalent to beginning it. In the present state of men's principles, it is not probable that one nation will observe another levying men, and building ships, and founding cannon, without providing men, and ships, and cannon themselves; and when both are thus threatening and defying, what is the hope that there will not be a war?*

* Note C.

It will scarcely be disputed that we should not kill one another unless we cannot help it. Since war is an enormous evil, some sacrifices are expedient for the sake of peace ; and if we consulted our understandings more and our passions less, we should soberly balance the probabilities of mischief, and inquire whether it be not better to endure some evils that we can estimate, than to engage in a conflict of which we can neither calculate the mischief, nor foresee the event ; which may probably conduct us from slaughter to disgrace, and which at last is determined, not by justice, but by power. Pride may declaim against these sentiments ; but my business is not with *pride*, but with *reason* : and I think reason determines that it would be more wise, and religion that it would be less wicked, to diminish our punctiliousness and irritability. If nations fought only when they could not be at peace, there would be very little fighting in the world. The wars that are waged for “insults to flags,” and an endless train of similar motives, are perhaps generally attributable to the irritability of our pride. We are at no pains to appear pacific towards the offender : our remonstrance is a threat : and the nation, which would give satisfaction to an *inquiry*, will give no other answer to a menace than a menace in return. At length we begin to fight, not because we are aggrieved, but because we are angry.

The object of the haughtiness and petulance which one nation uses towards another, is of course to produce some benefit ; to awe into compliance with its demands, or into forbearance from aggression. Now it ought to be distinctly shown, that petulance and haughtiness are more efficacious than calmness and moderation—that an address to the passions of a probable enemy is more likely to avert mischief from ourselves, than an address to their reason and their virtue. Nations are composed of men, and of men with human feelings. Whether with individuals or with communities, “a soft answer turneth away wrath.” There is, indeed, something in the calmness of reason—in an endeavour to convince rather than to intimidate—in an honest solicitude for friendliness and peace, which obtains, which commands, which extorts forbearance and esteem.* This is the privilege of rectitude and truth. It is an inherent quality of their nature ; an evidence of their identity with perfect

* Note D.

wisdom. I believe, therefore, that even as it concerns our *interests*, moderation and forbearance would be the most politic. And let not our *duties* be forgotten; for forbearance and moderation are duties, absolutely and indispensably imposed upon us by Jesus Christ.

The “balance of power” is a phrase with which we are made sufficiently familiar, as one of the great objects of national policy, that must be attained, at whatever cost of treasure or of blood. The support of this balance, therefore, is one of the great purposes of war, and one of the great occasions of its frequency.

It is, perhaps, not idle to remark, that a balance of power amongst nations, is inherently subject to continual interruption. If all the countries of Europe were placed on an equality to-day, they would of necessity become unequal to-morrow. This is the inevitable tendency of human affairs. Thousands of circumstances which sagacity cannot foresee, will continually operate to destroy an equilibrium. Of men, who enter the world with the same possessions and the same prospects, one becomes rich and another poor; one harangues in the senate and another labours in a mine; one sacrifices his life to intemperance and another starves in a garret. How accurately soever we may adjust the strength and consequence of nations to each other, the failure of one harvest, the ravages of one tempest, the ambition of one man, may unequalize them in a moment. It is, therefore, not a trifling argument against this anxious endeavour to attain an equipoise of power, to find that no equipoise can be maintained. When negotiation has followed negotiation, and treaty has been piled upon treaty, and war has succeeded to war—the genius of a Napoleon, or the fate of an armada, nullifies our labours without the possibility of prevention. I do not know how much nations have gained by a balance of power, but it is worth remembrance that some of those countries which have been most solicitous to preserve it, have been most frequently fighting with each other. How many wars has a balance of power prevented, in comparison with the number that have been waged to maintain it?

It is, indeed, deplorable enough, that such a balance is to be desired; and that the wickedness and violence of mankind are so great, that nothing can prevent them from destroying one another, but an equality of the means of destruction. In such a state of malignity and outrage, it need not be dis-

puted, that, if it could be maintained, an equality of strength is sufficiently desirable—as tigers may be restrained from tearing one another by mutual fear, without any want of savageness. It should be remembered, then, that whatever can be said in favour of a balance of power, can be said only because we are wicked; that it derives all its value from our crimes; and that it is wanted only to restrain the outrage of our violence, and to make us contented to growl, when we should otherwise fight.

Wars are often promoted from considerations of interest, as well as from passion. The love of gain adds its influence to our other motives to support them, and without other motives, we know that this love is sufficient to give great obliquity to the moral judgment, and to tempt us to many crimes. During a war of ten years, there will always be many whose income depends on its continuance; and a countless host of commissaries and purveyors, and agents, and mechanics, commend a war, because it fills their pockets. These men have commonly but one question respecting a war, and that is,—whether they get by it. This is the standard of their decision, and this regulates the measure of their support. If money is in prospect, the desolation of a kingdom is of little concern: destruction and slaughter are not to be put in competition with a hundred a year. In truth it seems to be the system of the conductors of a war, to give to the sources of gain every possible ramification. The more there are who profit by it, the more numerous will be its supporters; and thus the wishes of the cabinet become united with the avarice of the people, and both are gratified in slaughter and devastation.

A support more systematic and powerful, is, however, given to war, because it offers to the higher ranks of society, a profession which unites gentility with profit, and which, without the *vulgarity* of trade, maintains or enriches them. It is of little consequence to inquire whether the distinction of vulgarity between the toils of war and the toils of commerce, be fictitious. In the abstract, it is fictitious; but of this species of reputation, public opinion holds the *arbitrium, et jus, et norma*—and public opinion is in favour of war.

The army and the navy, therefore, afford to the middle and higher classes, a most acceptable profession. The profession of arms is like the profession of law or physic—a regular source of employment and profit. Boys are edu-

cated for the army, as they are educated for the bar; and parents appear to have no other idea than that war is part of the business of the world. Of *younger sons*,* whose fathers do not choose to support them at the expense of the heir, the army and the navy are the common resource. They would not know what to do without them. To many of these, the news of a peace becomes a calamity: principle is not powerful enough to cope with interest: They prefer the desolation of the world, to the loss of a colonelcy. It is in this manner that much of the rank, the influence, and the wealth of a country become interested in the promotion of wars; and when a custom is promoted by wealth, and influence, and rank, what is the wonder that it should be continued?

Yet it is a dreadful consideration that the destruction of our fellows should become a business by which to live; and that a man can find no other occupation of gain, than that of butchering his neighbours. It is said, (if my memory serves me, by Sir Walter Raleigh,) "he that taketh up his rest to live by this profession, shall hardly be an honest man."—"Where there is *no obligation to obey*," says Lord Clarendon, "it is a wonderful, and an unnatural appetite, that disposes men to be soldiers, that they may know how to live; and what reputation soever it may have in politics, it can have none in religion, to say, that the art and conduct of a soldier is not infused by nature, but by study, experience, and observation; and therefore that men are to *learn it*:—when, in truth, *this common argument is made by appetite to excuse, and not by reason to support*, an ill custom."† People do not often become soldiers in order to serve their country, but to serve themselves. An income is commonly the motive to the great, and idleness to the poor. To plead the love of our country is therefore hypocrisy; and let it be remembered that hypocrisy is itself an evidence, and an acknowledgment, that the motive which it would disguise, is bad.

By depending upon war for a subsistence, a powerful inducement is given to desire it; and I would submit it to the conscientious part of the profession, that he who desires a war for the sake of its profits, has lost something of his virtue: he has, at least, enlisted one of the most influential

* Note E.

† Lord Clarendon's Essays.

of human propensities against it, and when the prospect of gratification is before him—when the question of war is to be decided—it is to be feared that he will suffer the whispers of interest to prevail, and that humanity, and religion, and his conscience will be sacrificed to promote it. But whenever we shall have learnt the nature of pure Christianity, and have imbibed its dispositions, we shall not be willing to avail ourselves of such a horrible source of profit; nor to contribute to the misery, and wickedness, and destruction of mankind, in order to avoid a false and foolish shame.

It is frequently in the power of individual statesmen to involve a people in a war. “Their restraints,” says Knox, “in the pursuit of political objects, are not those of morality and religion, but solely reasons of state, and political caution. Plausible words are used, but they are used to hide the deformity of the real principles. Wherever war is deemed desirable in an interested view, a specious pretext never yet remained unfound;”^{*}—and “when they have once said what they think convenient, how untruly soever, they proceed to do what they judge will be profitable, how unjustly soever; and this, men very absurdly and unreasonably, would have called *reason of state*, to the discredit of all solid reason, and all rules of probity.”[†] Statesmen have two standards of morality—a social and a political standard. Political morality embraces all crimes; except, indeed, that it has that technical virtue which requires that he who may kill a hundred men with bullets, should not kill one with arsenic. And from this double system of morals it happens, that statesmen who have no restraint to political enormities but political expediency, are sufficiently amiable in private life.—But “probity,” says Bishop Watson, “is an uniform principle; it cannot be put on in our private closet, and put off in the council-chamber or the senate:” and I fear that he who is wicked as a statesman, if he be good as a man, has some other motive to goodness than its love—that he is decent in private life because it is not *expedient* that he should be flagitious. It cannot be hoped that he has much restraint from principle. I believe, however, the time will come, when it will be found that God has instituted but one standard of morality, and that to that standard is required the universal conformity, of nations, and of men.

^{*} Knox’s Essays.

[†] Lord Clarendon’s Essays.

Of the wars of statesmen's ambition, it is not necessary to speak, because no one, to whom the world will listen, is willing to defend them.

But statesmen have, besides ambition, many purposes of nice policy which make wars convenient; and when they have such purposes, they are cool speculators in blood. They who have many dependents have much patronage, and they who have much patronage have much power. By a war, thousands become dependent on a minister; and if he be disposed, he can often pursue schemes of guilt, and intrench himself in unpunished wickedness, because the war enables him to silence the clamor of opposition by an office, and to secure the suffrages of venality by a bribe. He has, therefore, many motives to war, in ambition that does not refer to conquest; or in fear, that extends only to his office or his pocket: and fear or ambition, are sometimes more interesting considerations than the happiness and the lives of men. Or perhaps he wants to immortalize his name by a splendid administration; and he thinks no splendor so great as that of conquest and plunder. Cabinets have, in truth, many secret motives of wars of which the people know little. They talk in public of invasions of right, of breaches of treaty, of the support of honour, of the necessity of retaliation, when these motives have no influence on their determination. Some untold purpose of expediency, or the private quarrel of a prince, or the pique or anger of a minister, are often the real motives to a contest, whilst its promoters are loudly talking of the honour or the safety of the country. The motives to war are indeed without end to their number, or their iniquity, or their insignificance. What was the motive to Xerxes in his invasion of Greece?

It is to be feared that the world has sometimes seen the example of a war, begun and prosecuted for the simple purpose of appeasing the clamors of a people by diverting their attention:

“I well might lodge a fear
To be again displaced; which, to avoid,
I cut them off, and had a purpose now
To lead out many to the Holy Land,
Lest rest and lying still might make them look
Too near into my state. Therefore, my Harry,
Be it thy course to busy giddy minds
With foreign quarrels; that action hence borne out
May waste the memory of former days.”

When the profligacy of a minister, or the unpopularity of his measures, has excited public discontent, he can, perhaps, find no other way of escaping the resentment of the people, than by thus making them forget it. He therefore discovers a pretext for denouncing war on some convenient country, in order to divert the indignation of the public from himself to their new-made enemies. Such wickedness has existed, and may exist again. Surely it is nearly the climax of possible iniquity. I know not whether the records of human infamy present another crime of such enormous, or such abandoned wickedness. A monstrous profligacy or ferocity that must be, which, for the sole purpose of individual interest, enters its closet, and coolly fabricates pretences for slaughter; that quietly contrives the exasperation of the public hatred, and then flings the lighted brands of war amongst the devoted and startling people.

The public, therefore, whenever a war is designed, should diligently inquire into the motives of engaging in it. It should be an inquiry that will not be satisfied with idle declamations on indeterminate dangers, and that is not willing to take any thing upon trust. The public should see the danger for themselves; and if they do not see it, should refuse to be led, blindfold, to murder their neighbours. This, we think, is the public duty, as it is certainly the public interest. It implies a forgetfulness of the ends and purposes of government, and of the just degrees and limitations of obedience, to be hurried into so dreadful a measure as a war, without knowing the reason, or asking it. A people have the power of prevention, and they ought to exercise it. Let me not, however, be charged with recommending violence or resistance. The power of preventing war, consists in the power of *refusing to take part in it*. This is the mode of opposing political evil, which Christianity permits, and in truth, requires. And as it is the most Christian method, so, as it respects war, it were certainly the most efficacious; for it is obvious that war cannot be carried on without the co-operation of the people.

But I believe the greatest cause of the popularity of war, and of the facility with which we engage in it, consists in this; that an idea of glory is attached to military exploits, and of honour to the military profession. Something of elevation is supposed to belong to the character of the soldier; whether it be that we involuntarily presume his per-

sonal courage; or that he who makes it his business to defend the rest of the community, acquires the superiority of a protector; or that the profession implies an exemption from the laborious and the “meaner” occupations of life. There is something in war, whether phantom or reality, which glitters and allures; and the allurements are powerful, since we see that it induces us to endure hardships and injuries, and expose life to a continual danger. Men do not become soldiers because life is indifferent to them, but because of some extrinsic circumstances which attach to the profession; and some of the most influential of these circumstances are the fame, the spirit, the honour, the glory, which mankind agree belong to the warrior. The glories of battle, and of those who perish in it, or who return in triumph to their country, are favourite topics of declamation with the historian, the biographer, and the poet.* They have told us a thousand times of *dying heroes*, who “resign their lives amidst the joys of conquest, and filled with England’s glory, smile in death;” and thus every excitement that eloquence and genius can command, is employed to arouse that ambition of fame which can be gratified only at the expense of blood.

There are many ways in which a soldier derives pleasure from his profession. A military officer,† when he walks the street, is an object of notice;‡ he is a man of *spirit*, of *honour*, of *gallantry*: wherever he be, he is distinguished from ordinary men: he is an acknowledged *gentleman*. If he engage in battle, he is *brave* and *noble*, and *magnanimous*: If he be killed, he has *died for his country*; he has *closed his career with glory*. Now all this is agreeable to the mind; it flatters some of its strongest and most pervading passions; and the gratification which these passions derive from war, is one of the great reasons why men so willingly engage in it.

Now we ask the question of a man of reason, What is the foundation of this fame and glory?—We profess that according to the best of our powers of discovery, no solid foundation can be found. Upon the foundation, whatever it be, an im-

* Note F.

† These observations apply also to the naval profession; but I have in this passage, as in some other parts of the Essay, mentioned only *soldiers*, to prevent circumlocution.

‡ Note G.

mense structure is however raised—a structure so vast, so brilliant, so attractive, that the greater portion of mankind are content to gaze in admiration, without any inquiry into its basis, or any solicitude for its durability.—If, however, it should be, that the gorgeous temple will be able to stand only till Christian truth and light become predominant, it surely will be wise of those who seek a niche in its apartments as their paramount and final good, to pause ere they proceed. If they desire a reputation that shall outlive guilt and fiction, let them look to the basis of military fame. If this fame should one day sink into oblivion and contempt, it will not be the first instance in which wide spread glory has been found to be a glittering bubble, that has burst, and been forgotten. Look at the days of chivalry. Of the ten thousand Quixottes of the middle ages, where is now the honour or the name? Yet poets once sang their praises, and the chronicler of their achievements believed he was recording an everlasting fame. Where are now the glories of the tournament? Glories

“Of which all Europe rung from side to side.”

Where is the champion whom princesses caressed, and nobles envied? Where are now the triumphs of Duns Scotus, and where are the folios that *perpetuated* his fame?—The glories of war have indeed outlived these: Human passions are less mutable than human follies; but I am willing to avow my conviction that these glories are alike destined to sink into forgetfulness; and that the time is approaching, when the applauses of heroism, and the splendours of conquest, will be remembered only as follies and iniquities that are past.—Let him who seeks for fame, other than that which an era of Christian purity will allow,—make haste; for every hour that he delays its acquisition will shorten its duration. This is certain if there be certainty in the promises of Heaven.*

In inquiring into the foundation of military glory, it will be borne in mind, that it is acknowledged by our adversaries, that this glory *is not recognized by Christianity*. No part of the heroic character, says one of the great advocates of war, is the subject of the “commendation or precepts or example” of Christ; but the character and dispositions most

opposite to the heroic, are the subject of them all.* This is a great concession; and it surely is the business of Christians, who are sincere in their profession, to doubt the purity of that "glory" and the rectitude of that "heroic character," which it is acknowledged that their Great Instructor, never in any shape countenanced, and often obliquely condemned.

If it be attempted to define *why* glory is allotted to the soldier, we suppose that we shall be referred to his skill, or his bravery, or his patriotism.

Of *skill*, it is not necessary to speak, since very few have the opportunity of displaying it. The business of the great majority is only obedience; and obedience of that sort which almost precludes the exercise of talent.

The rational and immortal being, who raises the edifice of his fame on simple *bravery*, has chosen but an unworthy and a frail foundation. Separate bravery from motives and purposes, and what will remain but that which is possessed by a mastiff or a game-cock? All just, all rational, and we will venture to affirm, all permanent reputation, refers to the mind or to virtue; and what connexion has animal power or animal hardihood with intellect or goodness? I do not decry *courage*. I know that He who was better acquainted than we are with the nature and worth of human actions, attached much value to courage—but he attached none to bravery.—Courage He recommended by his precepts, and enforced by his example:—Bravery he never recommended at all. The wisdom of this distinction, and its accordancy with the principles of his religion, are plain. Bravery requires the existence of many of those dispositions which he disallowed. Animosity, resentment, the desire of retaliation, the disposition to injure and destroy, all this is necessary to bravery; but all this is incompatible with Christianity. The courage which Christianity requires, is, to bravery, what fortitude is to daring—an effort of the mind rather than of the spirits. It is a calm, steady determinateness of purpose, that will not be diverted by solicitation, or awed by fear. "Behold, I go bound in the spirit unto Jerusalem, not knowing the things that shall befall me there, save that the Holy Ghost witnesseth in every city, saying, that bonds and afflic-

* Dr. Paley.

"Christianity quite annihilates the disposition for martial glory."—*Bishop Watson*.

tions abide me. *But none of these things move me ; neither count I my life dear unto myself.*"* What resemblance has bravery to courage like this ? This courage is a virtue and a virtue which it is difficult to acquire or to practise : and we have, therefore, heedlessly or ingeniously, transferred its praise to another quality, which is inferior in its nature, and easier to acquire, in order that we may obtain the reputation of virtue at a cheap rate. That simple bravery implies much merit, it will be difficult to show—at least, if it be meritorious, we think it will not always be easy in awarding the honours of a battle, to determine the preponderance of virtue between the soldier and the horse which carries him.

But *patriotism* is the great foundation of the soldier's glory. Patriotism is the universal theme. To "fight nobly for our country ;"—to "fall, covered with glory, in our country's cause ;"—to "sacrifice our lives for the liberties, and laws and religion of our country"—are phrases in the mouth of every man.—What do they mean, and to whom do they apply ?

We contend that to say generally of those who perish in war, that "they have died for their country," is simply untrue ; and for this simple reason, that they did not fight for it. To impugn the notion of ages, is perhaps a hardy task : but we wish to employ not dogmatism but argument : and we maintain that men have commonly no such purity of motive, that they have no such patriotism. What is the officer's motive to entering the army ? We appeal to himself.—Is it not *that he may obtain an income* ? And what is the motive of the private ? Is it not *that he prefers a life of idleness to industry*, or that he had no wish but *the wish for change* ?—Having entered the army, what, again, is the soldier's motive to fight ? Is it not that fighting is a part of his business—that it is one of the conditions of his servitude ?—We are not now saying that these motives are bad, but we are saying that they *are* the motives,—and that patriotism is *not*.† Of those who fall in battle, is there one in a hundred who even thinks of his country's good ? He thinks, perhaps, of its glory, and of the honour of his regiment, but for his country's advantage or welfare, he has no care and no thought. He fights, because fighting is a matter

* Acts xx. 22.

† Note I.

of course to a soldier, or because his personal reputation is at stake, or because he is compelled to fight, or because he thinks nothing at all of the matter ; but seldom, indeed, because he wishes to benefit his country. He fights in battle, as a horse draws in a carriage, because he is compelled to do it, or because he has done it before ; but he seldom thinks more of his country's good, than the same horse, if he were carrying corn to a granary, would think he was providing for the comforts of his master.

And, indeed, if the soldier speculated on his country's good, he often cannot tell how it is affected by the quarrel. Nor is it to be expected of him that he should know this. When there is a rumour of a war, there is an endless diversity of opinions as to its expediency, and endless oppositions of conclusion, whether it will tend more to the good of the country, to prosecute or avoid it. If senators and statesmen cannot calculate the good or evil of a war, if one promises advantages and another predicts ruin, how is the soldier to decide ? And without deciding and promoting the *good*, how is he to be patriotic ? Nor will much be gained by saying, that questions of policy form no part of his business, and that he has no other duty than obedience ; since this is to reduce his agency to the agency of a machine : and, moreover, by this rule his arms might be directed, indifferently, to the annoyance of another country, or to the oppression of his own. The truth is, that we give to the soldier, that of which we are wont to be sufficiently sparing—a *gratuitous* concession of merit. In ordinary life, an individual maintains his individual opinions, and pursues correspondent conduct, with the approbation of one set of men, and the censures of another.—One party says, he is benefiting his country, and another maintains that he is ruining it. But the soldier, for whatever he fights, and whether really in promotion of his country's good, or in opposition to it, is always a patriot, and is always secure of his praise. If the war is a national calamity, and was foreseen to be such, still he *fights for his country* : If his judgment has decided against the war, and against its justice or expediency, still he *fights for his country*. He is always virtuous :—If he but uses a bayonet, he is always a patriot.

To sacrifice our lives for the liberties, and laws, and religion of our native land, are undoubtedly high-sounding words :—but who are they that will do it ? Who is it that

will sacrifice his life for his country? Will the senator who supports a war? Will the writer who declaims upon patriotism? Will the minister of religion who recommends the sacrifice?—Take away glory—take away *war*, and there is not a man of them who will do it. Will you sacrifice your life at *home*?—If the loss of your life in London or at York, would procure just so much benefit to your country, as the loss of one soldier in the field, would you be willing to lay your head upon the block? Are you willing to die without notice and without remembrance; and for the sake of this little undiscoverable contribution to your country's good? You would, perhaps, die to *save* your country; but this is not the question. A soldier's death does not save his country. The question is, whether, without any of the circumstances of war, without any of its glory or its pomp, you are willing to resign yourself to the executioner. If you are not, you are not willing to die for your country: And there is not an individual amongst the thousands who declaim upon patriotism, who is willing to do it. He will lay down his life, indeed—but it must be in war: He is willing to die—but it is not for patriotism, but for glory.

The argument we think is clear—that patriotism is NOT the motive; and that in no rational use of language can it be said that the soldier “dies for his country.” Men will not sacrifice their lives at all, unless it be in war, and they do not sacrifice them in war from motives of patriotism.*

What then is the foundation of military fame? Is it

* We know that there may be, and have been, cases in which the soldier possesses purer motives. An invasion may arouse the national patriotism and arm a people for the unmingled purpose of defending themselves. Here is a definite purpose, a purpose which every individual understands and is interested in: and if he die under such circumstances, we do not deny that his motives are patriotic.† The actions to which they prompt, are, however, a separate consideration, and depend for their qualities on the rectitude of war itself. Motives may be patriotic, when actions are bad. I might, perhaps, benefit my country by blowing up a fleet, of which the cargo would injure our commerce: My motive may be patriotic, but my action is vicious.

It is not sufficiently borne in mind, that patriotism, even much purer than this, is not necessarily a virtue. “Christianity,” says Bishop Watson, “does not encourage particular patriotism, in opposition to general benignity.” And the reason is easy of discovery. Christianity is designed to benefit, not a community,

† Note J.

bravery? Bravery has little connexion with reason, and less with religion: Intellect may despise, and Christianity condemns it. Is it patriotism? Do we refer to the soldier's motives and purposes? If we do, he is not necessarily, or often, a patriot.—It was a common expression amongst sailors, and, perhaps, may be so still—"I hate the French, because they are slaves, and wear wooden shoes."—This was the sum of their reasonings and their patriotism; and I do not think the mass of those who fight on land, possess a greater.

Crimes should be traced to their causes; and guilt should be fixed upon those who occasion, although they may not perpetrate them. And to whom are the frequency and the crimes of war to be principally attributed? To the directors of public opinion, to the declaimers upon glory:—to men who sit quietly at home, in their studies and at their desks; to the historian and the biographer, and the poet, and the moral philosopher; to the pamphleteer; to the editor of the newspaper; to the teacher of religion.* One example of declamation from the pulpit, I would offer to the reader:—
 "Go then, ye defenders of your country; advance with alacrity, into the field, where God himself musters the hosts to war. Religion is too much interested in your success, not to lend you her aid. She will shed over this enterprise her selectest influence.—I cannot but imagine, the virtuous heroes, legislators, and patriots, of every age and country, are bending from their elevated seats to witness this contest, as if they were incapable, till it be brought to a favourable issue, of enjoying their eternal repose. Enjoy that repose, illustrious immortals! Your mantle fell when you ascended, and thousands, inflamed with spirit, and impatient to tread in your steps, are ready to swear by Him that sitteth upon the throne, and liveth for ever and ever, they will protect freedom in her last asylum, and never desert that cause which you sustained by your labours, and cemented with your blood. And thou, sole Ruler among the children of men, to whom the shields of the earth belong,—Gird on thy but the world. If it unconditionally encouraged particular patriotism, the duties of a subject of one state would often be in opposition to those of a subject of another. Christianity, however, knows no such inconsistencies: And whatever patriotism therefore is opposed, in its exercise, to the *general welfare of mankind*, is, in no degree, a virtue.

* Note K.

sword, thou most Mighty: Go forth with our hosts in the day of battle! Impart, in addition to their hereditary valour, that confidence of success which springs from thy presence! Pour into their hearts the spirit of departed heroes! Inspire them with thine own; and while led by thine hand, and fighting under thy banners, open thou their eyes to behold in every valley, and in every plain, what the prophet beheld by the same Illumination—chariots of fire, and horses of fire. Then shall the strong man be as tow, and the maker of it as a spark; and they shall both burn together, and none shall quench them!"* Of such irreverence of language, employed to convey such violence of sentiment, the world, I hope, has had few examples. Oh! how unlike another exhortation—"Put on mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long suffering, forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any."†

"As long as mankind," says Gibbon, "shall continue to bestow more liberal applause on their destroyers than on their benefactors, the thirst of military glory will ever be the vice of the most exalted characters."‡ "'Tis strange to imagine," says the Earl of Shaftesbury, "that war, which of all things appears the most savage, should be the passion

* "The sentiments proper to the Crisis.—A Sermon, preached October 19, 1803, by Robert Hall, A. M."

† Nor is the preacher inconsistent with *Apostles* alone. He is also inconsistent with himself. In another discourse, delivered in the preceding year, he says: "The safety of nations is *not to be sought* in arts or in arms.—*War reverses*, with respect to its objects, *all the rules of morality*. It is nothing less than a temporary repeal of all the principles of virtue. It is a system, out of which almost all the virtues are excluded, and in which nearly all the vices are incorporated.—In instructing us to consider a portion of our fellow creatures as the proper objects of enmity, it removes, as far as they are concerned, the basis of all society, of all civilization and virtue; for the basis of these, is the good will due to every individual of the species." "Religion," then, we are told, "sheds its selectest influence over that, which repeals all the principles of virtue"—over that, "in which nearly all the vices are incorporated!" What "Religion" it is which does this, I do not know,—but I know that it is not the religion of Christ.—TRUTH never led into contradictions like these. Well was it said that we cannot serve two masters. The quotations which we have given, are evidence sufficient that he who *holds with the one, neglects the other*.

‡ Decline and Fall.

of the most heroic spirits."—But he gives us the reason.—“By a small *misguidance of the affection*, a lover of mankind becomes a ravager; a hero and deliverer becomes an oppressor and destroyer.”* This is the “vice,” and this is the “misguidance,” which we say, that a large proportion of the writers of every civilized country are continually occasioning and promoting; and thus, without, perhaps, any purpose of mischief, they contribute more to the destruction of mankind than rapine or ambition. A writer thinks, perhaps, that it is not much harm to applaud bravery. The divergency from virtue may, indeed, be small in its beginning, but the effect of his applauses proceeds in the line of obliquity, until it conducts, at last, to every excess of outrage, to every variety of crime, to every mode of human destruction.

There is one species of declamation on the glories of those who die in battle, to which I would beg the notice of the reader. We are told that when the last breath of exultation and defiance is departed, *the intrepid spirit rises triumphantly from the field of glory to its kindred heavens*. What the hero has been on earth, it matters not: if he dies by a musket ball, he enters heaven in his own right. All men like to suppose that they shall attain felicity at last; and to find that they can attain it without goodness and in spite of vice, is doubtless peculiarly solacing. The history of the hero's achievements, wants, indeed, a completeness without it; and this gratuitous transfer of his soul to heaven, forms an agreeable conclusion to his story.

I would be far from “dealing damnation round the land,” and undoubtingly believe that of those who fall in battle, many have found an everlasting resting-place. But an indiscriminate consignment of the brave to felicity, is certainly unwarranted; and if wickedness consists in the promotion of wickedness, it is wicked too.

If we say in positive and glowing language, of men indiscriminately, and therefore of the bad, that they *rise on the wings of ecstasy to heaven*, we do all that language can do in the encouragement of profligacy. The terrors of religion may still be dreaded; but we have, at least, to the utmost of our power, diminished their influence. The mind willingly accepts the assurance, or acquiesces in the falsehood which

* Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour.

it wishes to be true; and in spite of all their better knowledge, it may be feared that some continue in profligacy, in the doubting hope that what poets and historians tell them, may not be a fiction.

Perhaps the most operative encouragement which these declamations give to the soldier's vices, is contained in this circumstance—that they manifest that public opinion does not hold them in abhorrence. Public opinion is one of the most efficacious regulators of the passions of mankind; and upon the soldier this rein is peculiarly influential. His profession and his personal conduct derive almost all their value and their reputation from the opinion of the world, and from that alone. If, therefore, the public voice does not censure his vices—if, in spite of his vices, it awards him everlasting happiness, what restraint remains upon his passions, or what is the wonder if they be not restrained?

The peculiar application of the subject to our purpose, is, however, that these and similar representations are motives to the profession of arms. The military life is made a privileged profession, in which a man may indulge vices with impunity. His occupation is an apology for his crimes, and shields them from punishment. And what greater motive to the military life can be given? Or what can be more atrocious than the crime of those who give it? I know not, indeed, whether the guilt predominates, or the folly. Pitiableness surely it is, that can persuade itself to sacrifice all the beauties of Virtue, and all the realities and terrors of Religion, to the love of the flowing imagery of *Spirits ascending to heaven*. Whether writers shall do this, is a question, not of choice, but of duty: If we would not be the abettors of crime, and the sharers of its guilt, it is imperative that we refrain.

The reader will, perhaps, have observed, that some of those writers who are liberal contributors to the military passion, occasionally, in moments when truth and nature seem to have burst the influence of habit, emphatically condemn the system which they have so often contributed to support. There are not many books of which the tendency is more warlike, or which are more likely to stimulate the passion for martial glory, than the life of Nelson, by Southey; a work, in the composition of which, it probably never suggested itself to the author to inquire whether he were not contributing to the destruction of mankind. A contributor,

however, as he has been, we find in another of his works, this extraordinary and memorable passage:—"There is but one community of Christians in the world, and that unhappily, of all communities one of the smallest, enlightened enough to understand the *prohibition of war by our Divine Master*, in its *plain, literal, and undeniable sense*: and conscientious enough to obey it, subduing the very instinct of nature to obedience."* Of these voluntary, or involuntary, testimonies of the mind against the principles which it habitually possesses, and habitually inculcates, many examples might be given;† and they are valuable testimonies, because they appear to be elicited by the influence of simple nature and unclouded truth. This, I think, is their obvious character. They will commonly be found to have been written when the mind has become sobered by reason, or tranquilized by religion; when the feelings are not excited by external stimulants, and when conquest, and honour, and glory, are reduced to that station of importance to which Truth assigns them.

But whether such testimonies have much tendency to give conviction to a reader, I know not. Surrounded as they are with a general contrariety of sentiment, it is possible that those who read them may pass them by as the speculations of impracticable morality. I cannot, however, avoid recommending the reader, whenever he meets with passages like these, seriously to examine into their meaning and their force; to inquire whether they be not accordant with the purity of truth, and whether they do not possess the greater authority, because they have forced themselves from the mind when least likely to be deceived, and in opposition to all its habits and all its associations.

Such, then, are amongst the principal of the causes of war.—Some consist in want of thought, and some in delusion; some are mercenary, and some simply criminal. Whether any or all of them, form a motive to the desolation of empires and to human destruction, such as a good or a reasoning man, who abstracts himself from habitual feelings, can contemplate with approbation, is a question which every one should ask and determine for himself. A conflict of nations is a serious thing: No motive arising from our passions should occasion it, or have any influence in occa-

* History of Brazil.

† See "The Inquiry, &c."

sioning it: Supposing the question of *lawfulness* to be superseded, war should be imposed only by stern, inevitable, unyielding necessity. That such a necessity is contained in these motives, I think cannot be shown. We may, therefore, reasonably question the defensibility of the custom, which is continued by such causes, and supported with such motives. If a tree is known by its fruits, we may also judge of the fruit by the tree: "Men do not gather grapes of thorns." If the motives to war, and its causes are impure, war itself cannot be virtuous; and I would, therefore, solemnly invite the reader to give, to the succeeding Inquiry, his sober and Christian attention.

PART II.

AN INQUIRY, &c.

WHEN I endeavour to divest myself of the influence of habit, and to contemplate a battle with those emotions which it would excite in the mind of a being who had never before heard of human slaughter, I find that I am impressed only with horror and astonishment: and, perhaps, of the two emotions, astonishment is the greatest.

That several thousand persons should meet together, and then deliberately begin to kill one another, appears to the understanding, a proceeding so preposterous, so monstrous, that I think a being, such as I have supposed, would inevitably conclude that they were mad. Nor, if it were attempted to explain to him some motives to such conduct, do I believe that he would be able to comprehend how any possible circumstances could make it reasonable. The ferocity and prodigious folly of the act, would out-balance the weight of every conceivable motive, and he would turn, unsatisfied away,

“Astonished at the madness of mankind.”

There is an advantage in making suppositions such as these; because, when the mind has been familiarised to a practice, however monstrous or inhuman, it loses some of its sagacity of moral perception—profligacy becomes honour, and inhumanity becomes spirit. But if the subject is by some circumstance presented to the mind unconnected with any of its previous associations, we see it with a new judgment and new feelings; and wonder, perhaps, that we have not felt so or thought so, before. And such occasions it is the part of a wise man to seek; since if they never hap-

pen to us, it will often be difficult for us accurately to estimate the qualities of human actions, or to determine whether we approve them from a decision of our judgment, or whether we yield to them only the acquiescence of habit.

It is worthy, at least, of notice and remembrance, that the only being in the creation of Providence which engages in the wholesale destruction of his own species, is man; that being who alone possesses reason to direct his conduct, who alone is required to love his fellows, and who alone hopes, in futurity, for repose and peace. All this seems wonderful, and may reasonably humiliate us. The powers which elevate us above the rest of the creation, we have employed in attaining to pre-eminence of outrage and malignity.

It may properly be a subject of wonder, that the arguments which are brought to justify a custom such as war, receive so little investigation. It must be a studious ingenuity of mischief, which could devise a practice more calamitous or horrible? and yet it is a practice of which it rarely occurs to us to inquire into the necessity, or to ask whether it cannot be, or ought not to be avoided. In one truth, however, all will acquiesce,—that the arguments in favour of such a practice should be unanswerably strong.

Let it not be said that the experience and the practice of other ages, have superseded the necessity of inquiry in our own; that there can be no reason to question the lawfulness of that which has been sanctioned by forty centuries; or that he who presumes to question it, is amusing himself with schemes of visionary philanthropy. “There is not, it may be,” says Lord Clarendon, “a greater obstruction to the investigation of truth, or the improvement of knowledge, than the too frequent appeal, and the too supine resignation of our understanding, to antiquity.”* Whosoever proposes an alteration of existing institutions, will meet, from some men, with a sort of instinctive opposition, which appears to be influenced by no process of reasoning, by no considerations of propriety, or principles of rectitude, which defends the existing system because it exists, and which would have equally defended its opposite if that had been the oldest. “Nor is it out of modesty that we have this resignation, or that we do, in truth, think those who have gone before us to be wiser than ourselves: we are as proud and as peevish as any of our pro-

* Lord Clarendon's Essays.

genitors; but it is out of laziness; we will rather take their words, than take the pains to examine the reason they governed themselves by.”* To those who urge objections from the authority of ages, it is, indeed, a sufficient answer to say, that they apply to every long continued custom. Slave dealers urged them against the friends of the abolition; Papists urged them against Wickliffe and Luther; and the Athenians probably thought it a good objection to an Apostle, that “he seemed to be a setter forth of *strange* gods.”

It is agreed by all sober moralists, that the foundation of our duty is the will of God, and that his will is to be ascertained by the Revelation which he has made. To Christianity, therefore, we refer in determination of this great question: We admit no other test of truth: and with him who thinks that the decisions of Christianity may be superseded by other considerations, we have no concern; we address not our argument to him, but leave him to find some other and better standard, by which to adjust his principles, and regulate his conduct. These observations apply to those objectors who loosely say that “wars are necessary; for supposing the Christian religion to prohibit war, it is preposterous, and irreverent also, to justify ourselves in supporting it, because “it is necessary.” To talk of a Divine law which *must be disobeyed*, implies, indeed, such a confusion of moral principles as well as laxity of them, that neither the philosopher nor the Christian, are required to notice it. But, perhaps, some of those who say that wars are necessary, do not very accurately inquire what they mean. There are two sorts of necessity—moral and physical; and these, it is probable, some men are accustomed to confound. That there is any *physical* necessity for war—that people cannot, if they choose, refuse to engage in it, no one will maintain: And a *moral* necessity to perform an action, consists only in the prospect of a certain *degree* of evil by refraining from it. If, then, those who say that “wars are necessary,” mean that they are physically necessary, we deny it. If they mean that wars avert greater evils than they occasion, we ask for proof. Proof has never yet been given: And even if we thought that we possessed such proof, we should still be referred to the primary question—“What is the will of God?”

* Lord Clarendon's Essays.

It is some satisfaction to be able to give, on a question of this nature, the testimony of some great minds against the lawfulness of war, opposed, as those testimonies are, to the general prejudice and the general practice of the world. It has been observed by Beccaria, that "it is the fate of great truths, to glow only like a flash of lightning amidst the dark clouds in which error has enveloped the universe; and if our testimonies are few or transient, it matters not, so that their light be the light of truth. There are, indeed, many, who in describing the horrid particulars of a siege or a battle, indulge in some declamation on the horrors of war, such as has been often repeated, and often applauded, and as often forgotten. But such declamations are of little value and of little effect: he who reads the next paragraph, finds, probably, that he is invited to follow the path *to glory and to victory—to share the hero's danger and partake the hero's praise*; and he soon discovers that the moralizing parts of his author, are the impulse of feelings rather than of principles, and thinks that though it may be very well to write, yet it is better to forget them.

There are, however, testimonies, delivered in the calm of reflection, by acute and enlightened men, which may reasonably be allowed at least so much weight as to free the present inquiry from the charge of being wild or visionary. Christianity indeed needs no such auxiliaries; but if they induce an examination of her duties, a wise man will not wish them to be disregarded.

"They who defend war," says Erasmus, "must defend the dispositions which lead to war; and *these dispositions are absolutely forbidden by the gospel*.—Since the time that Jesus Christ said put up thy sword into its scabbard, *Christians ought not to go to war*.—Christ suffered Peter to fall into an error in this matter, on purpose that, when He had put up Peter's sword, it might remain *no longer a doubt that war was prohibited*, which, before that order, had been considered as allowable."—"I am persuaded," says the Bishop of Llandaff, "*that when the spirit of Christianity shall exert its proper influence over the minds of individuals, and especially over the minds of public men in their public capacities, over the minds of men constituting the councils of princes, from whence are the issues of peace and war—when this happy period shall arrive, war will*

cease throughout the whole Christian world."* "War," says the same acute prelate, "has practices and principles peculiar to itself, *which but ill quadrate with the rule of moral rectitude, and are quite abhorrent from the benignity of Christianity.*"† The emphatical declaration which I have already quoted for another purpose, is yet more distinct. *The prohibition of war by our Divine Master, is plain, literal, and undeniable.*‡ Dr. Vicesimus Knox speaks in language equally specific:—"Morality and Religion forbid war, in its motives, conduct, and consequences."§

In an inquiry into the decisions of Christianity upon the question of war, we have to refer—to the general tendency of the revelation; to the individual declarations of Jesus Christ; to his practice; to the sentiments and practices of his commissioned followers; to the opinions respecting its lawfulness, which were held by their immediate converts; and to some other species of Christian evidence.

It is, perhaps, the capital error of those who have attempted to instruct others in the duties of morality, that they have not been willing to enforce the rules of the Christian Scriptures in their full extent. Almost every moralist pauses somewhere, short of the point which they prescribe; and this pause is made at a greater or less distance from the Christian Standard, in proportion to the admission, in a greater or less degree, of principles which have been super-added to the principles of the gospel. Few, however, supersede the laws of Christianity, without proposing some principle of "expediency," some doctrine of "natural law," some theory of "intrinsic decency and turpitude," which they lay down as the true standard of moral judgment.—They who reject truth are not likely to escape error. Having mingled with Christianity principles which it never taught, we are not likely to be consistent with Truth, or with ourselves; and, accordingly, he who seeks for direction from the professed teachers of morality, finds his mind bewildered in conflicting theories, and his judgment embarrassed by contradictory instructions.—But "Wisdom is justified by all her children:" and she is justified, perhaps, by nothing more evidently than by the laws which she has im-

* Life of Bishop Watson.

† Southey's History of Brazil.

‡ Ib.

§ Essays.

posed ; for *all* who have proposed any standard of rectitude, other than that which Christianity has laid down, or who have admixed any foreign principles with the principles which she teaches, have hitherto proved that they have only been “sporting themselves with their own deceivings.”*

It is a remarkable fact, that the laws of the Mosaic Dispensation, which, confessedly, was an imperfect system, are laid down clearly and specifically in the form of an express code ; whilst those of that purer religion which Jesus Christ introduced into the world, are only to be found, casually and incidentally scattered, as it were, through a volume—intermixed with other subjects—elicited by unconnected events—delivered at distant periods, and for distant purposes, in narratives, in discourses, in conversations, in letters. Into the final purpose of such an ordination, (for an ordination it must be supposed to be,) it is not our present business to inquire. One important truth, however, results from the fact as it exists :—That those who would form a general estimate of the moral obligations of Christianity, must derive it, not from *Codes* but from *Principles* ; not from a multiplicity of directions in what manner we are to act, but from instructions respecting the motives and dispositions by which all actions are to be regulated.†

It appears, therefore, to follow, that in the inquiry whether war is sanctioned by Christianity, a specific declaration of its decision is not likely to be found. If, then, we be asked for a prohibition of war by Jesus Christ, in the express terms of a command, in the manner in which *Thou shalt not kill* is directed to murder, we willingly answer that no such prohibition exists :—and it is not necessary to the argument. Even those who would require such a prohibition, are themselves satisfied respecting the obligation of many negative duties, on which there has been no specific decision in the New Testament. They believe that suicide

* “Even thinking men, bewildered by the various and contradictory systems of moral judgment, adopted by different ages and nations, have doubted the existence of any real and permanent standard, and have considered it as the mere creature of habit and education.”§—How has the declaration been verified—“I will destroy the wisdom of the wise.

† I refer, of course, to those questions of morality which are not specifically decided.

§ Murray's *Inquiries respecting the Progress of Society*.

is not lawful. Yet Christianity never forbade it. It can be shown, indeed, by implication and inference, that suicide could not have been allowed, and with this they are satisfied. Yet there is, probably, in the Christian Scriptures, not a twentieth part of as much indirect evidence against the lawfulness of suicide as there is against the lawfulness of war. To those who require such a command as *Thou shalt not engage in war*, it is therefore sufficient to reply, that they require that, which upon this and upon many other subjects, Christianity has not chosen to give.

We refer then, first, to the general nature of Christianity ; because we think that if there were no other evidence against the lawfulness of war, we should possess, in that general nature, sufficient proof that it is virtually forbidden.

That the whole character and spirit of our religion are eminently and peculiarly peaceful, and that it is opposed, in all its principles to carnage and devastation, cannot be disputed.

Have peace one with another.—By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another.

Walk with all lowliness and meekness, with long-suffering, forbearing one another in love.

Be ye all of one mind, having compassion one of another ; love as brethren, be pitiful, be courteous, not rendering evil for evil, or railing for railing.

Be at peace among yourselves. See that none render evil for evil to any man.—God hath called us to peace.

Follow after love, patience, meekness.—Be gentle, showing all meekness unto all men.—Live in peace.

Lay aside all malice.—Put off anger, wrath, malice.—Let all bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and clamour, and evil speaking be put away from you, with all malice.

Avenge not yourselves.—If thine enemy hunger, feed him ; if he thirst, give him drink.—Recompense to no man evil for evil.—Overcome evil with good.

Now we ask of any man who looks over these passages, what evidence do they convey respecting the lawfulness of war ? Could any approval or allowance of it have been subjoined to these instructions, without obvious and most gross inconsistency ?—But if war is obviously and most grossly inconsistent with the general character of Christianity—if war could not have been permitted by its teachers,

without any egregious violation of their own precepts, we think that the evidence of its unlawfulness, *arising from this general character alone*, is as clear, as absolute, and as exclusive, as could have been contained in any form of prohibition whatever.

To those solemn, discriminative, and public declarations of Jesus Christ, which are contained in the "sermon on the mount," a reference will necessarily be made upon this great question; and, perhaps, more is to be learnt from these declarations, of the moral duties of his religion, than from any other part of his communications to the world. It should be remarked in relation to the injunctions which follow, that he repeatedly refers to that less pure and less peaceable system of morality, which the law of Moses had inculcated and contradistinguishes it from his own.

"Ye have heard that it *hath* been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, but *I* say unto you that ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also."—"Ye have heard that it *hath* been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy; but *I* say unto you, Love your enemies; bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you; for if ye love them only which love you, what reward have ye?"*

There is an extraordinary emphasis in the form of these prohibitions and injunctions. They are not given in an insulated manner. They inculcate the obligations of Christianity as *peculiar* to itself. The previous system of retaliation is introduced for the purpose of prohibiting it, and of distinguishing more clearly and forcibly the pacific nature of the new dispensation.

Of the precepts from the mount the most obvious characteristic is greater moral excellence and superior purity. They are directed, not so immediately to the external regulation of the conduct, as to the restraint and purification of the affections. In another precept† it is not enough that an unlawful passion be just so far restrained as to produce no open immorality—the passion itself is forbidden. The tendency of the discourse is to attach guilt not to action only, but also to *thought*. It has been said, Thou shalt not kill,

* Matt. v. &c.

† Matt. v. 28.

and whosoever shall kill, shall be in danger of the judgment; but *I* say that whosoever is *angry* with his brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the judgment.* Our lawgiver attaches guilt to some of the violent feelings, such as resentment, hatred, revenge; and by doing this, we contend that he attaches guilt to war. War cannot be carried on without these passions which he prohibits. Our argument therefore is syllogistical. War cannot be allowed, if that which is necessary to war, is prohibited.

It was sufficient for the law of Moses, that men maintained love towards their neighbours; towards an enemy they were at liberty to indulge rancour and resentment. But Christianity says, "If ye love them only which love you, what reward have ye?—Love your enemies." Now what sort of love does that man bear towards his enemy, who runs him through with a bayonet? We contend that the distinguishing duties of Christianity must be sacrificed when war is carried on. The question is between the abandonment of these duties and the abandonment of war, for both cannot be retained.†

It is however objected that the prohibitions "Resist not evil," &c. are figurative; and that they do not mean that no injury is to be punished, and no outrage to be repelled. It has been asked with complacent exultation, what would these advocates of peace say to him who struck them on the right cheek? Would they turn to him the other? What would these patient moralists say to him who robbed them of a coat? Would they give him a cloak also? What would these philanthropists say to him who asked them to lend a hundred pounds? Would they not turn away? This is *argumentum ad hominem*; one example amongst the many, of that lowest and most dishonest of all modes of intellectual warfare, which consists in exciting the feelings instead of convincing the understanding. It is, however, some satisfaction, that the motive to the adoption of this mode of warfare, is itself an evidence of a bad cause; for what honest

* Matt. v. 22.

† Yet the retention of both has been, unhappily enough, attempted. In a late publication, of which part is devoted to the defence of war, the author gravely recommends soldiers, whilst shooting and stabbing their enemies, to maintain towards them a feeling of "good will!"—*Tracts and Essays by the late William Hey, Esq. F. R. S.*

also W. E. Channing's Sermon on War.

reasoner would produce only a laugh, if he were able to produce conviction. But I must ask in my turn, what do these objectors say *is* the meaning of the precepts? What *is* the meaning of "Resist not evil?" Does it mean to allow bombardment—devastation—murder? If it does not mean to allow all this, it does not mean to allow war. What again do the objectors say is the meaning of "Love your enemies," or of "do good to them that hate you?" Does it mean "ruin their commerce"—"sink their fleets"—"plunder their cities"—shoot through their hearts?" If the precept does not mean all this, it does not mean war. We are, then, not required to define what exceptions Christianity may admit to the application of some of the precepts from the Mount; since, whatever exceptions she may allow, it is manifest what she does *not* allow: for if we give to our objectors whatever license of interpretation they may desire, they cannot, either by honesty or dishonesty, so interpret the precepts as to make them allow *war*. I would, however, be far from insinuating that we are left without any means of determining the degree and kind of resistance, which, in some cases, is lawful; although I believe no specification of it can be *previously laid down*: For if the precepts of Christianity had been multiplied a thousand-fold, there would still have arisen many cases of daily occurrence, to which none of them would precisely have applied. Our business, then, *so far as written rules are concerned*, is, in all cases to which these rules do not apply, to regulate our conduct by those general principles and dispositions which our religion enjoins. I say, *so far as written rules are concerned*; for "if any man lack wisdom," and these rules do not impart it, "let him ask of God."*

Of the injunctions that are contrasted with "eye for eye, and tooth for tooth," the entire scope and purpose is the suppression of the violent passions, and the inculcation of forbearance, and forgiveness, and benevolence, and love. They forbid, not specifically the act, but the spirit of war; and this

* It is manifest, from the New Testament, that we are not required to give "a cloak," in *every* case to him who robs us of "a coat;" but I think it is equally manifest that we are required to give it *not the less* because he has robbed us: The circumstance of his having robbed us, does not entail an obligation to give; but it also does not impart a permission to withhold. If the necessities of the plunderer require relief, it is the business of the plundered to relieve them.

method of prohibition, Christ ordinarily employed. He did not often condemn the individual doctrines or customs of the age, however false or however vicious; but he condemned the passions by which only vice could exist, and inculcated the truth which dismissed every error. And this method was undoubtedly wise. In the gradual alterations of human wickedness, many new species of profligacy might arise which the world had not yet practised: In the gradual vicissitudes of human error, many new fallacies might obtain which the world had not yet held: and how were these errors and these crimes to be opposed, but by the inculcation of principles that were applicable to every crime and to every error?—Principles which tell us not always what is wrong, but which tell us what always is right.

There are two modes of censure or condemnation; the one is to reprobate evil, and the other to enforce the opposite good, and both these modes were adopted by Christ in relation to war.—He not only censured the passions that are necessary to war, but inculcated the affections which are most opposed to them. The conduct and dispositions upon which he pronounced his solemn benediction are exceedingly remarkable. They are these, and in this order: Poverty of spirit—Mourning—Meekness—Desire of righteousness—Mercy—Purity of heart—Peace making—Sufferance of persecution. Now let the reader try whether he can propose eight other qualities, to be retained as the general habit of the mind, which shall be more incongruous with war.

Of these benedictions I think the most emphatical is that pronounced upon the *Peace-makers*: “Blessed are the peace-makers; for they shall be called the children of God.”* Higher praise or a higher title, no man can receive. Now I do not say that these benedictions contain an absolute proof that Christ prohibited war, but I say they make it clear that he did not approve it. He selected a number of subjects for his solemn approbation; and not one of them possesses any congruity with war, and some of them cannot possibly exist in conjunction with it. Can any one believe that he who made this selection, and who distinguished the peace-makers with peculiar approbation, could have sanctioned his followers in murdering one another? Or does any one believe that those who were mourners, and meek, and merciful, and peace-

* Matt. v. 9.

making, could at the same time perpetrate such murder? If I be told that a temporary suspension of Christian dispositions, although necessary to the prosecution of war, does not imply the extinction of Christian principles, or that these dispositions may be the general habit of the mind, and may both precede and follow the acts of war; I answer that this is to grant all that I require, since it grants that when we engage in war, we abandon Christianity.

When the betrayers and murderers of Jesus Christ approached him, his followers asked "Shall we smite with the sword?" And without waiting for an answer, one of them drew "his sword, and smote the servant of the High Priest, and cut off his right ear."—"Put up thy sword again into its place," said his Divine Master, "for all they that take the sword, shall perish with the sword."* There is the greater importance in the circumstances of this command, because it prohibited the destruction of human life in a cause in which there were the best of possible reasons for destroying it. The question "shall we smite with the sword," obviously refers to the defence of the Redeemer from his assailants, by force of arms. His followers were ready to fight for him; and if any reason for fighting could be a good one, they certainly had it. But if, in defence of Himself from the hands of bloody ruffians, his religion did not allow the sword to be drawn, for what reason can it be lawful to draw it? The advocates of war are at least bound to show a better reason for destroying mankind, than is contained in this instance in which it was forbidden.

It will, perhaps, be said, that the reason why Christ did not suffer himself to be defended by arms, was, that such a defence would have defeated the purpose for which he came into the world, namely, to offer up his life; and that he himself assigns this reason in the context.†—He does indeed assign it; but the *primary* reason, the *immediate* context is—"for all they that take the sword, shall perish with the sword." The reference to the destined sacrifice of his life is an after-reference. This destined sacrifice might, perhaps, have formed a reason why his followers should not fight *then*, but the first, the principal reason which he assigned, was a reason why they should not fight *at all*.—Nor is it necessary to define the precise import of the words "for all

* Matt. xxvi. 51, 52.

† Note L.

they that take the sword shall perish with the sword:" since it is sufficient for us all, that they imply reprobation.

To the declaration which was made by Jesus Christ, in the conversation that took place between himself and Pilate, after he had been seized by the Jews, I would peculiarly invite the attention of the reader. The declaration refers specifically to *an armed conflict*, and to a *conflict between numbers*. In allusion to the capability of his followers to have defended his person, he says, "My kingdom is not of this world; if my kingdom were of this world, *then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews*: but now is my kingdom not from hence."* He had before forbidden his "*servants*" to fight in his defence, and now, before Pilate, he assigns the reason for it: "My kingdom is not of this world." This is the very reason which we are urging against war. We say that it is incompatible with his kingdom—with the state which he came into the world to introduce. The incompatibility of war with Christianity, is yet more forcibly evinced by the contrast which Christ makes between *His* kingdom and others. It is the ordinary practice in the world for subjects to "fight," and *His* subjects would have fought *if his kingdom had been of this world*; but since it was not of this world,—since its nature was purer and its obligations more pacific—*therefore* they might not fight.

His declaration referred, not to the act of a single individual who might draw his sword in individual passion, but to an armed engagement between hostile parties; to a conflict for an important object, which one party had previously resolved on attaining, and which the other were ready to have prevented them from attaining, with the sword. It refers, therefore, strictly to a conflict between armed numbers; and to a conflict which, it should be remembered, was in a much better cause than any to which we can now pretend.†

It is with the apostles as with Christ himself. The in-

* John xviii. 36.

† In the publication to which the note, page 41 refers, the Author informs us that the reason why Christ forbade his followers to fight in his defence, was, that it would have been to oppose the government of the country.—I am glad no better evasion can be found; and this would not have been found, if the author had consulted the reason assigned by the Prohibitor, before he promulgated his own.

cessant object of their discourses and writings is the inculcation of peace, of mildness, of placability. It might be supposed that they continually retained in prospect the reward which would attach to "Peace-makers." We ask the advocate of war, whether he discovers in the writings of the Apostles or of the Evangelists, any thing that indicates they approved of war. Do the tenor and spirit of their writings bear any congruity with it? Are not their spirit and tenor entirely discordant with it? We are entitled to renew the observation, that the pacific nature of the apostolic writings proves presumptively, that the writers disallowed war. That could not be allowed by them as sanctioned by Christianity, which outraged all the principles that they inculcated.

"Whence come wars and fightings amongst you?" is the interrogation of one of the apostles, to some whom he was reproving for their unchristian conduct. And he answers himself by asking them, "Come they not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members?"* This accords precisely with the argument that we urge. Christ forbade the passions which lead to war; and now, when these passions had broken out into actual fighting, his apostle, in condemning war, refers it back to their passions. We have been saying that *the passions are condemned and therefore war*; and now, again, the apostle James thinks, like his master, that the most effectual way of eradicating war, is to eradicate the passions which produce it.

In the following quotation we are told, not only what the arms of the apostles were not, but what they were. "The weapons of our warfare are *not carnal*, but mighty, through God, to the pulling down of strong holds, and bringing into captivity *every thought to the obedience of Christ*."† I quote this, not only because it assures us that the apostles had nothing to do with military weapons, but because it tells us the object of their warfare—the bringing every *thought* to the obedience of Christ: and this object I would beg the reader to notice, because it accords with the object of Christ himself in his precepts from the mount—the reduction of the *thoughts* to obedience. The apostle doubtless knew that if he could effect this, there was little reason to fear that his converts would slaughter one another. He followed the example of his master. He attacked wickedness in its root; and incul-

* James iv. 1.

† 2 Cor. v. 4.

cated those general principles of purity and forbearance, which, in their prevalence, would abolish war, as they would abolish all other crimes. The teachers of Christianity addressed themselves not to communities but men. They enforced the regulation of the passions and the rectification of the heart: and it was probably clear to the perceptions of apostles, although it is not clear to some species of philosophy, that whatever duties were binding upon one man, were binding upon ten, upon a hundred, and upon the state.

War is not often directly noticed in the writings of the apostles. When it is noticed, it is condemned just in that way in which we should suppose any thing would be condemned, that was *notoriously* opposed to the whole system—just as murder is condemned at the present day. Who can find, in modern books, that murder is *formally* censured? We may find censures of its motives, of its circumstances, of its degrees of atrocity; but the act itself no one thinks of censuring, because *every one knows* that it is wicked. Setting statutes aside, I doubt whether, if an Otaheitan should choose to argue that Christians allow murder because he cannot find it formally prohibited in their writings, we should not be at a loss to find direct evidence against him. And it arises, perhaps, from the same causes, that a formal prohibition of war is not to be found in the writings of the apostles. I do not believe they *imagined* that Christianity would ever be charged with allowing it. They write, as if the idea of such a charge never occurred to them. They did, nevertheless, virtually forbid it; unless any one shall say that they disallowed the passions which occasion war, but did not disallow war itself; that Christianity prohibits the cause but permits the effect; which is much the same as to say that a law which forbade the administering of arsenic, did not forbid poisoning.—And this sort of reasoning, strange and illogical as it is, we shall by and by find has been gravely adopted against us.

But although the general tenor of Christianity, and many of its direct precepts, appear to me to condemn and disallow war, it is certain that different conclusions have been formed; and many, who are undoubtedly desirous of performing the duties of Christianity, have failed to perceive that war is unlawful to them.

In examining the arguments by which war is defended, two important considerations should be borne in mind—first, that those who urge them, are not simply defending war,

they are also defending *themselves*. If war be wrong, their conduct is wrong; and the desire of self justification, prompts them to give importance to whatever arguments they can advance in its favour. Their decisions may therefore, with reason, be regarded as in some degree the decisions of a party in the cause. The other consideration is, that the defenders of war come to the discussion prepossessed in its favour. They are attached to it by their earliest habits. They do not examine the question as a philosopher would examine it, to whom the subject was new. Their opinions had been already formed. They are discussing a question which they had already determined. And every man, who is acquainted with the effects of evidence on the mind, knows, that under these circumstances, a very slender argument in favour of the previous opinions, possesses more influence than many great ones against it. Now all this cannot be predicated of the advocates of peace; they are *opposing* the influence of habit—they are contending *against* the general prejudice—they are, perhaps, dismissing their own previous opinions. And I would submit it to the candour of the reader, that these circumstances ought to attach in his mind, *suspicion* to the validity of the arguments against us.

The narrative of the Centurion who came to Jesus at Capernaum, to solicit him to heal his servant, furnishes one of these arguments. It is said that Christ found no fault with the centurion's profession; that if he had disallowed the military character, he would have taken this opportunity of censuring it;* and that instead of such censure, he highly commended the officer, and said of him, "I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel."†

An obvious weakness in this argument is this; that it is founded, not upon approval, but upon silence. Approbation is indeed expressed, but it is directed, not to his arms, but to his faith; and those who will read the narrative will find that no occasion was given for noticing his profession. He came to Christ, not as a military officer, but simply as a deserving man. A censure of his profession *might*, undoubtedly, have been pronounced, but it would have been a gratuitous censure, a censure that did not naturally arise out of the case. The objection is in its greatest weight presumptive only, for none can be supposed to countenance every thing that he

* Note M.

† Matt. viii. 10.

does not condemn. To observe *silence** in such cases, was, indeed, the ordinary practice of Christ. He very seldom interfered with the civil and political institutions of the world. In these institutions there was sufficient wickedness around him, but some of them, flagitious as they were, he never, on any occasion, even noticed. His mode of condemning and extirpating political vices was by the inculcation of general rules of purity, which, in their eventful and universal application, would reform them all.

But how happens it that Christ did not notice the Centurion's religion? He surely was an idolater. And is there not as good reason for maintaining that Christ approved idolatry, because he did not condemn it, as that he approved war because he did not condemn it? Reasoning from analogy, we should conclude that idolatry was likely to have been noticed rather than war; and it is therefore peculiarly and singularly unapt to bring forward the silence respecting war, as an evidence of its lawfulness.

A similar argument is advanced from the case of Cornelius, to whom Peter was sent from Joppa; of which it is said, that although the gospel was imparted to Cornelius by the especial direction of Heaven, yet we do not find that he therefore quitted his profession, or that it was considered inconsistent with his new character. The objection applies to this argument as to the last, that it is built upon silence, that it is simply negative. *We do not find* that he quitted the service:—I might answer, Neither do we find that he continued in it. We only know nothing of the matter: and the evidence is therefore so much less than proof, as silence is less than approbation. Yet, that the account is silent respecting any disapprobation of war, might have been a reasonable ground of argument under different circumstances. It might have been a reasonable ground of argument, if the primary object of Christianity had been the reformation of political institutions, or perhaps, even if her primary object had been the regulation of the external conduct; but her *primary* object was neither of these. She directed herself to the reformation of the heart, knowing that all other reformation would follow. She embraced indeed both morality and policy, and has reformed, or will reform both—not so much immediately as consequently; not so much by filtering the current, as by

* See a future quotation from the “Moral and Political Philosophy.”

purifying the spring. The silence of Peter, therefore, in the case of Cornelius, will serve the cause of war but little ;* that little is diminished when urged against the positive evidence of commands and prohibitions, and it is reduced to nothingness, when it is opposed to the *universal tendency* and *object* of the revelation.

It has sometimes been urged that Christ paid taxes to the Roman government at a time when it was engaged in war, and when, therefore, the money that he paid, would be employed in its prosecution. This we shall readily grant ; but it appears to be forgotten by our opponents that if this proves war to be lawful, they are proving too much. These taxes were thrown into the exchequer of the state, and a part of the money was applied to purposes of a most iniquitous and shocking nature ; sometimes, probably, to the gratification of the emperor's personal vices and to his gladiatorial exhibitions, &c., and certainly to the support of a miserable idolatry. If, therefore, the payment of taxes to such a government proves an approbation of war, it proves an approbation of many other enormities. Moreover, the argument goes too far in relation even to war ; for it must necessarily make Christ approve of all the Roman wars, without distinction of their justice or injustice—of the most ambitious, the most atrocious, and the most aggressive : and these, even our objectors will not defend. The payment of tribute by our Lord, was accordant with his usual system of avoiding to interfere in the civil or political institutions of the world.

“ Let him that has no sword, sell his garment and buy one.”†—This is another passage that is brought against us.‡ —“ For what purpose,” it is asked, “ were they to buy swords, if swords might not be used ?” I doubt whether with some of those who advanced this objection, it is not an objection of words rather than of opinion. I doubt whether they themselves think there is any weight in it. To those, however, who may be influenced by it, I would observe, that, as it appears to me, a sufficient answer to the objection may be found in the immediate context :—“ Lord, behold here are two swords,” said they ; and he immediately answered, “ It is enough.” How could two be enough when eleven were to be supplied with them ? That swords, in the sense, and for the purpose of military weapons, were even intended

* Note N.

† Luke xxii. 36.

‡ Note O.

in this passage, there appears much reason for doubting. This reason will be discovered by examining and connecting such expressions as these: "The Son of Man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to save them," said our Lord. Yet, on another occasion, he says, "I came not to send peace on earth but a *sword*." How are we to explain the meaning of the latter declaration? Obviously by understanding "sword" to mean something far other than steel. For myself, I see little reason for supposing that physical weapons were intended in the instruction of Christ. I believe they were not intended, partly because no one can imagine his apostles were in the habit of using such arms, partly because they declared that the weapons of their warfare were *not* carnal, and partly because the word "*sword*" is often used to imply "dissension," or the religious warfare of the Christian. Such an use of language is found in the last quotation; and it is found also in such expressions as these: "*shield* of faith"—"*helmet* of salvation"—"*sword* of the spirit"—"I have *fought* the good *fight* of faith."

But it will be said that the apostles did provide themselves with swords, for that on the same evening they asked, "shall we smite with the sword?" This is true, and I think it may probably be true also, that some of them provided themselves with swords in *consequence* of the injunction of their Master. But what then? The reader of the New Testament will find that hitherto the destined teachers of Christianity were very imperfectly acquainted with the nature of their master's religion—their conceptions of it were yet gross and Jewish. The very question that is brought against us, and the succeeding conduct of Peter, evince how little they yet knew that *His kingdom was not of this world, and that his servants might not fight*. Even after the resurrection, they seemed to be still expecting that his purpose was to establish a temporal government, by the inquiry—"Lord, wilt thou at this time, restore again the kingdom unto Israel?"* Why do we avail ourselves of the conduct of the apostles, before they themselves knew the duties of Christianity? Why, if this example of Peter be authority to us, do we not approve the *subsequent* example of this same apostle, in denying his master?

Why, indeed, do we urge the conduct of Peter at all,

* Acts i. 6.

when that conduct was immediately condemned by Christ? And, had it not been condemned, how happens it, that if he allowed his followers the use of arms, he healed the only wound which we find they ever inflicted with them?

It appears to me, that the apostles acted on this occasion upon the principles on which they had wished to act on another, when they asked, "Shall we command fire to come down from heaven to consume them?" And that their Master's principles of action were also the same in both.— "Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of; for the Son of Man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to save them." *This* is the language of Christianity; and I would seriously invite him who now justifies "destroying men's lives," to consider what manner of spirit he is of.

I think, then, that no argument arising from the instruction to buy swords can be maintained. This, at least, we know, that when the apostles were *completely* commissioned, they neither used nor possessed them. An extraordinary imagination he must have, who conceives of an apostle, preaching peace and reconciliation, crying "forgive injuries"—"love your enemies"—"render not evil for evil;" and at the conclusion of the discourse, if he chanced to meet with violence or insult, promptly drawing his sword and maiming or murdering the offender. We insist upon this consideration. If swords were to be worn, swords were to be used; and there is no rational way in which they could have been used, but some such as that which we have been supposing. If, therefore, the words "Let him that has no sword sell his garment and buy one," do not mean to authorize *such an use* of the sword, they do not mean to authorize its use at all: And those who adduce the passage, must allow its application in such a sense, or they must exclude it from any application to their purpose.

It has been said, again, that when soldiers came to John the Baptist to inquire of him what they should do, he did not direct them to leave the service, but to be content with their wages.* This, also, is at best but a negative evidence. It does not prove that the military profession was wrong, and it certainly does not prove that it was right. But in truth, if it asserted the latter, Christians have, as I conceive, nothing to do with it; for I think that we need not inquire what

* Note P.

John allowed, or what he forbade. He, confessedly, belonged to that system which required "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth;" and the observations which we shall by and by make on the authority of the law of Moses, apply therefore, to that of John the Baptist. Although it could be proved, (which it cannot be,) that he allowed wars, he acted not inconsistently with his own dispensation; and with that dispensation we have no business. Yet, if any one still insists upon the authority of John, I would refer him for an answer to Jesus Christ himself. What authority *He* attached to John on questions relating to his own dispensation, may be learnt from this—"The *least* in the kingdom of heaven is *greater* than he."

Such are the arguments which are adduced from the Christian Scriptures, by the advocates of war. Of these arguments, those derived from the cases of the Centurion and of Cornelius, are simply negative. It is not pretended that they possess *proof*. Their strength consists in silence, and of this silence there appears to be sufficient explanation. Of the objection arising from the payment of tribute, I know not who will avail himself. It is nullified by itself. A nearly similar observation applies to the instruction to *buy swords*; and with the case of John the Baptist I do not conceive that we have any concern. In these five passages, the sum of the New Testament evidences in favour of war, unquestionably consists: they are the passages which men of acute minds, studiously seeking for evidence, have selected. And what are they? There is not one of them, except the payment of tribute and the instruction to buy swords, of which it is even said by our opponents, that it *proves* any thing in favour of war. A "NOT" always intervenes—the Centurion was *not* found fault with: Cornelius was *not* told to leave the profession: John did *not* tell the soldiers to abandon the army. I cannot forbear to solicit the reader to compare these objections with the pacific evidence of the gospel which has been laid before him; I would rather say, to compare it with the gospel itself; for the sum, the tendency of the *whole revelation* is in our favour.

In an inquiry whether Christianity allows of war, there is a subject that always appears to me to be of peculiar importance—the Prophecies of the Old Testament respecting the arrival of a period of universal peace. The belief is perhaps general amongst Christians, that a time will come when

vice shall be eradicated from the world, when the violent passions of mankind shall be repressed, and when the pure benignity of Christianity shall be universally diffused. That such a period will come we indeed know assuredly, for God has promised it.

Of the many prophecies of the Old Testament respecting it, I will refer only to a few from the writings of Isaiah. In his predictions respecting the "last times," by which it is not disputed that he referred to the prevalence of the Christian religion, the prophet says—"They shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift the sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."* Again, referring to the same period, he says—"They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain, for the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth as the waters cover the sea."† And again, respecting the same era—"Violence shall be no more heard in thy land, wasting nor destruction within thy borders."‡

Two things are to be observed in relation to these prophecies: first, that it is the will of God that war should eventually be abolished. This consideration is of importance, for if war be not accordant with His will, war cannot be accordant with Christianity, which is the revelation of His will. My business, however, is principally with the second consideration—*that Christianity will be the means of introducing this period of Peace.* From those who say that our religion sanctions war, an answer must be expected to questions such as these:—By what instrumentality and by the diffusion of what principles, will the prophecies of Isaiah be fulfilled? Are we to expect some new system of religion, by which the imperfections of Christianity shall be removed, and its deficiencies supplied? Are we to believe that God sent his only Son into the world to institute a religion such as this—a religion, that in a few centuries, would require to be altered and amended? If Christianity allows of war, they must tell us what it is that is to extirpate war. If she allows "violence and wasting, and destruction," they must tell us what are the principles that are to produce gentleness, and benevolence, and forbearance.—I know not what answer such inquiries will receive from the advocate of war, but I know that Isaiah says the change will be effected by *Christianity*: And if

* Isaiah ii. 4

† Ib. xi. 9.

‡ Ib. lx. 18.

any one still chooses to expect another and a purer system, an apostle may perhaps repress his hopes :—"If we, or an angel from heaven," says Paul, "preach any other gospel than that which *we* have preached unto you, let him be accursed."*

Whatever the principles of Christianity will require hereafter, they require now. Christianity, *with its present principles and obligations*, is to produce universal peace. It becomes, therefore, an absurdity, a simple contradiction, to maintain that the principles of Christianity allow of war, when they and they only, are to eradicate it. If we have no other guarantee of Peace, than the existence of our religion, and no other hope of Peace, than in its diffusion, how can that religion sanction war? The conclusion that it does not sanction it, appears strictly logical: I do not perceive that a demonstration from Euclid can be clearer; and I think that if we possessed no other evidence of the unlawfulness of war, there is contained in this, a proof which prejudice cannot deny, and which sophistry cannot evade.

The case is clear. A more perfect obedience to that same gospel, which we are told sanctions slaughter, will be the means, and the only means, of exterminating slaughter from the world. It is not from an alteration of Christianity, but from an assimilation of Christians to its nature, that we are to hope. It is because we violate the principles of our religion, because we are not what they require us to be, that wars are continued. If we will not be peaceable, let us then, at least, be honest, and acknowledge that we continue to slaughter one another, not because Christianity permits it, but because we reject her laws.†

The Christian ought to be satisfied on questions connected with his duties, by the simple rules of his religion. If those rules disallow war, he should inquire no farther; but since I am willing to give conviction to the reader by whatever means, and since truth carries its evidence with greater force from accumulated testimony, I would refer to two or three other subjects in illustration of our principles, or in confirmation of their truth.

The opinions of the earliest professors of Christianity upon the lawfulness of war, are of importance; because they who lived nearest to the time of its Founder, were the most likely

* Gal. i. 8.

† Note Q.

to be informed of his intentions and his will, and to practise them without those adulterations which we know have been introduced by the lapse of ages.

During a considerable period after the death of Christ, it is certain, then, that his followers believed he had forbidden war, and that, in consequence of this belief, many of them refused to engage in it whatever were the consequences, whether reproach, or imprisonment, or death. These facts are indisputable: "It is as easy," says a learned writer of the seventeenth century, "to obscure the sun at mid-day as to deny that the primitive Christians renounced all revenge and war." Of all the Christian writers of the second century, there is not one who notices the subject, who does not hold it to be unlawful for a Christian to bear arms; "and," says Clarkson, "it was not till Christianity became corrupted that Christians became soldiers."*

Our Saviour inculcated mildness and peaceableness; we have seen that the apostles imbibed his spirit, and followed his example; and the early Christians pursued the example and imbibed the spirit of both. "This sacred principle, this earnest recommendation of forbearance, lenity, and forgiveness, mixes with all the writings of that age. There are more quotations in the apostolical fathers, of texts which relate to these points than of any other. Christ's sayings had struck them. "*Not rendering, says Polycarp the disciple of John, evil for evil, or railing for railing, or striking for striking, or cursing for cursing.*"† Christ and his apostles delivered general precepts for the regulation of our conduct. It was necessary for their successors to apply them to their practice in life. And to what did they apply the pacific precepts which had been delivered? They applied them to war: they were assured that the precepts absolutely forbade it. This belief they derived from those very precepts on which we have insisted: They referred, expressly, to the same passages in the New Testament, *and from the authority and obligation of those passages*, they refused to bear arms. A few examples from their history, will show with what undoubting confidence they believed in the unlaw-

* "Essay on the Doctrines and Practice of the Early Christians as they relate to war." To this Essay I am indebted for much information on the present part of our subject.

† Pol. Ep. ad Phil. C. 2.—Evidences of Christianity.

fulness of war, and how much they were willing to suffer in the cause of peace.

Maximilian, as it is related in the Acts of Ruinart, was brought before the tribunal to be enrolled as a soldier. On the proconsul's asking his name, Maximilian replied, "I am a Christian and cannot fight." It was however ordered that he should be enrolled, but he refused to serve, still alleging *that he was a Christian*. He was immediately told that there was no alternative between bearing arms, and being put to death. But his fidelity was not to be shaken—"I cannot fight," said he, "if I die." The procounsul asked who had persuaded him to this conduct; "My own mind," said the Christian, "and he who has called me." It was once more attempted to shake his resolution by appealing to his youth and to the glory of the profession, but in vain;—"I cannot fight," said he, "for any earthly consideration." He continued steadfast to his principles, sentence was pronounced upon him, and he was led to execution.

The primitive Christians not only refused to be enlisted in the army, but when they embraced Christianity whilst already enlisted, they abandoned the profession at whatever cost. Marcellus was a centurion in the legion called Trajana. Whilst holding this commission he became a Christian, and believing, in common with his fellow Christians, that war was no longer permitted to him, he threw down his belt at the head of the legion, declaring that he had become a Christian, and that he would serve no longer. He was committed to prison; but he was still faithful to Christianity. "It is not lawful," said he, "for a Christian to bear arms for any earthly consideration;" and he was in consequence put to death. Almost immediately afterwards, Cassian, who was Notary to the same legion, gave up his office. He steadfastly maintained the sentiments of Marcellus, and like him was consigned to the executioner. Martin, of whom so much is said by Sulpicius Severus, was bred to the profession of arms, which, on his acceptance of Christianity, he abandoned. To Julian the Apostate, the only reason that we find he gave for his conduct was this—"I am a Christian, and therefore I cannot fight." The answer of Tarachus to Numerianus Maximus, is in words nearly similar:—"I have led a military life and am a Roman; and because I am a Christian I have abandoned my profession of a soldier."

These were not the sentiments, and this was not the con-

duct, of the insulated individuals who might be actuated by individual opinions, or by their private interpretations of the duties of Christianity. Their principles were the principles of the body. They were recognized and defended by the Christian writers their contemporaries. Justin Martyr and Tatian talk of soldiers and Christians as distinct characters; and Tatian says that the Christians declined even military commands. Clemens of Alexandria calls his Christian contemporaries the "Followers of Peace," and expressly tells us that "the followers of peace used none of the implements of war." Lactantius, another early Christian, says expressly, "It can *never* be lawful for a righteous man to go to war." About the end of the second century, Celsus, one of the opponents of Christianity, charged the Christians *with refusing to bear arms even in case of necessity*. Origen, the defender of the Christians, does not think of denying the fact; he admits the refusal, and justifies it, *because war was unlawful*. Even after Christianity had spread over almost the whole of the known world, Tertullian, in speaking of a part of the Roman armies, including more than one third of the Standing Legions of Rome, distinctly informs us that "not a Christian could be found amongst them."

All this is explicit. The evidence of the following facts is however yet more determinate and satisfactory. Some of the arguments which, at the present day, are brought against the advocates of peace, were then urged against these early Christians; and *these arguments they examined and repelled*. This indicates investigation and inquiry, and manifests that their belief of the unlawfulness of war, was not a vague opinion, hastily admitted, and loosely floating amongst them, but that it was the result of deliberate examination and a consequent firm conviction that Christ had forbidden it. Tertullian says, "Though the soldiers came to John and received a certain form to be observed, yet Jesus Christ, by disarming Peter, disarmed every soldier afterwards; for custom never sanctions any unlawful act." "Can a soldier's life be lawful," says he, in another work, "when Christ has pronounced that he who lives by the sword shall perish by the sword? Can any one, who possesses the peaceable doctrine of the gospel, be a soldier, when it is his duty not so much as to go to law? And shall he, who is not to revenge his own wrongs, be instrumental in bringing others into chains, imprisonment, torture, death?"—So that

the very same arguments which are brought in defence of war at the present day, were brought against the Christians sixteen hundred years ago, and sixteen hundred years ago they were repelled by these faithful contenders for the purity of our religion. It is remarkable, too, that Tertullian appeals to the precepts from the mount, in proof of those principles on which this essay has been insisting:—*that the dispositions which the precepts inculcate are not compatible with war, and that war, therefore, is irreconcilable with Christianity.*

If it be possible, a still stronger evidence of the primitive belief, is contained in the circumstance, that some of the Christian authors *declared that the refusal of the Christian to bear arms*, was a fulfilment of ancient prophecy. The peculiar strength of this evidence consists in this—that the fact of a refusal to bear arms, is assumed as notorious and unquestioned. Irenæus, who lived about Anno 180, affirms that the prophecy of Isaiah, which declared that men should turn their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks, *had been fulfilled in his time*; “for the Christians,” says he, “have changed their swords and their lances into instruments of peace, and *they know not now how to fight.*” Justin Martyr, his contemporary, writes,—“That the prophecy is fulfilled, you have good reason to believe, for we, who in times past killed one another, *do not now fight with our enemies.*” Tertullian, who lived later, says, “You must confess that the prophecy has been accomplished, as far as *the practice of every individual is concerned*, to whom it is applicable.”*

It has been sometimes said, that the motive which influ-

* These examples might be multiplied. Enough, however, have been given to establish our position; and the reader who desires further or more immediate information, is referred to *Justin Mart.* in Dialog. cum Tryph. ejusdemque Apolog. 2.—ad Zenam: *Tertull.* de corona militis.—Apolog. Cap. 21 and 37.—lib. de Idolol. C. 17, 18, 19.—ad Scapulam cap. 1.—adversus Jud. Cap. 7 and 9.—adv. Gnost. 13.—adv. Marc. C. 4.—lib. de patient C. 6. 10: *Orig.* cont. *Celsum* lib. 3, 5, 8.—In Josuam, hom. 12 Cap. 9.—in Matt. Cap. 26 Tract. 36: *Cypr.* Epist. 56.—ad Cornel. Lactan. de just. lib. 5. C. 18 Lib. 6 C. 20: *Ambr.* in Luc. 22: *Chrysost.* in Matth. 5. hom. 18.—in Matth. 26 hom. 85.—lib. 2 de Sacerdotio.—1 Cor. 13: *Chromat.* in Matth. 5. *Hieron.* ad Ocean.—lib. Epist. p. 3 Tom. 1. Ep. 2: *Athan.* de Inc. Verb. Dei: *Cyrrill. Alex.* lib. 11. in Johan. Cap. 25, 26. See also *Erasmus.* Luc. Cap. 3, and 22. Ludov. Vives in Introd. ad. Sap: *I Ferus* lib. 4 Comment. in Matth. 7 and Luc. 22.

enced the early Christians to refuse to engage in war, consisted in the idolatry which was connected with the Roman armies.—*One* motive this idolatry unquestionably afforded ; but it is obvious, from the quotations which we have given, that their belief of the unlawfulness of *fighting*, independent of any question of idolatry, was an insuperable objection to engaging in war. Their words are explicit : “ I cannot *fight* if I die.”—“ I am a Christian, and therefore I cannot *fight*.”—“ Christ,” says Tertullian, “ *by disarming Peter*, disarmed every soldier ;” and Peter was not about to fight in the armies of idolatry. So entire was their conviction of the incompatibility of war with our religion, that they would not even *be present* at the gladiatorial fights, “ lest,” says Theophilus, “ we should become partakers of the murders committed there.” Can any one believe that they who would not *even witness* a battle between two men, would themselves fight in a battle between armies ? And the destruction of a gladiator, it should be remembered, was authorised by the state as much as the destruction of enemies in war.

It is, therefore, indisputable, that the Christians who lived nearest to the time of our Saviour, believed, with undoubting confidence, that he had unequivocally forbidden war—that they openly avowed this belief, and that, in support of it, they were willing to sacrifice, and did sacrifice, their fortunes and their lives.

Christians, however, afterwards became soldiers ; And when ?—When their *general* fidelity to Christianity became relaxed ; when, *in other respects*, they violated its principles ;—when they had begun “ to dissemble,” and “ to falsify their word,” and “ to cheat ;”—when “ Christian Casuists” had persuaded them that they might “ *sit at meat in the idol’s temple ;*”—when Christians accepted even the *priesthoods of idolatry*. In a word, they became soldiers, when they had ceased to be Christians.

The departure from the original faithfulness, was, however, not suddenly general. Like every other corruption, war obtained by degrees. During the first two hundred years, not a Christian soldier is upon record. In the third century, when Christianity became partially corrupted, Christian soldiers were common. The number increased with the increase of the general profligacy ; until at last, in the fourth century, Christians became soldiers without hesitation, and, perhaps, without remorse. Here and there,

however, an ancient Father still lifted up his voice for peace ; but these, one after another, dropping from the world, the tenet that *war is unlawful*, ceased at length to be a tenet of the church.

Such was the origin of the present belief in the lawfulness of war. It began in unfaithfulness, was nurtured by profligacy, and was confirmed by general corruption.—We seriously, then, and solemnly invite the conscientious Christian of the present day, to consider these things. Had the professors of Christianity continued in the purity and faithfulness of their forefathers, we should *now* have believed that war was forbidden ; and Europe, many long centuries ago, would have reposed in peace.

Let it always be borne in mind by those who are advocating war, that they are contending for a corruption which their forefathers abhorred ; and that they are making Jesus Christ the sanctioner of crimes, which his purest followers offered up their lives because they would not commit.

An argument has sometimes been advanced in favour of war from the Divine communications to the Jews under the administration of Moses. It has been said, that as wars were allowed and enjoined to that people, they cannot be inconsistent with the will of God.

We have no intention to dispute that, under the Mosaic dispensation, some wars were allowed, or that they were enjoined upon the Jews as an imperative duty. But those who refer, in justification of our present practice, to the authority by which the Jews prosecuted their wars, must be expected to produce the same authority for our own. Wars were *commanded* to the Jews, but are they commanded to us ? War, in the abstract, was never commanded. And, surely, those specific wars which were enjoined upon the Jews for an express purpose, are neither authority nor example for us, who have received no such injunction, and can plead no such purpose.

It will, perhaps, be said that the commands to prosecute wars, even to extermination, are so positive and so often repeated, that it is not probable, if they were inconsistent with the will of Heaven, they would have been thus peremptorily enjoined. We answer, that they were not inconsistent with the will of Heaven *then*. But even then, the prophets foresaw that they were not accordant with the universal will of God, since they predicted that when that will

should be fulfilled, war should be eradicated from the world. And by what dispensation was this will to be fulfilled? By that of the "Rod out of the stem of Jesse."

But what do those who refer to the dispensation of Moses maintain? Do they say that the injunctions to the Jews are binding upon them? If they say this, we have at least reason to ask them for greater consistency of obedience. That these injunctions, in point of fact, do not bind them, they give sufficient proof, by the neglect of the greater portion of them, enforced as those injunctions were, by the same authority as that which commanded war. They have, therefore, so far as their argument is concerned, annulled the injunctions by their own rejection of them. And out of ten precepts to reject nine and retain one, is a gratuitous and idle mode of argument.

If I be told that we still acknowledge the obligation of many of these precepts, I answer that we acknowledge the duties which they enjoin, but not because of the authority which enjoined them. We obey the injunctions, not because they were delivered under the law, but because they are enforced by Christianity. The command "Thou shalt not kill," has never been abolished; but Christians do not prohibit murder because it was denounced in the decalogue, they would have prohibited it if the decalogue had never existed.

But farther: Some of the commands under the law, Christianity *requires* us to disobey. *If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, which will not obey the voice of his father, &c. all the men of the city shall stone him with stones that he die.* If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, entice thee secretly, saying, 'Let us go and serve other Gods,' thou shalt not pity him or conceal him, but thou shalt surely kill him; thine hand shall be first upon him to put him to death."*† Now we know that Christianity will not sanction an obedience of these commands; and if we did obey them, our own laws would treat us as murderers. If the precepts under the dispensation of Moses are binding because they were promulgated by Heaven, they are binding in all their commands and all their prohibitions. But some of these precepts we habitually disregard, and some it were criminal

* Deut. xxi. 18, 21.

† Deut. xiii. 9.

to obey; and with what reason then do we refer to them in our defence?

And *why* was the law superseded? Because it “made nothing perfect.”—“The law was given by Moses, but grace and *truth* came by Jesus Christ.” The manner in which the author of “*Truth*” prefaced some of his most important precepts, is much to our present purpose. “It hath been said by them of old time, An eye for an eye,” &c. He then introduces his own precept with the contradistinguishing preface—“But *I* say unto you.” This, therefore, appears to be a specific abrogation of the *authority* of the legal injunctions, and an introduction of another system; and this is all that our present purpose requires. The truth is, that the law was abolished because of its imperfections; yet we take hold of one of these imperfections in justification of our present practice. Is it because we feel that we cannot defend it by our own religion?

We therefore dismiss the dispensation of Moses from any participation in the argument. Whatever it allowed, or whatever it prohibited in relation to war, we do not inquire. We ask only what Christianity allows and prohibits, and by this we determine the question.—It is the more necessary to point out the inapplicability of these arguments from the Old Testament, because there are some persons of desultory modes of thinking, who find that war is allowed in “the Bible,” and who forget to inquire into the present authority of the permission.

There are some persons who suppose themselves sufficiently justified in their approbation of war, by the example of men of piety of our own times. The argument, as an argument, is of little concern; but every thing is important that makes us acquiescent in war. *Here are men*, say they, *who make the knowledge of their duties the great object of their study, and yet these men engage in war without any doubt of its lawfulness.* All this is true; and it is true also, that some good men have expressly inculcated the lawfulness of war; and it is true also, that the Articles of the Church of England specifically assert it.*—But what, if it should have come to pass, that “blindness in part, hath happened unto Israel!”

What is the argument? *That good men have engaged in*

* Note R.

war, and therefore that Christianity allows it. They who satisfy themselves with such reasoning, should bear in mind that he who voluntarily passes over the practice of the two first centuries of Christianity, and attempts to defend himself by the practice of after and darker ages, has obviously no other motive than that he finds his religion, when vitiated and corrupt, more suitable to his purpose than it was in the days of its purity. This state of imperfection and impurity has diffused an influence upon the good, as upon the bad. I question not that some Christians of the present day who defend war, *believe* they act in accordance with their religion; just as I question not that many, who zealously bore faggots to the stake of the Christian martyrs, *believed* so too. The time has been, when those who killed good men *thought* "they did God service"* But let the succeeding declaration be applied by our present objectors—"These things will they do unto you, *because they have not known the Father nor Me.*"† Here, then, appears to be our error—that we do not estimate the conduct of men by the standard of the gospel, but that we reduce the standard of the gospel to the conduct of men. That good men should fail to conform to the perfect purity of Christianity, or to *perceive* it, need not be wondered, for we have sufficient examples of it. Good men, in past ages allowed many things as permitted by Christianity, which we condemn, and shall for ever condemn. In the present day there are many questions of duty on which men of piety disagree. If their authority be rejected by us on other points of practice, why is it to determine the question of war? Especially why do we insist on their decisions, when they differ in their decisions themselves? If good men have allowed the lawfulness of war, good men have also denied it. We are therefore again referred to the simple evidence of religion; an evidence which it will always be found wise to admit, and dangerous to question.

There is, however, one argument brought against us, which if it be just, precludes at once all question upon the subject:—*That a distinction is to be made between rules which apply to us as individuals, and rules which apply to us as subjects of the state; and that the pacific injunctions of Christ from the mount, and all the other kindred com-*

* Note S.

† John xvi. 3.

mands and prohibitions of the Christian Scriptures, have no reference to our conduct as members of the political body. This is the argument to which the greatest importance is attached by the advocates of war, and by which thinking men are chiefly induced to acquiesce in its lawfulness. In reality, some of those who think most acutely upon the subject, acknowledge that the peaceable, forbearing, forgiving dispositions of Christianity, are absolutely obligatory upon individuals in their full extent: and this acknowledgment I would entreat the reader to bear in his recollection.

Now it is obvious that the proof of the rectitude of this distinction, must be expected of those who make it. General rules are laid down by Christianity, of which, in some cases, the advocate of war denies the applicability. *He*, therefore, is to produce the reason and the authority for exception. Now we would remind him that general rules are binding unless their inapplicability can be clearly shown. We would remind him that the general rules in question, are laid down by the commissioned Ministers of Jesus Christ, and by Jesus Christ himself; and we would recommend him, therefore, to hesitate before he institutes exceptions to those rules, upon any authority *inferior* to the authority which made them.

The foundation for the distinction between the duties of individuals and those of communities, must, we suppose, be sought in one of these two positions:

1. That as no law exists, of general authority amongst nations, by which one state is protected from the violence of another, it is necessary that each independent community should protect itself; and that the security of a nation cannot sometimes be maintained otherwise than by war.

2. That as the general utility and expediency of actions is the foundation of their moral qualities, and as it is sometimes most conducive to general utility and expediency that there should be a war, war is therefore, sometimes lawful.*

The first of these positions will probably be thus enforced. If an individual suffers aggression, there is a Power to which he can apply that is above himself and above the aggressor; a power by which the bad passions of those around him are restrained, or by which their aggressions are punished. But amongst nations there is no acknowledged su-

* Note T.

perior or common arbitrator.—Even if there were, there is no way in which its decisions could be enforced, but by the sword. War, therefore, is the only means which one nation possesses of protecting itself from the aggression of another.

This, certainly, is plausible reasoning; but it happens to this argument as to many others, that it assumes *that* as established, which has not been proved, and upon the proof of which the truth of the whole argument depends. It assumes, That the reason why an individual is not permitted to use violence, is, *that the Laws will use it for him*. And in this the fallacy of the position consists; for the foundation of the duty of forbearance in private life, is *not* that the laws will punish aggression, but *that Christianity requires forbearance*. Undoubtedly, if the existence of a common arbitrator were the foundation of the duty, the duty would not be binding upon nations. But that which we require to be proved is this—that Christianity exonerates nations from those duties which she has imposed upon individuals. This, the present argument does not prove; and, in truth, with a singular unhappiness in its application, it assumes, in effect, that she has imposed these duties upon neither the one nor the other.

If it be said that Christianity allows to individuals some degree and kind of resistance, and that some resistance is therefore lawful to states, we do not deny it. But if it be said that the degree of lawful resistance extends to the slaughter of our fellow Christians—that it extends to war—we do deny it: We say that the rules of Christianity cannot, by any possible latitude of interpretation be made to extend to it. The duty of forbearance, then, is *antecedent* to all considerations respecting the condition of man; and whether he be under the protection of laws or not, the duty of forbearance is imposed.

The only truth which appears to be elicited by the present argument, is, that the difficulty of obeying the forbearing rules of Christianity, is *greater* in the case of nations than in the case of individuals: *The obligation to obey them is the same in both*. Nor let any one urge the difficulty of obedience in opposition to the duty; for he who does this, has yet to learn one of the most awful rules of his religion—a rule that was enforced by the precepts, and more especially by the final example, of Christ, of apostles, and of martyrs, the rule which requires that we should be “obedient even unto death.”

Let it not however be supposed that we believe the difficulty of forbearance would be as great in practice, as it is great in theory. We hope hereafter to show, that it promotes our interests as certainly as it fulfils our duties.

The rectitude of the distinction between rules which apply to individuals, and rules which apply to states, is thus maintained by Dr. Paley on the principle of **EXPEDIENCY**.

“The *only* distinction,” says he, “that exists between the case of independent States and independent individuals, is founded in this circumstance; that the particular consequence sometimes appears to exceed the value of the general rule;” or, in less technical words, that a greater disadvantage may arise from obeying the commands of Christianity, than from transgressing them. *Expediency*, it is said, is the test of moral rectitude, and the standard of our duty. If we believe that it will be most expedient to disregard the general obligations of Christianity, that belief is the justifying motive of disregarding them. Dr. Paley proceeds to say, “In the transactions of private persons, no advantage that results from the breach of a general law of justice, can compensate to the public for the violation of the law; *in the concerns of empire this may sometimes be doubted.*” He says there may be cases in which “the magnitude of the particular evil induces us to *call in question* the obligation of the general rule.” “Situations *may be feigned*, and consequently *may possibly arise*, in which the general tendency is outweighed by the enormity of the particular mischief.” Of the doubts which must arise as to the occasions when the “obligation” of Christian laws ceases, he however says that “moral philosophy furnishes no precise solution;” and he candidly acknowledges “the danger of leaving it to the sufferer to decide upon the comparison of particular and general consequences, and the still greater danger of such decisions being drawn into future precedents. If treaties, for instance, be no longer binding than while they are convenient, or until the inconveniency ascend to a certain point, (which point must be fixed by the judgment, or rather by the feelings of the complaining party,)—one, and almost the only method of averting or closing the calamities of war, of preventing or putting a stop to the destruction of mankind, is lost to the world for ever.” And in retrospect of the indeterminateness of these rules of conduct, he says finally, “these

however are the principles upon which the calculation is to be formed.”*

It is obvious that this reasoning proceeds upon the principle that *it is lawful to do evil that good may come*. If good will come by violating a treaty, we may violate it.† If good will come by slaughtering other men, we may slaughter them. I know that the advocate of Expediency will tell us that that is *not* evil of which good, in the aggregate comes; and that the good or evil of actions *consists* in the good or evil of their general consequences.—I appeal to the understanding and the conscience of the reader—Is this distinction honest to the meaning of the apostle? Did he intend to tell his readers that they might violate their solemn promises, that they might destroy their fellow Christians, *in order that good might come*? If he did mean this, surely there was little truth in the declaration of the same apostle *that he used great plainness of speech*.

We are told that “whatever is *expedient* is right.” We shall not quarrel with the dogma, but how is expediency to be determined? By the calculations and guessings of men, or by the knowledge and foresight of God? Expediency may be the test of our duties, but what is the test of expediency?—Obviously, I think it is this; *the decisions which God has made known respecting what is best for man*. Calculations of expediency, of “particular and general consequences,” are not entrusted to us, for this most satisfactory reason—that we cannot make them. The calculation, to be any thing better than vague guessing, requires prescience, and where is prescience to be sought? Now it is conceded by our opponents, that the only Possessor of prescience has declared that the forbearing, non-resisting character, *is* best for man. Yet we are told that sometimes, it is *not* best, that sometimes it is “inexpedient.” How do we discover this? The Promulgator of the law has never intimated it. Whence, then, do we derive the right of substituting our computations for His prescience? Or, having obtained it, what is the limit to its exercise? If, because we calculate that obedience will not be beneficial, we may dispense with his laws in one instance, why may we not dispense with them in ten? Why may we not abrogate them altogether?

* Moral and Political Philosophy, Chap. “Of War and Military Establishments.”

† Ibid.

The right is however claimed; and how is it to be exercised? We are told that the duty of obedience “may sometimes be *doubted*,”—that in some cases, we are induced to “*call in question*” the obligation of the Christian rule—that “situations *may be feigned*,” that circumstances “*may possibly arise*,” in which we are at liberty to dispense with it—that still it is dangerous to leave “it to the sufferer to decide” when the obligation of the rule ceases; and that of all these doubts “philosophy furnishes no precise solution!”—I know not how to contend against such principles as these. An argument might be repelled; the assertion of a fact might be disproved; but what answer can be made to “possibilities” and “doubts?” They who are at liberty to *guess* that Christian laws may sometimes be suspended, are at liberty to guess that Jupiter is a fixed star, or that the existence of America is a fiction. What answer the man of science would make to such suppositions I do not know, and I do not know what answer to make to ours. Amongst a community which had to decide on the “particular and general consequences” of some political measure, which involved the sacrifice of the principles of Christianity, there would of necessity be an endless variety of opinions. Some would think it *expedient* to supersede the law of Christianity, and some would think the evil of obeying the law, less than the evil of transgressing it. Some would think that the “particular mischief” outweighed the “general rule,” and some that the “general rule” outweighed the “particular mischief.” And in this chaos of opinion, what is the line of rectitude, or how is it to be discovered? Or is *that* rectitude, which appears to each separate individual to be right? And are there as many species of truth, as there are discordancies of opinion?—Is *this* the simplicity of the Gospel? Is *this* the path in which a wayfaring man, though a fool, shall not err?

These are the principles of expediency on which it is argued that the duties which attach to private life do not attach to citizens.—I think it will be obvious to the eye of candour, that they are exceedingly indeterminate and vague. Little more appears to be done by Dr. Paley than to exhibit their doubtfulness. In truth, I do not know whether he has argued better in favour of his position, or against it. To me it appears that he has evinced it to be fallacious; for I do not think that *any thing* can be Christian truth, of which the

truth cannot be more evidently proved. But whatever may be thought of the conclusion, the reader will certainly perceive that the whole question is involved in extreme vagueness and indecision; an indecision and vagueness, which it is difficult to conceive that Christianity ever intended should be hung over the very greatest question of practical morality that man has to determine; over the question that asks whether the followers of Christ are at liberty to destroy one another. That such a procedure as a war, is, under any circumstances, sanctioned by Christianity, from whose principles it is acknowledged to be "abhorrent," ought to be clearly made out. It ought to be obvious to loose examination. It ought not to be necessary to ascertain it, that a critical investigation should be made, of questions which ordinary men cannot comprehend, and which, if they comprehended them, they could not determine; and above all that investigation ought not to end, as we have seen it does end, in vague indecision—in "doubts" of which even "Philosophy furnishes no precise solution." But when this indecision and vagueness are brought to oppose the Christian evidence for peace; when it is contended, not only that it militates against that evidence, but that it outbalances and supersedes it—we would say of such an argument, that it is not only weak, but idle; of such a conclusion, that it is not only unsound, but preposterous.

Christian obligation is a much more simple thing than speculative philosophy would make it appear; and to all those who suppose that our relations as subjects dismiss the obligation of Christian laws, we would offer the consideration, that neither the Founder of Christianity, nor his apostles, ever made the distinction. Of questions of "particular and general consequences," of "general advantages and particular mischiefs," no traces are to be found in their words or writings. The morality of Christianity is a simple system, adapted to the comprehensions of ordinary men. Were it otherwise, what would be its usefulness? If philosophers only could examine our duties, and if their examinations ended in *doubts without solution*, how would men, without learning and without leisure, regulate their conduct? I think, indeed, that it is a sufficient objection to all such theories as the present, that they are not adapted to the wayfaring man. If the present theory be admitted, one of these two effects

will be the consequence: the greater part of the community must trust for the discovery of their duties to the sagacity of others, or they must act without any knowledge of their duties at all.

But, that the pacific injunctions of the Christian Scriptures do apply to us, under every circumstance of life, whether private or public, appears to be made necessary by the universality of Christian obligation.* The language of Christianity upon the obligation of her moral laws, is essentially this—"What I say unto you, I say unto all." The pacific laws of our religion, then, are binding upon all men; upon the king, and upon every individual who advises him, upon every member of a legislature, upon every officer and agent, and upon every private citizen. How then can *that* be lawful for a body of men which is unlawful for each individual? How, if one be disobedient, can his offence make disobedience lawful to all? We maintain yet more, and say, that to dismiss Christian benevolence as subjects, and to retain it as individuals, is simply impossible. He who possesses that subjugation of the affections, and that universality of benevolence, by which he is influenced to do good to those who hate him, and to love his enemies in private life, cannot, without abandoning those dispositions, butcher other men because they are called public enemies.

The whole position, therefore, that the pacific commands and prohibitions of the Christian Scriptures, do not apply to our conduct as subjects of a state, appears to me to be a fallacy.† Some of the arguments which are brought to support it, so flippantly dispense with the principles of Christian obligation, so gratuitously assume, that because obedience may be difficult, obedience is not required, that they are rather an excuse for the distinction than a justification of it—and some are so lamentably vague and indeterminate, the principles which are proposed are so technical, so inapplicable to the circumstances of society, and in truth, so incapable of being practically applied, that it is not credible that they were designed to suspend the obligation of rules, which were imposed by a revelation from heaven.

The reputation of Dr. Paley is so great, that as he has devoted a chapter of the Moral Philosophy to "War and Military Establishments," it will perhaps be expected, in an

* Note U.

† Note V.

inquiry like the present, that some specific reference should be made to his opinions—and I make this reference willingly.

The chapter “on War” begins thus:—“Because the Christian Scriptures describe wars, as what they are, as crimes or judgments, some men have been led to believe that it is unlawful for a Christian to bear arms. But it should be remembered, that it may be necessary for individuals to unite their force, and for this end to resign themselves to a common will; and yet it may be true that that will is often actuated by criminal motives, and often determined to destructive purposes.” This is a most remarkable paragraph: It assumes, at once, the whole subject of inquiry, and is an assumption couched in extraordinary laxity of language.—“It may be necessary for individuals to unite their force”—The tea-table and the drawing-room have often told us this; but *Philosophy* should tell us how the necessity is proved. Nor is the morality of the paragraph more rigid than the philosophy—“Wars are crimes,” and are often undertaken from “criminal motives, and determined to destructive purposes;” yet of these purposes, and motives, and crimes, “it may be necessary” for Christians to become the abettors and accomplices!

Paley proceeds to say, that in the New Testament *the profession of a soldier** is no where forbidden or condemned; and he refers to the cases of John the Baptist, of the Roman Centurion, and of Cornelius; and with this he finishes all inquiry into the Christian evidence upon the subject, after having expended upon it less than a page of the edition before me.†

These arguments are all derived from the silence of the New Testament, and to all reasoning founded upon this silence, no one can give a better answer than himself. In replying to the defences by which the advocates of Slavery

* I do not know why “the profession of a soldier,” is substituted for the simple term, *war*. Dr. P. does not say that *war* is no where forbidden or condemned, which censure or prohibition, it is obviously easy to have pronounced without even noticing “the profession of a soldier.” I do not say that this language implies a want of ingenuousness, but it certainly was more easy to prove that the *profession of a soldier* is no where condemned, than that *war* is no where condemned.

† Note W.

attempt to justify it, he notices that which they advance from *the silence of the New Testament* respecting it. He says—It is urged that “Slavery was a part of the civil constitution of most countries when Christianity appeared; yet that no passage is to be found in the Christian Scriptures, by which it is condemned or prohibited.” “This,” he rejoins, “is true; for Christianity, soliciting admission into all nations of the world, abstained, as behoved it, from intermeddling with the civil institutions of any. But does it follow, from the silence of Scripture concerning them, that all the civil institutions which then prevailed were right, or that the bad should not be exchanged for better!” I beg the reader to apply this reasoning to Paley’s own arguments in favour of war from the silence of the Scriptures. How happens it that he did not remember it himself?

Now I am compelled to observe, that in the discussion of the lawfulness of war, Dr. Paley has neglected his professed principles of decision, and his ordinary practice. His professed principles are these; that the discovery of the “Will of God, which is the whole business of morality,” is to be attained by referring, *primarily*, to “his express declarations when they are to be had, and which must be sought for in Scripture.”—Has he sought for these declarations? Has he sought for “Resist not evil,” or for “Love your enemies,” or for “Put up thy sword,” or for “The weapons of our warfare are not carnal,” or for “My kingdom is not of this world?” He has sought for none of these; he has examined none of them; he has noticed none of them. His professed principles are, again, that *when our instructions are dubious, we should endeavour to explain them by what we can collect of our Master’s general inclination or intention.** Has he conformed to his own rule? Has he endeavoured to collect this general inclination, and to examine this general tendency? He has taken no notice of it whatever. This neglect, we say, is contrary to his ordinary practice. Upon other subjects, he has assiduously applied to the Christian Scriptures in determination of truth. He has examined not only their direct evidence, but the evidence which they afford by induction and implication: the evidence arising from their general tendency. Suicide is no where condemned in the New Testament; yet Paley condemns it, and how? He examines the

* Moral and Political Philosophy, Book ii. Chap. 4.

sacred volume, and finds that by implication and inference, it may be collected that suicide is not permitted by Christianity. He says that patience under suffering is inculcated as an important duty ; and that the recommendation of patience, implies the unlawfulness of suicide to get out of suffering. This is sound reasoning ; but he does not adopt it in the examination of war. Could he not have found that the inculcation of peaceableness forms as good an argument against the lawfulness of war, as the inculcation of patience forms against the lawfulness of suicide ? He certainly could have done this, and why has he not done it ? Why has he passed it over in silence ?

I must confess my belief, that he was unwilling to discuss the subject upon Christian Principles ; that he had resolved to make war consistent with Christianity ; and that, foreseeing her “express declarations” and “general intentions” militated against it, he avoided noticing them at all. Thus much at least is certain, that in discussing the lawfulness of war, he has abandoned both his avowed principles and his correspondent practice. There is, to me at least, in the chapter “On War,” an appearance of great indecision of mind, arising from the conflict between Christian truth and the power of habit, between the consciousness that war is “abhorrent” to our religion, and the desire to defend it on the principle of expediency. The whole chapter is characterized by a very extraordinary laxity, both of arguments and principles.

After the defensibility of war has been proved, or assumed, in the manner which we have exhibited, Dr. Paley states the occasions upon which he determines that wars become justifiable. “The objects of *just* war,” says he, “are precaution, defence, or reparation.”—“Every *just* war, supposes an injury perpetrated, attempted, or feared.”

I shall acknowledge, that if these be justifying motives to war, I see very little purpose in talking of morality upon the subject. It was wise to leave the principles of Christianity out of the question, and to pass them by unnoticed, if they were to be succeeded by principles like these. It is in vain to expatiate on moral obligations, if we are at liberty to declare war whenever an “injury is feared.” An injury, without limit to its insignificance ! A fear, without stipulation for its reasonableness ! The judges, also, of the reasonableness of fear, are to be they who are under its influence ; and who

so likely to judge amiss as those who are afraid? Sounder philosophy than this has told us, that “he who has to reason upon his duty when the temptation to transgress it is before him, is almost sure to reason himself into an error.” The necessity for this ill-timed reasoning, and the allowance of it, is amongst the capital objections to the philosophy of Paley. It tells us that a people may suspend the laws of God when they think it is “expedient;” and they are to judge of this expediency when the temptation to transgression is before them!—Has Christianity left the lawfulness of human destruction to be determined on such principles as these?

Violence, rapine, and ambition, are not to be restrained by morality like this. It may serve for the speculation of a study; but we will venture to affirm that mankind will never be controlled by it. Moral rules are useless, if, from their own nature, they cannot be, or will not be applied.—Who believes that if kings and conquerors may fight when they have fears, they will not fight when they have them not? The morality allows too much latitude to the passions, to retain any practical restraint upon them. And a morality that will not be practised, I had almost said, that cannot be practised, is an useless morality. It is a *theory* of morals. We want clearer and more exclusive rules; we want more obvious and immediate sanctions. It were in vain for a philosopher to say to a general who was burning for glory, “You are at liberty to engage in the war provided you have suffered, or fear you will suffer an injury; otherwise Christianity prohibits it.”—He will tell him of twenty injuries that have been suffered, of a hundred that have been attempted, and of ten thousand that he fears. And what answer can the philosopher make to him?

I think that Dr. Paley has, in another and a later work, given us stronger arguments in favour of peace, than the Moral Philosophy gives in favour of war. In the “Evidences of Christianity” we find these statements:—“The two following positions appear to me to be satisfactorily made out; first, That the gospel *omits some qualities*, which have usually engaged the praises and admiration of mankind, but which, in reality, and in their general effects, have been *prejudicial to human happiness*; secondly, that the gospel has *brought forward some virtues*, which *possess the highest intrinsic value*, but which have commonly been overlooked and contemned.—The second of these propositions is

exemplified in the instances of passive courage or endurance of suffering, patience under affronts and injuries, humility, irresistance, placability.—The truth is, there are two opposite descriptions of character under which mankind may be generally classed. The one possesses vigour, firmness, resolution, is daring and active, quick in its sensibilities, jealous in its fame, eager in its attachments, inflexible in its purpose, violent in its resentments. The other meek, yielding, complying, forgiving, not prompt to act, but willing to suffer, silent and gentle under rudeness and insult, suing for reconciliation where others would demand satisfaction, giving way to the pushes of impudence, conceding and indulgent to the prejudices, the wrong-headedness, the intractability of those with whom it has to deal.—The former of these characters is, and ever hath been, the favourite of the world.—Yet so it hath happened, that with the Founder of Christianity, *this latter is the subject of his commendation, his precepts, his example*; and that *the former is so, in no part of its composition*. This morality shows, at least, that *no two things can be more different than the heroic and the Christian characters*. Now it is proved, in contradiction to first impressions, to popular opinion, to the encomiums of orators and poets, and even to the suffrages of historians and moralists, that *the latter character possesses most of true worth*, both as being most difficult either to be acquired or sustained, and as *contributing most to the happiness and tranquillity of social life*.—If this disposition were universal, the case is clear; the world would be a society of friends: whereas, if the other disposition were universal, it would produce a scene of universal contention. The world would not be able to hold a generation of such men. If, what is the fact, the disposition be partial; if a few be actuated by it amongst a multitude who are not, *in whatever degree it does prevail, it prevents, allays, and terminates quarrels, the great disturbers of human happiness, and the great sources of human misery*, so far as man's happiness and misery depend upon man. *The preference of the patient to the heroic character*, which we have here noticed, is a peculiarity in the Christian institution, which I propose as *an argument of wisdom*.”*

* I must be just. After these declarations, the author says, that when the laws which inculcate the Christian character, are

These are the sentiments of Dr. Paley upon this great characteristic of the Christian Morality. I think that in their plain, literal, and unsophisticated meaning, they exclude the possibility of the lawfulness of war. The simple conclusion from them, is, that violence, and devastation, and human destruction cannot exist in conjunction with the character of a Christian. This would be the conclusion of the inhabitant of some far and peaceful island, where war and Christianity were alike unknown. If he read these definitions of the Christian duties, and were afterwards told that we thought ourselves allowed to plunder and to murder one another, he would start in amazement at the monstrous inconsistency. Casuistry may make her "distinctions," and philosophy may talk of her "expediencies," but the monstrous inconsistency remains. What is the fact? Mahometans and Pagans do not believe that our religion allows of war. They reproach us with the inconsistency. Our wars are, with them, a scandal and a taunt. "You preach to us," say they, "of Christianity, and would convert us to your creed;—first convert yourselves; show us that yourselves believe in it." Nay, the Jews at our own doors tell us, that our wars are an evidence that the Prince of Peace is not come. They bring the violence of Christianity to prove that Christ was a deceiver. Thus do we cause the way of truth to be evil spoken of. Thus are we, who should be the helpers of the world, its stumbling blocks and its shame. We, who should be lights to them that sit in darkness, cause them to love that darkness still. Well may the Christian be ashamed for these things: Well may he be ashamed for the reputation of his religion: And he may be ashamed, too, for the honoured defender of the Christian faith, who stands up, the

applied to what is necessary to be done for the sake of the public, they are applied to a case to which they do not belong; and he adds, "This distinction is plain," but in what its plainness consists, or how it is discovered at all, he does not inform us. The reader will probably wonder, as I do, that whilst Paley says no two things can be more opposite than the Christian and the heroic characters, he nevertheless thinks it "is plain," that Christianity sanctions the latter.

I would take the opportunity afforded me by this note, to entreat the reader to look over the whole of Chap. 2, Part. II. in the Evidences of Christianity. He will find many observations on the placability of the gospel, which will repay the time of reading them.

advocate of blood ; who subtilizes the sophisms of the schools, and roves over the fields of speculation to find an argument to convince us that we may murder one another ! This is the “ wisdom of the world ;” that wisdom which is, emphatically, “ **FOOLISHNESS.**”

We have seen that the principle on which Dr. Paley’s Moral Philosophy decides that war is lawful, is, that it is expedient. I know not how this argument accords with some of the statements of the Evidences of Christianity. We are there told that the non-resisting character possesses “ the highest intrinsic value,” and the “ most of true worth ;” that it “ prevents the great disturbances of human happiness,” and destroys “ the great sources of human misery,” and that it “ contributes most to the happiness and tranquillity of social life.” And in what then does expediency consist, if the non-resisting character be not expedient ? Dr. Paley says, again, in relation to the immense mischief and bloodshed arising from the violation of Christian duty—“ We do not say that no evil can exceed this, nor any possible advantage compensate it, but we say that a loss which affects all, *will scarcely be made up to the common stock of human happiness, by any benefit that can be procured to a single nation.*” And is not therefore the violation of the duty *inexpedient* as well as criminal ? He says, again, that the war-like character “ *is, in its general effects, prejudicial to human happiness,*”—and, therefore, surely it is inexpedient.

The advocate of war, in the abundance of his topics of defence (or in the penury of them,) has had recourse to this : *That as a greater number of male children are brought into the world than of female, wars are the ordination of Providence to rectify the inequality ;* and one or two moralists have proceeded a step farther, and have told us, not that war is designed to carry off the excess, but *that an excess is born in order to supply its slaughters.* Dreadful ! Are we to be told that God sends too many of his rational creatures into the world, and therefore that he stands in need of wars to destroy them ? Has he no other means of adjusting the proportions of the species, than by a system which violates the revelation that he has made, and the duties that he has imposed ? Or, yet more dreadful—are we to be told that He creates an excess of one of the sexes, on purpose that their destruction of each other may be with impunity to the species ? This reasoning surely is sufficiently confident :

—I fear it is more than sufficiently profane. But alas for the argument! It happens most unfortunately for it, that although more males are born than females, yet, from the greater mortality of the former, it is found that long before the race arrives at maturity, the number of females predominates. What a pity—that just as the young men had grown old enough to kill one another, it should be discovered that there are not too many to remain peaceably alive! Let then, the principle be retained and acted upon; and since we have now an excess of females, let us send forth an armament of ladies, that their redundancy may be lopped by the appointed means.—But really it is time for the defender of war to abandon reasoning like this. It argues little in favour of any cause, that its advocates have recourse to such deplorable subterfuges.

The magistrate “beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.” From this acknowledgment of the lawfulness of coercion on the part of the civil magistrate, an argument has been advanced in favour of war. It is said, that by parity of reasoning, coercion is also lawful in the suppression of the violence which one nation uses towards another.

Some men talk as if the principles which we maintain were subversive of all order and government.* They ask us—Is the civil magistrate to stand still and see lawless violence ravaging the land? Is the whole fabric of human society to be dissolved? We answer, no; and that whencesoever these men may have derived their terrors, they are not chargeable upon us or upon our principles. To deduce even a plausible argument in favour of war from the permission “to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil,” it is obviously necessary to show that we are permitted to take his life. And the right to put an offender to death, must be proved, if it can be proved at all, either *from an express permission of the Christian Scriptures*, or, supposing Christianity to have given no decisions, either directly or indirectly, *from a necessity which knows no alternative*. Now every one knows that this express permission to inflict death is not to be found; and, upon the question of its *necessity*, we ask for that evidence which alone can determine it—the evidence of

* Note X.

experience: and this evidence, the advocate of war has never brought, and cannot bring. And we shall probably not be contradicted when we say, that that degree of evidence which experience has afforded, is an evidence in our favour rather than against us.

But some persons entertain an opinion, that in the case of murder, at least, there is a sort of immutable necessity for taking the offender's life. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." If any one urges this rule against us, we reply, that it is not a rule of Christianity; and if the necessity of demanding blood for blood is an everlasting principle of retributive justice, how happens it that, in the first case in which murder was committed, the murderer was not put to death?*

The philosopher however would prove what the Christian cannot; and Mably accordingly says, "In the state of nature, I have a right to take the life of him who lifts his arm against mine. *This right, upon entering into society, I surrender to the magistrate.*" If we conceded the truth of the first position, (which we do not,) the conclusion from it is a sophism too idle for notice. Having, however, been thus told that the state has a right to kill, we are next informed, by Filangieri, that the criminal has no right to live. He says, "If I have a right to kill another man, *he has lost his right to life.*"† Rousseau goes a little farther. He tells us, that in consequence of the "social contract" which we make with the sovereign on entering into society, "Life is a conditional grant of the state:"‡ so that we hold our lives, it seems, only as "tenants at will," and must give them up whenever their owner, the state, requires them. The reader has probably hitherto thought that he retained his head by some other tenure.

The right of taking an offender's life being thus proved, Mably shows us how its exercise becomes expedient. "A murderer," says he, "in taking away his enemy's life, *believes he does him the greatest possible evil.* Death, then, in the murderer's estimation, is the greatest of evils. *By the fear of death, therefore,* the excesses of hatred and revenge must be restrained." If language wilder than this

* Note Y.

† Montagu on Punishment of Death.

‡ Contr. Soc. ii. 5. Montagu.

can be held, Rousseau, I think, holds it. He says, "The preservation of both sides (the criminal and the state) is incompatible; one of the two must perish." How it happens that a nation "must perish," if a convict is not hanged, the reader, I suppose, will not know.

I have referred to these speculations for the purpose of showing, that the right of putting offenders to death is not easily made out. Philosophers would scarcely have had recourse to these metaphysical abstractions if they knew an easier method of establishing the right. Even philosophy, however, concedes us much:—"Absolute necessity, alone," says Pastoret, "can justify the punishment of death;" and Rousseau himself acknowledges, that "we have no right to put to death, *even for the sake of example*, any but those who cannot be permitted to live without danger." Beccaria limits the right to two specific cases; in which, "if an individual, though deprived of his liberty, has still such credit and connexions as may endanger the security of the nation, or, by his existence, is likely to produce a dangerous revolution in the established form of government—he must undoubtedly die."* It is not, perhaps, necessary for us to point out why, in these suppositious cases, a prisoner may not be put to death; since I believe that philosophy will find it difficult, on some of her own principles, to justify his destruction: For Dr. Paley decides, that whenever a man thinks there are great grievances in the existing government, and that, by heading a revolt, he can redress them, without occasioning greater evil by the rebellion than benefit by its success—*it is his duty to rebel*.† The prisoner whom Beccaria supposes, may be presumed to have thought this; and with reason too, for the extent of his credit, his connexions and his success, is the plea for putting him to death; and we must therefore leave it to those who indulge in such speculations, to consider, how it can be right for one man to take the lead in a revolution, whilst it is right for another to hang him for taking it.

What then does the lawfulness of coercion on the part of the magistrate, prove upon the question of the lawfulness of war? If capital punishments *had never been inflicted*, what would it have proved? Obviously nothing. If capital

* Del Delitti e delia Penes, xvi. Montagu.

† Moral and Political Philosophy. See Note Z.

punishments *cannot be shown to be defensible*, what does it prove? Obviously nothing: for an unauthorized destruction of human life on the gallows, cannot justify another unauthorized destruction of it on the field.

Perhaps some of those who may have been hitherto willing to give me a patient attention, will be disposed to withdraw it, when they hear the unlawfulness of defensive war unequivocally maintained. But it matters not. My business is with what appears to me to be truth: if truth surprises us, I cannot help it—still it is truth.

Upon the question of defensive war, I would beg the reader to bear in his recollection, that every feeling of his nature is enlisted against us; and I would beg him, knowing this, to attain as complete an abstraction from the influence of those feelings as shall be in his power. This he will do, if he is honest in the inquiry for truth. It is not necessary to conceal that the principles which we maintain may sometimes demand the sacrifice of our apparent interests. Such sacrifices Christianity has been wont to require: They are the tests of our fidelity; and of those whom I address, I believe there are some, who, if they can be assured that we speak the language of Christianity, will require no other inducements to obedience.

The lawfulness of defensive war, is commonly simplified to *the right of self-defence*. This is one of the strong holds of the defender of war, the almost final fastness to which he retires. *The instinct of self-preservation*, it is said, *is an instinct of nature; and since this instinct is implanted by God, whatever is necessary to self-preservation, is accordant with his will*. This is specious, but like many other specious arguments, it is sound in its premises, but, as I think, fallacious in its conclusions. That the instinct of self-preservation is an instinct of nature, is clear—that, because it is an instinct of nature, we have a right to kill other men, is *not* clear.

The fallacy of the whole argument appears to consist in this,—that it assumes that an instinct of nature is a law of *paramount* authority. God has implanted in the human system, various propensities or instincts, of which the purposes are wise. These propensities tend in their own nature to *abuse*; and when gratified or followed to excess, they become subversive of the purposes of the wisdom which implanted them, and destructive of the welfare of mankind.

He has, therefore, instituted a *superior law*, sanctioned by his immediate authority: by this law we are required to regulate these propensities. The question therefore is not whether the instinct of self-preservation is implanted by nature, but whether Christianity has restricted its operation. By this, and by this only, the question is to be determined. Now he who will be at the trouble of making the inquiry, will find that a regulation of the instincts of nature, and a restriction of their exercise, is a prominent object of the Christian morality; and I think it is plain that this regulation and restriction apply to the instinct before us. That some of these propensities are to be restrained is certain. One of the most powerful instincts of our nature, is an affection to which the regulating precepts of Christianity are peculiarly directed. I do not maintain that any natural instinct is to be eradicated, but that all of them are to be regulated and restrained; and I maintain this of the instinct of self-preservation.

The establishment of this position, is, indeed, the great object of the present inquiry. What are the dispositions and actions to which the instinct of self-preservation prompts, but actions and dispositions which Christianity forbids? They are non-forbearance, resistance, retaliation of injuries. The truth is, that it is to *defence* that the peaceable precepts of Christianity are directed. *Offence* appears not to have even suggested itself. It is “Resist not *evil*,” it is “Overcome *evil* with good;” it is “Do good to them that *hate* you;” it is “Love your *enemies*,” it is “Render not evil for *evil*,” it is “Whoso *smiteth thee on one cheek*.” All this supposes previous offence, or injury, or violence; and it is *then* that forbearance is enjoined.

“The chief aim,” says a judicious author, “of those who argue in behalf of defensive war, is directed *at the passions*,”* and, accordingly, the case of an assassin will doubtless be brought against me. I shall be asked—Suppose a ruffian breaks into your house, and rushes into your room with his arm lifted to murder you, do you not believe that Christianity allows you to kill him? This is the last refuge of the cause: my answer to it is explicit—*I do not believe it.*

* The lawfulness of Defensive War impartially considered, by a member of the Church of England.

I have referred to this utmost possible extremity, because I am willing to meet objections of whatever nature, and because, by stating this, which is enforced by all our prejudices and all our instincts, I shall at least show that I give to those who differ from me, a fair, an open, and a candid recognition of all the consequences of my principles. I would, however, beg the same candour of the reader, and remind him, that were they unable to abide this test, the case of the ruffian has little practical reference to war. I remind him of this, not because I doubt whether our principles can be supported, but because, if he should think that in this case I do not support them, he will yet recollect that very few wars are proved to be lawful. Of the wars which are prosecuted, some are simply wars of aggression, some are for the maintenance of a balance of power; some are in assertion of technical rights, and some, undoubtedly, to repel invasion. The last are, perhaps, the fewest; and of these only it can be said that they bear any analogy whatever to the case which is supposed; and even in these, the analogy is seldom complete. It has rarely, indeed, happened that wars have been undertaken simply for the preservation of life, and that no other alternative has remained to a people, than to kill, or to be killed. And let it be remembered, that *unless this alternative only remains*, the case of the ruffian is irrevelant; it applies not, practically, to the subject.

I do not know what those persons mean, who say, that we are authorized to kill an assassin, by *the law of nature*. Principles like this, heedlessly assumed, as of self-evident truth, are, I believe, often the starting-post of our errors; the point of divergency from rectitude, from which our after obliquities proceed. Some men seem to talk of the laws of nature, as if nature were a legislatress who had sat and framed laws for the government of mankind.—Nature makes no laws. A law implies a legislator; and there is no legislator upon the principles of human duty, but God. If, by the “law of nature,” is meant any thing of which the sanctions or obligations are *different* from those of revelation, it is obvious that we have set up a moral system of our own, and in opposition to that which has been established by Heaven. If we mean by the “law of nature,” nothing but that which is *accordant* with revelation, to what purpose do we refer to it all? I do not suppose that any sober moralist will statedly

advance the laws of nature in opposition to the laws of God : but I think that to advance them *at all*—that to refer to *any* principle or law, in determination of our duty, irrespectively of the simple will of God, is always dangerous ; for there will be many, who, when they are referred for direction to such law or principle, will regard it, in their practice, as a *final* standard of truth. I believe that a reference to the laws of nature has seldom illustrated our duties, and never induced us to perform them ; and that it has hitherto answered little other purpose than that of amusing the lovers of philosophical morality.

The mode of proving, or of stating, the right to kill an assassin, is this :—“ There is one case in which all extremities are justifiable ; namely, when our life is assaulted and it becomes necessary for our preservation to kill the assailant. This is evident in a state of nature ; unless it can be shown that we are bound to prefer the aggressor’s life to our own ; that is to say, to love our enemy *better* than ourselves, which can never be a debt of justice, nor any where appears to be a duty of charity.”* If I were disposed to hold argumentation like this, I would say, that although we may not be required to love our enemies *better* than ourselves, we are required to love them *as* ourselves, and that in the supposed case, it still would be a question equally balanced, which life ought to be sacrificed ; for it is quite clear, that if we kill the assailant, we love him *less* than ourselves, which may, perhaps, militate a little against “ a duty of charity.” But the truth is, that the question is not whether we should love our enemy better than ourselves, but whether we should sacrifice the laws of Christianity in order to preserve our lives—whether we should prefer the interests of religion to our own—whether we should be willing to “ lose our life, for Christ’s sake and the gospel’s.”

This system of *counter-crime* is of very loose tendency. The assailant violates his duties by attempting to kill me, and I, therefore, am to violate mine by actually killing him. Is his meditated crime then, a justification of my perpetrated crime ? In the case of a condemned Christian martyr who was about to be led to the stake, it is supposable, that by having contrived a mine, he may preserve his life by sud-

* Moral and Political Philosophy.

denly firing it and blowing his persecutors into the air. Would Christianity justify the act? Or what should we say of him if he committed it? We should say that whatever his *faith* might be, his *practice* was very unsound; that he might *believe* the gospel, but that he certainly did not fulfil its duties. Now I contend that for all the purposes of the argument, the cases of the martyr and the assaulted person are precisely similar. He who was about to be led to the stake, and he who was about to lose his life by the assassin, are both required to regulate their conduct by the same laws, and are both to be prepared to offer up their lives in testimony of their allegiance to Christianity: the one in allegiance to her, in opposition to the violation of her moral principles and her moral spirit; and the other, in opposition to errors in belief or to ecclesiastical corruptions. It is therefore in vain to tell me that the victim of persecution would have suffered for religion's sake, for so also would the victim of the ruffian. There is nothing in the sanctions of Christianity, which implies that obedience to her moral law is of less consequence than an adherence to her faith; nor as it respects the welfare of the world, does the consequence appear to be less; for he, who by his fidelity to Christianity, promotes the diffusion of Christian dispositions and of peace, contributes, perhaps, as much to the happiness of mankind, as he, who by the same fidelity, recommends the acceptance of an accurate creed.

A great deal hangs upon this question, and it is therefore necessary to pursue it farther. We say, then, first—that Christianity has not declared that we are ever at liberty to kill other men: secondly—that she virtually prohibits it, because her principles and the practice of our Saviour are not compatible with it; and, thirdly—that if Christianity allowed it, she would in effect and in practice, allow *war*, without restriction to defence of life.

The first of these positions will probably not be disputed; and upon the second, that Christianity virtually prohibits the destruction of human life, it has been the principal object of this essay to insist. I would, therefore, only observe, that the conduct of the Founder of Christianity, when his *enemies approached him "with swords and staves,"* appears to apply strictly to self-defence. These armed men came with the final purpose of murdering him; but although he knew this

purpose, he would not suffer the assailants to be killed or even to be wounded. Christ, therefore, would not preserve his own life by sacrificing another's.

But we say, thirdly, that if Christianity allows us to kill one another in self-defence, she allows *war*, without restriction to self-defence. Let us try what would have been the result if the Christian Scriptures had thus placed human life at our disposal: suppose they had said—*You may kill a ruffian in your own defence, but you may not enter into a defensive war.* The prohibition would admit, not of *some* exceptions to its application—the exceptions would be so many, that no prohibition would be left; because there is no practical limit to the right of self-defence, until we arrive at defensive war. If one man may kill one, two may kill two, and ten may kill ten, and an army may kill an army:—and this is defensive *war*. Supposing, again, the Christian Scriptures had said, *an army may fight in its own defence, but not for any other purpose.*—We do not say that the exceptions to *this* rule would be so many as wholly to nullify the rule itself; but we say that whoever will attempt to apply it in practice, will find that he has a very wide range of justifiable warfare; a range that will embrace many more wars, than moralists, laxer than we shall suppose them to be, are willing to defend. If an army may fight in defence of their own lives, they may, and they must fight in defence of the lives of others: If they may fight in defence of the lives of others, they will fight in defence of their property: If in defence of property, they will fight in defence of political rights: If in defence of rights, they will fight in promotion of interests: If in promotion of interests, they will fight in promotion of their glory and their crimes. Now let any man of honesty look over the gradations by which we arrive at this climax, and I believe he will find that, *in practice*, no curb can be placed upon the conduct of an army until they reach it. There is, indeed, a wide distance between fighting in defence of life, and fighting in furtherance of our crimes; but the steps which lead from one to the other, will follow in inevitable succession. I know that the letter of our rule excludes it, but I know that rule will be a letter only. It is very easy for us to sit in our studies, and to point the commas, and semicolons, and periods of the soldier's career; it is very easy for us to say he shall stop at defence of life, or at protection

of property, or at the support of rights; but armies will never listen to us—we shall be only the Xerxes of morality throwing our idle chains into the tempestuous ocean of slaughter.

What is the testimony of experience? When nations are mutually exasperated, and armies are levied, and battles are fought, does not every one know that with whatever motives of defence one party may have begun the contest, both, in turn become aggressors? In the fury of slaughter, soldiers do not attend, they cannot attend, to questions of aggression. Their business is destruction, and their business they will perform. If the army of defence obtains success, it soon becomes an army of aggression. Having repelled the invader, it begins to punish him. If a war is once begun, it is vain to think of distinctions of aggression and defence. Moralists may *talk* of distinctions, but soldiers will *make* none; and none can be made; it is without the limits of possibility.

But indeed, what is defensive war? A celebrated moralist defines it to be, war, undertaken in consequence of “*an injury* perpetrated, attempted, or feared;” which shows with sufficient clearness, how little *the assassin* concerns the question, for fear respecting life does not enter into the calculation of “injuries.” So, then, if we fear some injury to our purses, or to our “honour,” we are allowed to send an army to the country that gives us fear, and to slaughter its inhabitants; and this, we are told, is defensive war. By this system of reasoning, which has been happily called “martial logic,” there will be little difficulty in proving any war to be defensive. Now we say that if Christianity allows defensive war, she allows all war—except indeed that of simple aggression; and by the rules of this morality, the aggressor is difficult of discovery; for he whom we choose to “fear,” may say that he had previous “fear” of us, and that his “fear” prompted the hostile symptoms which made us “fear” again.—The truth is, that to attempt to make any distinctions upon the subject, is vain. War must be wholly forbidden, or allowed without restriction to defence; for no definitions of lawful or unlawful war, will be, or can be, attended to. If the principles of Christianity, in any case, or for any purpose, allow armies to meet and to slaughter one another, her principles will never conduct us to the period which prophecy has assured us they shall produce. There

is no hope of an eradication of war but by an absolute and total abandonment of it.*

What then is the principle for which we contend? *An unreasoning reliance upon Providence for defence, in all those cases in which we should violate His laws by defending ourselves.* The principle can claim a species of merit, which must at least be denied to some systems of morality—that of simplicity, of easiness of apprehension, of adaptation to every understanding, of applicability to every circumstance of life.

If a wisdom which we acknowledge to be unerring, has determined and declared that any given conduct is right and that it is good for man, it appears preposterous and irreverent to argue that another can be better. The Almighty certainly *knows* our interests, and if he has not directed us in the path which promotes them, the conclusion is inevitable, that he has voluntarily directed us amiss.—Will the advocate of war abide this conclusion? And if he will not, how will he avoid the opposite conclusion, that the path of forbearance is the path of expediency?

It would seem to be a position of very simple truth, that it becomes an *erring* being, to regulate his actions by an acquiescent reference to an unerring will. That it is necessary for one of these erring beings, formally to insist upon this truth, and systematically to prove it to his fellows, may reasonably be a subject of grief and of shame. But the hardihood of guilt denies the truth, and the speculativeness of philosophy practically supersedes it:—and the necessity therefore remains.

We have seen that the duties of the religion which God has imparted to mankind require irresistance; and surely it is reasonable to believe, even without a reference to experience, that he will make our irresistance subservient to our

* It forms no part of a Christian's business to inquire why his religion forbids any given actions, although I know not that the inquiry is reprehensible. In the case of personal attack, possibly Christianity may decide, that if one of two men must be hurried from the world, of whom the first is so profligate as to assault the life of his fellow, and the other is so virtuous as to prefer the loss of life to the abandonment of Christian principles—it is more consistent with her will that the good should be transferred to his hoped felicity, than that the bad should be consigned to punishment.

interests—that if, for the purpose of conforming to his will, we subject ourselves to difficulty or danger, he will protect us in our obedience, and direct it to our benefit—that if he requires us not to be concerned in war, he will preserve us in peace—that he will not desert those who have no other protection, and who have abandoned all other protection because they confide in His alone.

And if we refer to experience, we shall find that the reasonableness of this confidence is confirmed. There have been thousands who have confided in Heaven in opposition to all their apparent interests, but of these thousands, has one eventually said that he repented his confidence, or that he reposed in vain?—"He that will lose his life for my sake and the gospel's, the same shall find it." If it be said that we take futurity into the calculation, in our estimate of *interest*, I answer—so we ought. Who is the man that would exclude futurity; or what are his principles? I do not comprehend the foundation of those objections to a reference to futurity which are thus flippantly made. Are we not immortal beings? Have we not interests beyond the present life? It is a deplorable temper of mind, which would diminish the frequency, or the influence, of our references to futurity. The prospects of the future *ought* to predominate over the sensations of the present. And if the attainment of this predominance be difficult, let us at least, not voluntarily, argumentatively, persuade ourselves to forego the prospect, or to diminish its influence.

Yet, even in reference only to the present state of existence, I believe we shall find that the testimony of experience is, that forbearance is most conducive to our interests.

Integer vitæ scelerisque purus
Non eget Mauri jaculis neque arcu,
Nec venenatis gravida sagittis,
Fusce, pharetra.

HORACE.

And the same truth is delivered by much higher authority than that of Horace, and in much stronger language:—"If a man's ways please the Lord, he maketh even his *enemies to be at peace with him.*"

The reader of American history will recollect that in the beginning of the last century, a desultory and most dreadful warfare was carried on by the natives against the European

settlers ; a warfare that was provoked, as such warfare has almost always originally been, by the injuries and violence of the Christians. The mode of destruction was secret and sudden. The barbarians sometimes lay in wait for those who might come within their reach on the highway or in the fields, and shot them without warning ; and sometimes they attacked the Europeans in their houses, “ scalping some, and knocking out the brains of others.” From this horrible warfare, the inhabitants sought safety by abandoning their homes, and retiring to fortified places, or to the neighbourhood of garrisons : and those whom necessity still compelled to pass beyond the limits of such protection, provided themselves with arms for their defence. But amidst this dreadful desolation and universal terror, the *Society of Friends*, who were a considerable proportion of the whole population, were steadfast to their principles. They would neither retire to garrisons, nor provide themselves with arms. They remained openly in the country, whilst the rest were flying to the forts. They still pursued their occupations in the fields or at their homes, without a weapon either for annoyance or defence. And what was their fate ? They lived in security and quiet. The habitation, which, to his armed neighbour, was the scene of murder and of the scalping-knife, was to the unarmed Quaker a place of safety and of peace.

Three of the Society were, however, killed. And who were they ? They were three who abandoned their principles. Two of these victims were men, who, in the simple language of the narrator, “ used to go to their labour without any weapons, and trusted to the Almighty, and depended on His providence to protect them ; (it being their principle not to use weapons of war to offend others or to defend themselves :) *but a spirit of distrust* taking place in their minds, they took weapons of war to defend themselves, and the Indians, who had seen them several times without them and let them alone, saying they were peaceable men and hurt nobody, therefore they would not hurt them,—now seeing them have guns, and supposing they designed to kill the Indians, they therefore shot the men dead.” The third whose life was sacrificed, was a woman, who “ had remained in her habitation,” not thinking herself warranted in going “ to a fortified place for preservation, neither she, her son, nor daughter, nor to take thither the little ones ; but the poor woman after some time began to let in a slavish fear, and

advised her children to go with her to a fort not far from their dwelling." She went;—and shortly afterwards "the bloody, cruel Indians, lay by the way, and killed her."*

The fate of the Quakers during the rebellion in Ireland was nearly similar. It is well known that the rebellion was a time not only of open war, but of cold blooded murder; of the utmost fury of bigotry, and the utmost exasperation of revenge. Yet the Quakers were preserved even to a proverb; and when strangers passed through streets of ruin and observed a house standing uninjured and alone, they would sometimes point, and say—"That, doubtless, was the house of a Quaker."†

It were to no purpose to say, in opposition to the evidence of these facts, that they form an exception to a general rule.—The exception to the rule consists in the *trial* of the experiment of non-resistance, not in its *success*. Neither were it to any purpose to say, that the savages of America, or the desperadoes of Ireland, spared the Quakers because they were *previously* known to be an unoffending people, or because the Quakers had *previously* gained the love of these by forbearance or good offices:—we concede all this; it is the very argument which we maintain. We say that an *uniform, undeviating* regard to the peaceable obligations of Christianity, *becomes the safeguard of those who practise it*. We venture to maintain that no reason whatever, can be assigned, why the fate of the Quakers would not be the fate of *all* who should adopt their conduct. No reason can be assigned why, if their number had been multiplied ten fold or a hundred fold, they would not have been preserved. If there be such a reason, let us hear it. The American and

* See "Select Anecdotes, &c., by John Barclay," p. 71—79. In this little volume I have found some illustrations of the *policy* of the principle which we maintain in the case of a personal attack. Barclay, the celebrated Apologist, was attacked by a highwayman. He made no other resistance than a calm expostulation. The felon dropped his presented pistol and offered no farther violence. A Leonard Fell, was assaulted by a highway robber, who plundered him of his money and his horse, and afterwards threatened to blow out his brains. Fell solemnly spoke to the robber on the wickedness of his life. The man was astonished:—he declared he would take neither his money nor his horse, and returned them both.—"If thine enemy hunger, feed him,—for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head."

† Note A. A.

Irish Quakers were, to the rest of the community, what one nation is to a continent. And we must require the advocate of war to produce, (that which has never yet been produced,) a reason for believing, that although individuals exposed to destruction were preserved, a nation exposed to destruction would be destroyed. We do not, however, say, that if a people, in the customary state of men's passions, should be assailed by an invader, and should, on a sudden, choose to declare that they would try whether Providence would protect them—of such a people, we do not say that they would experience protection, and that none of them would be killed. But we say that the evidence of experience is, that a people who habitually regard the obligations of Christianity in their conduct towards other men, and who steadfastly refuse, through whatever consequences, to engage in acts of hostility, *will experience protection in their peacefulness*: And it matters nothing to the argument, whether we refer that protection to the immediate agency of Providence, or to the influence of such conduct upon the minds of men.

Such has been the experience of the unoffending and unresisting, in individual life. A *National* example of a refusal to bear arms, has only once been exhibited to the world: But that one example has proved, so far as its political circumstances enabled it to prove, all that humanity could desire, and all that scepticism could demand, in favour of our argument.

It has been the ordinary practice of those who have colonized distant countries, to force a footing or to maintain it, with the sword. One of the first objects has been to build a fort and to provide a military. The adventurers became soldiers, and the colony was a garrison.—Pennsylvania was however colonized by men who believed that war was absolutely incompatible with Christianity, and who therefore resolved not to practise it. Having determined not to fight, they maintained no soldiers and possessed no arms. They planted themselves in a country that was surrounded by savages, and by savages who knew they were unarmed. If easiness of conquest, or incapability of defence, could subject them to outrage, the Pennsylvanians might have been the very sport of violence. Plunderers might have robbed them without retaliation, and armies might have slaughtered them without resistance. If they did not give a temptation to outrage, no temptation could be given. But these were

the people who possessed their country in security, whilst those around them were trembling for their existence. This was a land of peace, whilst every other was a land of war. The conclusion is inevitable, although it is extraordinary—they were in no need of arms *because they would not use them.*

These Indians were sufficiently ready to commit outrages upon other states, and often visited them with desolation and slaughter; with that sort of desolation, and that sort of slaughter, which might be expected from men whom civilization had not reclaimed from cruelty, and whom religion had not awed into forbearance. “But whatever the quarrels of the Pennsylvanian Indians were, with others, they uniformly respected and held as it were sacred, the territories of William Penn.”* “The Pennsylvanians never lost man, woman, or child by them, which neither the colony of Maryland, nor that of Virginia could say, no more than the great colony of New England.”†

The security and quiet of Pennsylvania was not a transient freedom from war, such as might accidentally happen to any nation. She continued to enjoy it “for more than seventy years,”‡ and subsisted in the midst of six Indian nations, without so much as a militia for her defence.”§ “The Pennsylvanians became armed, though without arms; they became strong, though without strength; they became safe, without the ordinary means of safety.—The constable’s staff was the only instrument of authority amongst them, for the greater part of a century, and never, during the administration of Penn or that of his proper successors, was there a quarrel or a war.”||

I cannot wonder that these people were not molested—extraordinary and unexampled as their security was. There is something so noble in this perfect confidence in the Supreme Protector, in this utter exclusion of “slavish fear,” in this voluntary relinquishment of the means of injury or of defence, that I do not wonder that even ferocity could be disarmed by such virtue. A people, generously living without arms, amidst nations of warriors! Who would attack a people such as this? There are few men so abandoned as not to respect such confidence. It were a peculiar and an


* Clarkson.

§ Oldmixon.

† Oldmixon, Anno 1708.

|| Clarkson, Life of Penn.

‡ Proud.



unusual intensity of wickedness that would not even revere it.

And when was the security of Pennsylvania molested, and its peace destroyed?—When the men who had directed its counsels and *who would not engage in war*, were *out-voted in its legislature*:—when *they who supposed that there was greater security in the sword than in Christianity, became the predominating body*. From that hour, the Pennsylvanians transferred their confidence in Christian principles, to a confidence in their arms; and from that hour to the present they have been subject to war.

Such is the evidence derived from a national example of the consequences of a pursuit of the Christian policy in relation to war. Here are a people who absolutely refused to fight, and who incapacitated themselves for resistance by refusing to possess arms, and this was the people whose land, amidst surrounding broils and slaughter, was selected as a land of security and peace. The only national opportunity which the virtue of the Christian world has afforded us of ascertaining the safety of relying upon God for defence, has determined that it is safe.

If the evidence which we possess, do not satisfy us of the expediency of confiding in God, what evidence do we ask, or what can we receive? We have his promise that he will protect those who abandon their seeming interests in the performance of his will, and we have the testimony of those who have confided in him, that he has protected them. Can the advocate of war produce one single instance in the history of man, of a person who had given an unconditional obedience to the will of heaven, and who did not find that his conduct was *wise* as well as virtuous, that it accorded with his *interests* as well as with his duty? We ask the same question in relation to the peculiar obligations to irrisistance. Where is the man who regrets, that in observance of the forbearing duties of Christianity, he consigned his preservation to the superintendence of God?—And the solitary national example that is before us, confirms the testimony of private life; for there is sufficient reason for believing that no nation, in modern ages, has possessed so large a portion of virtue or of happiness, as Pennsylvania before it had seen human blood. I would therefore repeat the question—What evidence do we ask, or can we receive?

This is the point from which we wander—WE DO NOT

BELIEVE IN THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD. When this statement is formally made to us, we think, perhaps, that it is not true; but our practice is an evidence of its truth—for if we did believe, we should also *confide* in it, and should be willing to stake upon it the consequences of our obedience.* We can talk with sufficient fluency of “trusting in Providence,” but in the application of it to our conduct in life, we know wonderfully little. Who is it that confides in Providence, and for what does he trust Him? Does his confidence induce him to set aside his own views of interest and safety, and simply to obey precepts which appear inexpedient and unsafe? This is the confidence that is of value, and of which we know so little. There are many who believe that war is disallowed by Christianity, and who would rejoice that it were forever abolished, but there are few who are willing to maintain an undaunted and unyielding stand against it. They can talk of the loveliness of peace, aye, and argue against the lawfulness of war, but when difficulty or suffering would be the consequence, they will not refuse to do what they know to be unlawful, they will not practise the peacefulness which they say they admire. Those who are ready to sustain the consequences of undeviating obedience are the supporters of whom Christianity stands in need. She wants men who are willing to *suffer* for her principles.

It is necessary for us to know by what principles we are governed. Are we regulated by the injunctions of God, or are we not? If there be any lesson of morality which it is of importance to mankind to learn, and if there be any which they have not yet learnt, it is the necessity of simply performing the duties of Christianity without reference to consequences. If we could persuade ourselves to do this, we should certainly pass life with greater consistency of conduct, and, as I firmly believe, in greater enjoyment and greater peace. The world has had many examples of such fidelity and confidence. Who have been the Christian martyrs of all ages, but men who maintained their fidelity to Christianity through whatever consequences? *They* were

* “The dread of being destroyed by our enemies if we do not go to war with them, is a plain and unequivocal proof of our disbelief in the superintendence of Divine Providence.”—*The Lawfulness of Defensive War impartially considered; by a Member of the Church of England.*

faithful to the Christian creed; *we* ought to be faithful to the Christian morality: without morality the profession of a creed is vain. Nay, we have seen that there have been martyrs to the duties of morality, and to these very duties of *peacefulness*. The duties remain the same, but where is our obedience?

I hope for the sake of his understanding and his heart, that the reader will not say I reason on the supposition that the world was, what it is not; and that although these duties may be binding upon us when the world shall become purer, yet that we must now accommodate ourselves to the state of things as they are. This is to say that in a land of assassins, assassination would be right. If no one begins to reform his practice, until others have begun before him, reformation will never be begun. If apostles, or martyrs, or reformers, had “accommodated themselves to the existing state of things,” where had now been Christianity? The business of reformation belongs to him who sees that reformation is required. The world has no other human means of amendment. If you believe that war is not allowed by Christianity, it is your business to oppose it; and if fear or distrust should raise questions on the consequences, apply the words of our Saviour—“What is that to thee?—Follow thou me.”

Our great misfortune in the examination of the duties of Christianity, is, that we do not contemplate them with sufficient simplicity. We do not estimate them without some addition or abatement of our own; there is almost always some intervening medium. A sort of half-transparent glass is hung before each individual, which possesses endless shades of colour and degrees of opacity, and which presents objects with endless varieties of distortion. This glass is coloured by our education and our passions. The business of moral culture is to render it transparent. The perfection of the perceptive part of moral culture is to remove it from before us.—*Simple obedience without reference to consequences*, is our great duty. I know that philosophers have told us otherwise: I know that we have been referred, for the determination of our duties, to calculations of expediency and of the future consequences of our actions:—but I believe that in whatever degree this philosophy directs us to forbear an unconditional obedience to the rules of our religion, it will be found, that when Christianity shall advance

in her purity and her power, she will sweep it from the earth with the besom of destruction.

The positions, then, which we have endeavoured to establish, are these:—

- I. That the general character of Christianity is wholly incongruous with war, and that its general duties are incompatible with it.
- II. That some of the express precepts and declarations of Jesus Christ virtually forbid it.
- III. That His practice is not reconcilable with the supposition of its lawfulness.
- IV. That the precepts and practice of the apostles correspond with those of our Lord.
- V. That the primitive Christians believed that Christ had forbidden war; and that some of them suffered death in affirmance of this belief.
- VI. That God has declared in prophecy, that it is His will that war should eventually be eradicated from the earth: and this eradication will be effected by Christianity, by the influence of its *present* principles.
- VII. That those who have refused to engage in war, in consequence of their belief of its inconsistency with Christianity, have found that Providence has protected them.

Now we think that the establishment of any considerable number of these positions is sufficient for our argument. The establishment of the whole, forms a body of evidence, to which I am not able to believe that an inquirer, to whom the subject was new, would be able to withhold his assent. But since such an inquirer cannot be found, I would invite the reader to lay prepossession aside, to suppose himself to have now first heard of battles and slaughter, and dispassionately to examine whether the evidence in favour of peace be not very great, and whether the objections to it bear any proportion to the evidence itself. But whatever may be the determination upon this question, surely it is reasonable to try the experiment whether security cannot be maintained without slaughter. Whatever be the reasons for war, it is certain that it produces enormous mischief. Even waving the obligations of Christianity, we have to choose between evils that are certain, and evils that are doubtful; between the actual endurance of a great calamity, and the possibility of a less. It certainly cannot be proved that

peace would not be the best policy ; and since we know that the present system is bad, it were reasonable and wise to try whether the other is not better. In reality, I can scarcely conceive the possibility of greater evil than that which mankind now endure ; an evil, moral and physical, of far wider extent, and far greater intensity, than our familiarity with it allows us to suppose. If a system of peace be not productive of less evil than the system of war, its consequences must, indeed, be enormously bad ; and that it would produce such consequences, we have no warrant for believing either from reason or from practice—either from the principles of the moral government of God, or from the experience of mankind. Whenever a people shall pursue, steadily and uniformly, the pacific morality of the gospel, and shall do this from the pure motive of obedience, there is no reason to fear for the consequences : there is no reason to fear that they would experience any evils such as we now endure, or that they would not find that Christianity understands their interests better than themselves ; and that the surest, and the only rule of wisdom, of safety, and of expediency, is to maintain her spirit in every circumstance of life.

“ There is reason to expect,” says Dr. Johnson, “ that as the world is more enlightened, policy and morality will at last be reconciled.”* When this enlightened period shall arrive, we shall be approaching, and we shall not till then approach, that era of purity and of peace, when “ violence shall be no more heard in our land, wasting nor destruction within our borders”—that era in which God has promised that “ they shall not hurt nor destroy in all His holy mountain.” That a period like this will come, I am not able to doubt : I believe it because it is not credible that He will always endure the butchery of man by man ; because he has declared that he will not endure it ; and because I think there is a perceptible approach of that period in which we will say—“ It is enough.”† In this belief I rejoice : I rejoice that the number is increasing of those who are asking,—“ Shall the sword devour for ever ?” and of those, who, whatever be the opinions or the practice of others, are openly saying, “ I am for peace.”‡

Whether I have succeeded in establishing the position

* Falkland's Islands.

† Psalm cxx. 7.

‡ 2 Sam. xxiv. 16.

THAT WAR, OF EVERY KIND, IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH CHRISTIANITY, it is not my business to determine; but of this, at least, I can assure the reader, that I would not have intruded this inquiry upon the public, if I had not believed, with undoubting confidence, that the position is accordant with everlasting truth;—with that truth which should regulate our conduct here, and which will not be superseded in the world that is to come.

PART III.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE EFFECTS OF WAR.

War's least horror is th' ensanguined field.—BARBAULD.

THERE are few maxims of more unfailing truth than that “A tree is known by its fruits;” and I will acknowledge that if the lawfulness of war were to be determined by a reference to its consequences, I should willingly consign it to this test, in the belief that, if popular impressions were suspended, a good, or a benevolent, or a reasoning man, would find little cause to decide in its favour.

In attempting to illustrate some of the effects of war, it is my purpose to inquire, not so much into its civil or political, as into its moral consequences; and of the latter, to notice those, chiefly, which commonly obtain little of our inquiry or attention. To speak strictly, indeed, civil and political considerations are necessarily involved in the moral tendency: for the happiness of society is always diminished by the diminution of morality; and enlightened policy knows that the greatest support of a state is the virtue of the people.

The reader needs not be reminded of—what nothing but the frequency of the calamity can make him forget—the intense sufferings and irreparable deprivations which a battle inevitably entails upon private life. These are calamities of which the world thinks little, and which, if it thought of them, it could not remove. A father or a husband can seldom be replaced: a void is created in the domestic felicity, which

there is little hope that the future will fill. By the slaughter of a war, there are thousands who weep in unpitied and unnoticed secrecy, whom the world does not see; and thousands who retire, in silence, to hopeless poverty, for whom it does not care. To these, the conquest of a kingdom is of little importance. The loss of a protector or a friend is ill repaid by empty glory. An addition of territory may add titles to a king, but the brilliancy of a crown throws little light upon domestic gloom. It is not my intention to insist upon these calamities, intense, and irreparable, and unnumbered as they are; but those who begin a war without taking them into their estimates of its consequences, must be regarded as, at most, half-seeing politicians. The legitimate object of political measures is the good of the people—and a great sum of good a war must produce, if it outbalances even *this* portion of its mischiefs.

In the more obvious effects of war, there is, however, a sufficient sum of evil and wretchedness. The most dreadful of these is the destruction of human life. The frequency with which this destruction is represented to our minds has almost extinguished our perception of its awfulness and horror. In the interval between Anno 1141 and 1815, our country has been at war with France alone, *two hundred and sixty-six years*. If to this we add our wars with other countries, probably we shall find that one half of the last six or seven centuries has been spent by this country in war! A dreadful picture of human violence! There is no means of knowing how many victims have been sacrificed during this lapse of ages. Those who have fallen in battle, and those who have perished “in tents and ships, amidst damps and putrefaction,” probably amount to a number, greater than the number of men now existing in France and England together. And where is our equivalent good?—“The wars of Europe, for these two hundred years last past, by the confession of all parties, have really ended in the advantage of none, but to the manifest detriment of all.” This is the testimony of the celebrated Dr. Josiah Tucker, Dean of Gloucester: And Erasmus has said, “I know not whether *ANY* war ever succeeded so fortunately in all its events, but that the conqueror, if he had a heart to feel or an understanding to judge as he ought to do, repented that he had ever engaged in it at all.”

Since the last war, we have heard much of the distresses

of the country; and whatever be the opinion, whether they have been brought upon us by the peace, none will question whether they have been brought upon us by war. The peace may be the occasion of them, but war has been the cause. I have no wish to declaim upon the amount of our national debt—that it is a great evil, and that it has been brought upon us by successive contests, no one disputes. Such considerations ought, undoubtedly, to influence the conduct of public men in their disagreements with other states, even if higher considerations do not influence it. They ought to form part of the calculations of the evil of hostility. I believe that a greater mass of human suffering and loss of human enjoyment are occasioned by the pecuniary distresses of a war, than any ordinary advantages of a war compensate. But this consideration seems too remote to obtain our notice. Anger at offence, or hope of triumph, overpowers the sober calculations of reason, and outbalances the weight of after and long continued calamities. If the happiness of the people were, what it ought to be, the primary and the ultimate object of national measures, I think that the policy which pursued this object, would often find that even the pecuniary distresses resulting from a war make a greater deduction from the quantum of felicity, than those evils which the war may have been designed to avoid. At least the distress is certain; the advantage doubtful. It is known that during the past eight years of the present peace, a considerable portion of the community have been in suffering in consequence of war. Eight years of suffering to a million of human creatures, is a serious thing! “It is no answer to say, that this universal suffering, and even the desolation that attends it, are the inevitable consequences and events of war, how warrantably soever entered into, but rather an argument that *no war* can be warrantably entered into, that may produce such intolerable mischiefs.”*

There is much of truth, as there is of eloquence, in these observations of one of the most acute intellects that our country has produced:—“It is wonderful with what coolness and indifference the greater part of mankind see war com-

* Lord Clarendon—who, however, excepts those wars which are likely “to introduce as much benefit to the world, as damage and inconvenience to a part of it.” The morality of this celebrated man, also, seems thus to have been wrecked upon the rock of *expediency*.

menced. Those that hear of it at a distance, or read of it in books, but have never presented its evils to their minds, consider it as little more than a splendid game, a proclamation, an army, a battle, and a triumph. Some, indeed, must perish in the most successful field; but they *die upon the bed of honour, resign their lives amidst the joys of conquest, and filled with England's glory, smile in death.* The life of a modern soldier is ill represented by heroic fiction. War has means of destruction more formidable than the cannon and the sword. Of the thousands and ten thousands that perished in our late contests with France and Spain, a very small part ever felt the stroke of an enemy. The rest languished in tents and ships, amidst damps and putrefaction, gasping and groaning unpitied amongst men made obdurate by long continuance of hopeless misery; and were at last whelmed in pits, or heaved into the ocean, without notice, and without remembrance. By incommodious encampments and unwholesome stations, where courage is useless and enterprise impracticable, fleets are silently dispeopled, and armies sluggishly melted away.

“Thus is a people gradually exhausted for the most part with little effect. The wars of civilized nations make very slow changes in the system of empire. The public perceives scarcely any alteration but an increase of debt; and the few individuals who are benefited, are not supposed to have the clearest right to their advantages. If he that shared the danger, enjoyed the profit, and after bleeding in the battle, grew rich by the victory, he might show his gains without envy. But at the conclusion of a ten years' war, how are we recompensed for the death of multitudes, and the expense of millions,* but by contemplating the sudden glories of paymasters and agents, and contractors and commissaries, whose equipages shine like meteors, and whose palaces rise like exhalations?

“These are the men, who without virtue, labour, or hazard, are growing rich as their country is impoverished; they rejoice when obstinacy or ambition adds another year to slaughter and devastation, and laugh from their desks at bravery and science, while they are adding figure to figure, and cipher to cipher, hoping for a new contract from a new

* Note B B.

armament, and computing the profits of a siege or a tempest.”*

Our business, however, is principally with the moral effects of war.

“The tenderness of nature, and the integrity of manners, which are driven away or powerfully discountenanced by the corruption of war, are not quickly recovered—and the weeds which grow up in the shortest war, can hardly be pulled up and extirpated without a long and unsuspected peace.”—“War introduces and propagates opinions and practice as much against heaven as against earth;—it lays our natures and manners as waste as our gardens and our habitations; and we can as easily preserve the beauty of the one as the integrity of the other, under the cursed jurisdiction of drums and trumpets.”†

“War does more harm to the morals of men than even to their property and persons.”‡ “It is a temporary repeal of all the principles of virtue.”§ “There is not a virtue of gospel goodness but has its death-blow from war.”||

I do not know whether the greater sum of moral evil resulting from war, is suffered by those who are immediately engaged in it, or by the public. The mischief is most extensive upon the community, but upon the profession it is most intense.

Rara fides pietasque viris qui castra sequuntur.

LUCAN.

No one pretends to applaud the morals of an army, and for its religion, few think of it at all. A soldier is depraved even to a proverb. The fact is too notorious to be insisted upon, that thousands who had filled their stations in life with propriety, and been virtuous from principle, have lost, by a military life, both the practice and the regard of morality; and when they have become habituated to the vices of war, have laughed at their honest and plodding brethren who are still spiritless enough for virtue, or stupid enough for piety. The vices which once had shocked them, become the subject, not of acquiescence, but of exultation. “Almost all the professions,” says Dr. Knox, “have some characteristic manners which the professors seem to adopt with little examination, as

* Johnson—Falkland’s Islands.

† Lord Clarendon’s Essays.

‡ Erasmus.

§ Hall.

|| William Law, A. M.

necessary and as honourable distinctions. It happens, unfortunately, that profligacy, libertinism, and infidelity, are thought, by weaker minds, almost as necessary a part of a soldier's uniform, as his shoulder-knot. To hesitate at an oath, to decline intoxication, to profess a regard for religion, would be almost as ignominious as to refuse a challenge."*

It is, however, not necessary to insist upon the immoral influence of war upon the military character, since no one probably will dispute it. Nor is it difficult to discover how the immorality is occasioned. It is obvious that those who are continually engaged in a practice, "in which almost all the vices are incorporated," and who promote this practice with individual eagerness, cannot, without the intervention of a miracle, be otherwise than collectively depraved.

If the soldier engages in the destruction of his species, he should at least engage in it with reluctance, and abandon it with joy. The slaughter of his fellow men should be dreadful in execution and in thought. But what is his aversion or reluctance? He feels none—it is not even a subject of seriousness to him. He butchers his fellow candidates for heaven, as a woodman fells a coppice; with as little reluctance, and as little regret.

Those who will compute the tendency of this familiarity with human destruction, cannot doubt whether it will be pernicious to the moral character. What is the hope, that he who is familiar with murder, who has himself often perpetrated it, and who exults in the perpetration, will retain undepraved the principles of virtue? His moral feelings are blunted: His moral vision is obscured. We say his *moral vision* is obscured; for we do not think it possible that he should retain even the *perception* of Christian purity. The soldier, again, who plunders the citizen of another nation without remorse or reflection, and bears away the spoil with triumph, will inevitably lose something of his principles of probity. These principles are shaken; an inroad is made upon their integrity, and it is an inroad that makes after inroads the more easy. Mankind do not generally resist the influence of habit. If we rob and shoot those who are "enemies" to-day, we are in some degree prepared to shoot and rob those who are not enemies to-morrow. The strength

* Essays.—No. 19. Knox justly makes much exception to the applicability of these censures.

of the restraining *moral principle* is impaired. Law may, indeed, still restrain us from violence; but the power and efficiency of principle is diminished. And this alienation of the mind from the practice, the love, and the perception of Christian purity, therefore, of necessity, extends its influence to the other circumstances of life; and it is *hence*, in part, that the general profligacy of armies arises. That which we have not practised in war we are little likely to practise in peace; and there is no hope that we shall possess the goodness which we neither *love* nor *perceive*.

Another means by which war becomes pernicious to the moral character of the soldier, is the incapacity which the profession occasions for the sober pursuits of life. "The profession of a soldier," says Dr. Paley, "almost always unfits men for the business of regular occupations." On the question, whether it be better that of three inhabitants of a village, one should be a soldier and two husbandmen, or that all should occasionally become both, he says, that from the latter arrangement the country receives three raw militiamen and three *idle and profligate peasants*.* War cannot be continual. Soldiers must sometimes become citizens: and citizens who are unfit for stated business will be idle; and they who are idle will scarcely be virtuous. A political project, therefore, such as a war, which will eventually pour fifty or a hundred thousand of such men upon the community, must of necessity be an enormous evil to a state. It were an infelicitous defence to say, that soldiers do not become idle until the war is closed, or they leave the army.—To keep men out of idleness by employing them in cutting other men's limbs and bodies, is at least an extraordinary economy; and the profligacy still remains; for, unhappily, if war keeps soldiers busy, it does not keep them good.

By a peculiar and unhappy coincidence, the moral evil attendant upon the profession is perpetuated by the after system of *half-pay*. We have no concern with this system on political or pecuniary considerations; but it will be obvious that those who return from war, with the principles and habits of war, are little likely to improve either by a life without necessary occupation or express object. By this system, there are thousands of men in the prime, or in the bloom of life, who live without such object or oc-

* Note C C.

cupation. This would be an evil, if it happened to any set of men, but upon men who have been soldiers the evil is peculiarly intense. He whose sense of moral obligation has been impaired by the circumstances of his former life, and whose former life has induced habits of disinclination to regular pursuits, is the man who, above all others, it is unfortunate for the interests of purity should be supported on "half-pay." If war have occasioned "unfitness for regular occupations," he will not pursue them; if it have familiarized him with profligacy, he will be little restrained by virtue. And the consequences of consigning men under such circumstances to society, at a period of life when the mind is busy and restless and the passions are strong, must, of inevitable necessity, be bad.—The officer who leaves the army with the income only which the country allows him, often finds sufficient difficulty in maintaining the character of a gentleman. A gentleman, however, he will be; and he who resolves to appear rich whilst he is poor, who will not increase his fortune by industry, and who has learnt to have few restraints from principle, sometimes easily persuades himself to pursue schemes of but very exceptionable probity. Indeed, by his peculiar law, the "law of honour," honesty is not required.

I do not know whether it be *politic* that he who has held a commission should not be expected to use a ledger or a yard; but since, by thus becoming a "military gentleman," the number is increased of those who regulate their conduct by the law of honour, the rule is necessarily pernicious in its effects. When it is considered that this law allows of "profaneness, neglect of public worship and private devotion, cruelty to servants, rigorous treatment of tenants or other dependants, want of charity to the poor, injuries to tradesmen by insolvency or delay of payment, with numberless examples of the same kind;" that it is, "in most instances, favourable to the licentious indulgence of the natural passions;" that it allows of adultery, drunkenness, prodigality, duelling, and of revenge in the extreme"—when all this is considered, it is manifestly inevitable, that those who regulate their conduct by the maxims of such a law, must become, as a body, reduced to a low station in the scale of morality.†

* Dr. Paley.

† There is something very unmanly and cowardly in some of the maxims of this law of honour. How unlike the fortitude, the

We insist upon these things *because they are the consequences of war*. We have no concern with “half pay,” or with the “law of honour;”* but with war, which extends the evil of the one, and creates the evil of the other. Soldiers may be depraved—and part of their depravity is, undoubtedly, their crime, but part also is their misfortune. *The whole evil* is imputable to war; and we say that this evil forms a powerful evidence against it, whether we direct that evidence to the abstract question of its lawfulness or to the practical question of its expediency. *That* can scarcely be lawful, which necessarily occasions such enormous depravity. *That* can scarcely be expedient, which is so pernicious to virtue, and therefore to the state.

The economy of war requires of every soldier, an implicit submission to his superior; and this submission is required of every gradation of rank to that above it. This system may be necessary to hostile operations, but I think it is unquestionably adverse to intellectual and moral excellence.

The very nature of unconditional obedience implies the relinquishment of the use of the reasoning powers. Little more is required of the soldier than that he be obedient and brave. His obedience is that of an animal, which is moved by a goad or a bit, without judgment or volition of his own; and his bravery is that of a mastiff which fights whatever mastiff others put before him.—It is obvious that in such agency, the intellect and the understanding have little part. Now I think that this is important. He who, with whatever motive, resigns the direction of his conduct implicitly to another, surely cannot retain that erectness and independence of mind, that manly consciousness of mental freedom, which is one of the highest privileges of our nature. The rational being becomes reduced in the intellectual scale: an encroachment is made upon the integrity of its independence. God has given us, individually, capacities for the

manliness of real courage, are the motives of him who fights a duel! He accepts a challenge, commonly because he is afraid to refuse it. The question with him is, whether he fears more, *a pistol or the world's dread frown*; and his conduct is determined by the preponderating influence of one of these objects of fear. If I am told that he probably feels no fear of death; I answer, that if he fears not the death of a duellist, his principles have sunk to that abyss of depravity, whence nothing but the interposition of Omnipotence is likely to reclaim them.

* Note D D.

regulation of our individual conduct. To resign its direction, therefore, to the despotism of another, appears to be an unmanly and unjustifiable relinquishment of the privileges which he has granted to us. Referring simply to the conclusions of reason, I think those conclusions would be that military obedience must be pernicious to the mind. And if we proceed from reasoning to facts, I believe that our conclusions will be confirmed. Is the military character distinguished by intellectual eminence? Is it not distinguished by intellectual inferiority? I speak, of course, of the *exercise* of intellect; and I believe that if we look around us, we shall find that no class of men, in a parallel rank in society, exercise it less, or less honourably to human nature, than the military profession.* I do not, however, attribute the want of intellectual excellence, solely to the implicit submissions of a military life. Nor do I say that this want is so much the fault of the soldier, as of the circumstances to which he is subjected. We attribute this evil, also, to its rightful parent. The resignation of our actions to the direction of a foreign will, is made so familiar to us by war, and is mingled with so many associations which reconcile it, that I am afraid lest the reader should not contemplate it with sufficient abstraction.—Let him remember that *in nothing but in war* do we submit to it.

It becomes a subject yet more serious, if military obedience requires the relinquishment of our moral agency, if it requires us to do, not only what may be opposed to our will, but what is opposed to our consciences. And it does require this; a soldier must obey, how criminal soever the command, and how criminal soever he knows it to be. It is certain that of those who compose armies, many commit actions which they believe to be wicked, and which they would not commit but for the obligations of a military life. Although a soldier determinately believes that the war is unjust, al-

* This inferiority will, probably, be found less conspicuous in the private than in his superiors. Employment in different situations, or in foreign countries, and the consequent acquisition of information, often make the private soldier superior in intelligence to labourers and mechanics; a cause of superiority, which, of course, does not similarly operate amongst men of education.

We would here beg the reader to bear in his recollection, the limitations which are stated in the preface, respecting the application of any apparent severity in our remarks.

though he is convinced that his particular part of the service is atrociously criminal, still he must proceed—he must prosecute the purposes of injustice or robbery ; he must participate in the guilt and be himself a robber. When we have sacrificed thus much of principle, what do we retain ? If we abandon all use of our perceptions of good and evil, to what purpose has the capacity of perception been given ? It were as well to possess no sense of right and wrong, as to prevent ourselves from the pursuit or rejection of them. To abandon some of the most exalted privileges which Heaven has granted to mankind, to refuse the acceptance of them, and to throw them back, as it were, upon the Donor, is surely little other than profane. He who *hid* a talent, was, of old, punished for his wickedness—what then is the offence of him who refuses to receive it ? Such a resignation of our moral agency is not contended for or tolerated in any one other circumstance of human life. War stands upon this pinnacle of depravity alone. She, only, in the supremacy of crime, has told us that she has abolished even the obligation to be virtuous.

To what a situation is a rational and responsible being reduced, who commits actions, good or bad, mischievous or beneficial at the word of another ! I can conceive no greater degradation. It is the lowest, the final abjectness of the moral nature. It is *this* if we abate the glitter of war, and if we add this glitter it is nothing more. Surely the dignity of reason, and the light of revelation, and our responsibility to God, should make us pause before we become the voluntary subjects of this monstrous system.

I do not know, indeed, under what circumstances of *responsibility* a man supposes himself to be placed, who thus abandons and violates his own sense of rectitude and of his duties. Either he is responsible for his actions or he is not ; and the question is a serious one to determine. Christianity has certainly never stated any cases in which personal responsibility ceases. If she admits such cases, she has at least not told us so ; but she has told us, explicitly and repeatedly, that she does require individual obedience and impose individual responsibility. She has made no exceptions to the imperativeness of her obligations, whether we are required to neglect them or not ; and I can discover in her sanctions, no reason to suppose that in her final adjudications she admits the plea *that another required us to do*

that which she required us to forbear.—But it may be feared, it may be *believed*, that how little soever religion will abate of the responsibility of those who obey, she will impose not a little upon those who command. They, at least, are answerable for the enormities of war; unless, indeed, any one shall tell me that responsibility attaches no where, that that which would be wickedness in another man, is innocence in a soldier, and that Heaven has granted to the directors of war, a privileged immunity, by virtue of which crime incurs no guilt and receives no punishment.

It appears to me that the obedience which war exacts to arbitrary power, possesses more of the character of servility and even of slavery, than we are accustomed to suppose; and as I think this consideration may reasonably affect our feeling of independence, how little soever higher considerations may affect our consciences, I would allow myself in a few sentences upon the subject. I will acknowledge that when I see a company of men in a stated dress, and of a stated colour, ranged, rank and file, in the attitude of obedience, turning or walking at the word of another, now changing the position of a limb and now altering the angle of a foot, I feel humiliation and shame. I feel humiliation and shame when I think of the capacities and the prospects of man, at seeing him thus drilled into obsequiousness and educated into machinery. I do not know whether I shall be charged with indulging in idle sentiment or idler affectation. If I hold unusual language upon the subject, let it be remembered that the subject is itself unusual. I will retract my affectation and sentiment, if the reader will show me any case in life parallel to that to which I have applied it.

No one questions whether military power *be* arbitrary. *That which governs an army*, says Paley, *is DESPOTISM*: and the subjects of despotic power we call slaves. Yet a man may live under an arbitrary prince with only the *liability* to slavery; he may live and die, unmolested in his person and unrestrained in his freedom. But the despotism of an army is an operative despotism, and a soldier is practically and personally a slave. Submission to arbitrary authority is the business of his life: the will of the despot is his rule of action.

It is vain to urge that if this be slavery, every one who labours for another is a slave; because there is a difference between the subjection of a soldier and that of all other la-

bourers, in which the essence of slavery consists. If I order my servant to do a given action, he is at liberty, if he think the action improper, or if, from any other cause, he choose not to do it, to refuse his obedience. I can discharge him from my service indeed, but I cannot *compel* obedience or *punish* his refusal. The soldier *is* thus punished or compelled. It matters not whether he have entered the service voluntarily or involuntarily: being there, he is required to do what may be, and what in fact often is, opposed to his will and his judgment. If he refuse obedience he is dreadfully punished; his flesh is lacerated and torn from his body, and finally, if he persist in his refusal, he may be shot. Neither is he permitted to leave the service. His natural right to go whither he would, of which nothing but his own crimes otherwise deprives him, is denied to him by war. If he attempt to exercise this right he is pursued as a felon, he is brought back in irons, and is miserably tortured for "desertion." This, therefore, we think is slavery.

I have heard it contended that an apprentice is a slave equally with a soldier; but it appears to be forgotten that an apprentice is consigned to the government of another because he is not able to govern himself. But even were apprenticeship to continue through life, it would serve the objection but little. Neither custom nor law allows a master to require his apprentice to do an immoral action. There is nothing in his authority analogous to that which compels a soldier to do what he is persuaded is wicked or unjust. Neither, again, can a master compel the obedience of an apprentice by the punishments of a soldier. Even if his commands be reasonable, he cannot, for refractoriness, torture him into a swoon and then revive him with stimulants only to torture him again; still less can he take him to a field and shoot him. And if the command be vicious, he may not punish his disobedience at all.—Bring the despotism that governs an army into the government of the state, and what would Englishmen say? They would say, with one voice, that Englishmen were slaves.

If this view of military subjection fail to affect our pride, we are to attribute the failure to that power of public opinion by which all things seem reconcilable to us; by which situations that would otherwise be loathsome and revolting, are made not only tolerable but pleasurable. Take away the influence and the gloss of public opinion from the situation of

a soldier, and what should we call it? We should call it a state of insufferable degradation; of pitiable slavery. But public opinion, although it may influence notions cannot alter things. Whatever may be our notion of the soldier's situation, he has indisputably resigned both his moral and his natural liberty to the government of despotic power. He has added to ordinary slavery, the slavery of the conscience; and he is therefore, in a twofold sense, a slave.

If I be asked why I thus complain of the nature of military obedience, I answer, with Dr. Watson, that all "despotism is an offence against natural justice; it is a degradation of the dignity of man, and ought not, on any occasion, to be either practised or submitted to:"—I answer that the obedience of a soldier does, in point of fact, depress the erectness and independence of his mind;—I answer, again, that it is a sacrifice of his moral agency, which impairs and vitiates his principles, and which our religion emphatically condemns; and, finally and principally I answer, that such obedience is not defended or permitted for any other purpose than the prosecution of war, and that it is therefore a powerful evidence against the solitary system that requires it. I do not question the necessity of despotism to war: it is because I know that it is necessary that I thus refer to it; for I say that *whatever* makes such despotism and consequent degradation and vice necessary, must itself be bad, and must be utterly incompatible with the principles of Christianity.*

Yet I do not know whether, in its effects on the military character, the greatest moral evil of war is to be sought. Upon the community its effects are indeed less apparent, because they who are the secondary subjects of the immoral influence are less intensely affected by it than the immediate agents of its diffusion. But whatever is deficient in the degree of evil, is probably more than compensated by its extent. The influence is like that of a continual and noxious vapour; we neither regard nor perceive it, but it secretly undermines the moral health.

* I would scarcely refer to the monstrous practice of impressing seamen, because there are many who deplore and many who condemn it. Whether this also be necessary to war, I know not: probably it is necessary; and if it be, I would ask no other evidence against the system that requires it. Such an invasion of the natural rights of man, such a monstrous assumption of arbi-

Every one knows that vice is contagious. The depravity of one man has always a tendency to deprave his neighbours; and it therefore requires no unusual acuteness to discover, that the prodigious mass of immorality and crime, which are accumulated by a war, must have a powerful effect in "demoralizing" the public. But there is one circumstance connected with the injurious influence of war, which makes it peculiarly operative and malignant. It is, that we do not hate or fear the influence, and do not fortify ourselves against it. Other vicious influences insinuate themselves into our minds by stealth; but this we receive with open embrace. If a felon exhibits an example of depravity and outrage, we are little likely to be corrupted by it; because we do not love his conduct or approve it. But from whatever cause it happens, the whole system of war is the subject of our complacency or pleasure; and it is *therefore* that its mischief is so immense. If the soldier who is familiarized with slaughter and rejoices in it, loses some of his Christian dispositions, the citizen who, without committing the slaughter, unites in the exultation, loses also some of his. If he who ravages a city and plunders its inhabitants, impairs his principles of probity, he who approves and applauds the outrage, loses also something of his integrity or benevolence. We acknowledge these truths when applied to other cases. It is agreed that a frequency of capital punishments has a tendency to make the people callous, to harden them against human suffering, and to deprave their moral principles. And the same effect will necessarily be produced by war, of which the destruction of life is incomparably greater, and of which our abhorrence is incomparably less.—The simple truth is that we are gratified and delighted with things which are incompatible with Christianity, and that our minds therefore become alienated from its love. Our affections cannot be fully directed to "two masters." If we love and delight in war, we are little likely to love and delight in the dispositions of Christianity.—And the evil is in its own nature of almost universal operation. During a war, a whole people become familiarized with the utmost excesses of enormity—with the utmost intensity of human wickedness—and they rejoice and exult in them; so that there is probably not an trary power, such a violation of every principle of justice, cannot possibly be necessary to any system of which Christianity approves.

individual in a hundred who does not lose something of his Christian principles by a ten years' war.

The effect of the system in preventing the perception, the love, and the *operation* of Christian principles, in the minds of men who know the nature and obligations of them, needs little illustration. We often see that Christianity cannot accord with the system, but the conviction does not often operate on our minds. In one of the speeches of Bishop Watson in the House of Lords, there occur these words:—"Would to God, my lords, that the spirit of the Christian religion would exert its influence over the hearts of individuals in their public capacity; then would revenge, avarice, and ambition, which have fattened the earth with the blood of her children, be banished from the counsels of princes and there would be no more war. The time will come—the prophet hath said it and I believe it—the time will assuredly come when nation, literally speaking, shall no longer lift up sword against nation.—No man will rejoice, my lords, more than I shall, to see the time when peace shall depend on an obedience to the benevolent principles of the gospel."* This is language becoming a Christian. Would it have been believed that this same man voluntarily and studiously added almost one half to the power of gunpowder, in order that the ball which before would kill but six men, might now kill ten—and that he did this, knowing that its purpose was to spread wider destruction and bloodier slaughter? Above all, would it be believed that he recorded this achievement as an evidence of his sagacity, and that he recorded it in the book which contains the declaration I have quoted?

The same consequences attach to the influence of the soldier's personal character. Whatever that character be, if it arise out of his profession, we seldom regard it with repulsion. We look upon him as a man whose *honour and spirit* compensate for "venial errors." If he be spirited and gallant, we ask not for his virtue and care not for his profligacy. We look upon the sailor as a brave and noble fellow, who may reasonably be allowed in droll profaneness, and sailor-like debaucheries—debaucheries, which, in the paid-off crew of a man-of-war, seem sometimes to be animated by

—— the dissolutes Spirit that fell,
The fleshliest Incubus.

* Life of Bishop Watson.

We are, however, much diverted by them. The sailor's cool and clumsy vices are very amusing to us; and so that he amuses us we are indifferent to his crimes. That some men should be wicked, is bad—that the many should feel complacency in wickedness, is, perhaps, worse. We may flatter ourselves with dreams of our own virtue, but that virtue is very questionable—those principles are very unoperative, which permit us to receive pleasure from the contemplation of human depravity, with whatever “honour or spirit” that depravity is connected. Such principles and virtue will oppose, at any rate, little resistance to temptation. An abhorrence of wickedness is more than an outwork of the moral citadel. He that does not hate vice has opened a passage for its entrance.*

I do not think that those who feel an interest in the virtue and the happiness of the world will regard the animosity of party and the restlessness of resentment which are produced by a war, as trifling evils. If any thing be opposite to Christianity it is retaliation and revenge. In the obligation to restrain these dispositions, much of the characteristic pliability of Christianity consists. The very essence and spirit of our religion are abhorrent from resentment.—The very essence and spirit of war are promotive of resentment; and what then must be their mutual adverseness? That war excites these passions, needs not be proved. When a war is in contemplation, or when it has been begun, what are the endeavours of its promoters? They animate us by every artifice of excitement to hatred and animosity. Pamphlets, placards, newspapers, caricatures—every agent is in requisition to irritate us into malignity. Nay, dreadful as it is, the pulpit resounds with declamations to stimulate our too sluggish resentment and to invite us to blood.—And thus the most unchristian-like of all our passions, the passion which it is most the object of our religion to repress, is excited and fostered. Christianity cannot be flourishing under circumstances like these. The more effectually we are animated to

* All sober men allow this to be true in relation to the influence of those *Novels* which decorate a profligate character with objects of attraction. They allow that our complacency with these subjects abates our hatred of the accompanying vices.—And the same also is true in relation to war; with the difference, indeed, which is likely to exist between the influence of the vices of fiction and that of the vices of real life.

war, the more nearly we extinguish the dispositions of our religion. War and Christianity are like the opposite ends of a balance, of which one is depressed by the elevation of the other.

These are the consequences which make war dreadful to a state. Slaughter and devastation are sufficiently terrible, but their collateral evils are their greatest. It is *the immoral feeling* that war diffuses—it is *the depravation of principle*, which forms the mass of its mischief.

There is one mode of hostility that is allowed and encouraged by war, which appears to be distinguished by peculiar atrocity: I mean privateering. If war could be shown to be necessary or right, I think this, at least, were indefensible. It were surely enough that army slaughtered army and that fleet destroyed fleet, without arming individual avarice for private plunder, and legalizing robbery because it is not of our countrymen. Who are the victims of this plunder, and what are its effects? Does it produce any mischief to our enemies but the ruin of those who perhaps would gladly have been friends;—of those who are made enemies only by the will of their rulers, and who now conduct their commerce with no other solicitude about the war than how they may escape the rapine which it sanctions? Privateering can scarcely plead even the merit of public mischief in its favour. An empire is little injured by the wretchedness and starvation of a few of its citizens. The robbery may, indeed, be carried to such extent, and such multitudes may be plundered, that the ruin of individuals may impart poverty to a state. But for *this* mischief the privateer can seldom hope: and what is that practice, of which the only topic of defence is the enormity of its mischief!

There is a yet more dreadful consideration: The privateer is not only a robber but a murderer. If he cannot otherwise plunder his victim, human life is no obstacle to his rapine. Robbery is his object, and his object he will attain. Nor has he the ordinary excuses of slaughter in his defence. His government does not require it of him: He makes no pretext of patriotism, but robs and murders of his own choice, and simply for gain. The soldier makes a bad apology when he pleads the command of his superior, but the privateer has no command to plead; and with no object but plunder, he deliberately seeks a set of ruffians who are unprincipled enough for robbery, and ferocious enough for murder, and

sallies with them upon the ocean, like tigers upon a desert, and like tigers prowling for prey.—To talk of Christianity, as permitting these monstrous proceedings, implies deplorable fatuity, or more deplorable profaneness. I would, however, hope, that he who sends out a privateer has not so little shame as to pretend to conscience or honesty.—If he will be a robber and a murderer, let him at least not be a hypocrite; for it is hypocrisy for such men to pretend to religion or morality. He that thus robs the subjects of another country, wants nothing but impunity to make him rob his neighbour: He has no restraint from principle.

I know not how it happens that men make pretensions to Christianity whilst they *sanction* or *promote* such prodigious wickedness. It is sufficiently certain, that whatever be their pretensions to it, it is not operative upon their conduct. Such men may talk of religion, but they neither possess nor regard it: And although I would not embrace in such censure, those, who without immediate or remote participation in the crime, look upon it with secret approbation because it injures their “enemies,” I would nevertheless suggest to their consideration, whether *their* moral principles are at that point in the scale of purity and benevolence which religion enjoins.

We often hear, during a war, of subsidies from one nation to another for the loan of an army; and we hear of this without any emotion, except, perhaps, of joy at the greater probability of triumph, or of anger that our money is expended. Yet, surely, if we contemplate such a bargain for a moment, we shall perceive that our first and greatest emotion ought to be abhorrence.—To borrow ten thousand men who know nothing of our quarrel, and care nothing for it, to help us to slaughter their fellows! To pay for their help in guineas to their sovereign! Well has it been exclaimed

War is a game, that were their subjects wise,
Kings would not play at.*

A king sells his subjects as a farmer sells his cattle; and sends them to destroy a people, whom, if they had been higher bidders, he would, perhaps, have sent them to defend. That kings should do this, may grieve, but it cannot surprise us: Avarice has been as unprincipled in humbler life; the pos-

* Note E E.

sible malignity of individual wickedness is, perhaps, without any limit. But that a large number of persons with the feelings and reason of men, should coolly listen to the bargain of their sale, should compute the guineas that will pay for their blood, and should then quietly be led to a place where they are to kill people towards whom they have no animosity, is simply wonderful. To what has inveteracy of habit reconciled mankind! I have no capacity of supposing a case of slavery, if slavery be denied in this. Men have been sold in another continent, and England has been shocked and aroused to interference; yet these men were sold, not to be slaughtered but to work: but of the purchases and sales of the world's political butchers, England cares nothing and thinks nothing—nay, she is a participator in the bargains. There is no reason to doubt that upon other subjects of horror, similar familiarity of habit would produce similar effects; or that he who heedlessly contemplates the purchase of an army, wants nothing but this familiarity to make him heedlessly look on at the commission of parricide. If we could for one moment emancipate ourselves from this power of habit, how would it change the scene that is before us! Little would remain to war of splendour or glory, but we should be left with one wide waste of iniquity and wretchedness.

It is the custom, during the continuance of a war, to offer public prayers for the success of our arms—and our enemies pray also for the success of theirs. I will acknowledge that this practice appears to me to be eminently shocking and profane. The idea of two communities of Christians, separated perhaps by a creek, at the same moment begging their common Father to assist them in reciprocal destruction, is an idea of horror to which I know no parallel. *Lord assist us to slaughter our enemies:* This is our petition.—“Father, forgive them; they know not what they do.”—This is the petition of Christ.

It is certain, that of two contending communities, both cannot be in the right. Yet both appeal to heaven to avouch the justice of their cause, and both mingle with their petitions for the increase, perhaps, of Christian dispositions, importunities to the God of mercy to assist them in the destruction of one another. Taking into account the ferocity of the request—the solemnity of its circumstances—the falsehood of its representations—the fact that both parties are Christians, and that their importunities are simultaneous

to their common Lord, I do not think that the world exhibits another example of such irreverent and shocking iniquity. Surely it were enough that we slaughter one another alone in our pigmy quarrels, without soliciting the Father of the universe to be concerned in them: surely it were enough that each reviles the other with the iniquity of his cause, without each assuring Heaven that *he* only is in the right—an assurance that is false, probably in both, and certainly in one.

To attempt to pursue the consequences of war through all her ramifications of evil, were, however, both endless and vain. It is a moral gangrene which diffuses its humours through the whole political and social system. To expose its mischief, is to exhibit all evil; for there is no evil which it does not occasion, and it has much that is peculiar to itself.

That, together with its multiplied evils, war produces some good, I have no wish to deny. I know that it sometimes elicits valuable qualities which had otherwise been concealed, and that it often produces collateral and adventitious, and sometimes immediate advantages. If all this could be denied, it would be needless to deny it, for it is of no consequence to the question whether it be proved. That any wide extended system should not produce *some* benefits, can never happen. In such a system, it were an unheard-of purity of evil, which was evil without any mixture of good. But, to compare the ascertained advantages of war, with its ascertained mischiefs, or with the ascertained advantages of a system of peace, and to maintain a question as to the preponderance of good, implies not ignorance, but guilt—not incapacity of determination, but voluntary falsehood.

But I rejoice in the conviction that the hour is approaching, when Christians shall cease to be the murderers of one another. Christian light is certainly spreading, and there is scarcely a country in Europe, in which the arguments for unconditional peace, have not recently produced conviction. This conviction is extending in our own country, in such a degree, and upon such minds, that it makes the charge of enthusiasm or folly, vain and idle. The friends of peace, if we choose to despise their opinions, cannot themselves be despised; and every year is adding to their number, and to the sum of their learning and their intellect.

It will perhaps be asked, what then are the duties of a subject who believes that all war is incompatible with his religion, but whose governors engage in a war and demand his service? We answer explicitly, *It is his duty, mildly and temperately, yet firmly, to refuse to serve.*—There are some persons, who, without any determinate process of reasoning, appear to conclude that responsibility for national measures attaches solely to those who direct them; that it is the business of *governments* to consider what is good for the community, and that, in these cases, the duty of the subject is merged in the will of the sovereign. Considerations like these, are, I believe, often voluntarily permitted to become opiates of the conscience. *I have no part*, it is said, *in the counsels of the government, and am not, therefore, responsible for its crimes.* We are, indeed, not responsible for the crimes of our rulers, but we are responsible for our own; and the crimes of our rulers *are* our own; if, whilst we believe them to be crimes, we promote them by our co-operation. “It is at all times,” says Gisborne, “the duty of an Englishman, stedfastly to decline obeying any orders of his superiors, which his conscience should tell him were in any degree impious or unjust.”* The apostles, who instructed their converts to be subject to every ordinance of man for conscience’ sake, and to submit themselves to those who were in authority, and who taught them, that whoever resisted the power, resisted the ordinance of God, made one necessary and uniform provision—*that the magistrate did not command them to do, what God had commanded them to forbear.*† With the regulations which the government of a country thought fit to establish, the apostles complied, whatever they might think of their wisdom or the expediency, provided, and only provided, they did not, by this compliance, abandon their allegiance to the Governor of the world. It is scarcely necessary to observe in how many cases they refused to obey the commands of the governments under which they were placed, or how openly they maintained the duty of refusal, whenever these commands interfered with their higher obligations. It is narrated very early in “the Acts,” that one of their number was imprisoned for preaching, that he was commanded to preach no more, and was then released. Soon afterwards all the apostles were

* Duties of men in Society.

† Note F. F.

imprisoned.—“Did we not straitly command you,” said the rulers, “that ye should not teach in this name?”—The answer which they made is in point:—“We ought to obey God rather than men.”* And this system they continued to pursue. If Cæsar had ordered one of the apostles to be enrolled in his legions, does any one believe that he would have served?

But those who suppose that obedience in all things is required, or that responsibility in political affairs, is transferred from the subject to the sovereign, reduce themselves to a great dilemma. It is to say that we must resign our conduct and our consciences to the will of others, and act wickedly or well, as their good or evil may preponderate, without merit for virtue or responsibility for crime. If the government direct you to fire your neighbour's property, or to throw him over a precipice, will you obey? If you will not, there is an end of the argument; for if you may reject its authority in one instance, where is the limit to rejection? There is no rational limit but that which is assigned by Christianity, and that is both rational and practicable. If any one should ask the meaning of the words “whoso resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God”—we answer, that it refers to *active* resistance; *passive* resistance, or non-compliance, the apostles themselves practised. On this point we should be distinctly understood. We are not so inconsistent as to recommend a civil war, in order to avoid a foreign one.—*Refusal to obey* is the *final* duty of Christians.

We think, then, that it is the business of every man, who believes that war is inconsistent with our religion, respectfully, but steadfastly, to refuse to engage in it. Let such as these remember, that an honourable and an awful duty is laid upon them. It is upon their fidelity, so far as human agency is concerned, that the cause of peace is suspended. Let them then be willing to avow their opinions and to defend them. Neither let them be contented with words, if more than words, if suffering also, is required. It is only by the unyielding perseverance of good, that corruption can be extirpated. If you believe that Jesus Christ has prohibited slaughter, let not the opinion or the commands of a world

* Acts vi. 28.

induce you to join in it. By this "steady and determinate pursuit of virtue," the benediction which attaches to those who hear the sayings of God and do them, will rest upon you, and the time will come when even the world will honour you, as contributors to the work of human reformation.

NOTES

TO THE

INQUIRY OF THE ACCORDANCY OF WAR

WITH THE

PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIANITY.

NOTES

TO THE

INQUIRY OF THE ACCOUNTS OF THE

AND THE

REVENUE OF THE

NOTES

TO

JONATHAN DYMOND ON WAR.



NOTE A.

With joy ambition saw and soon improved
The execrable deed! 'Twas not enough
By subtle fraud to snatch a single life.
Puny Impiety! whole kingdoms fell
To sate the lust of power: more horrid still,
The foulest stain and scandal of our nature,
Became its boast. ONE murder made a *villain*;
MILLIONS a *hero*. Princes were privileged
To kill, and numbers sanctified the crime.

Death, by Porteus.—ED.

This comparison of a hero with a robber has been often made. "Father Mascaron told us from the pulpit to day," says Made. de Maintenon, "that the hero was a robber, who did at the head of an army, what a highwayman did alone." "Our master, Lewis 14th," she adds, "was not pleased with the comparison." "I am a pirate," said one of that class to Alexander the Great, "because I have only a single vessel. Had I a great fleet, I should be a conqueror." Lucca calls conquerors "great and furious robbers."

NOTE B.

And what makes the contrast more striking, we glory and rejoice in the wholesale destruction of Fathers, Husbands and Sons, of the amiable and generous, of the polite and accomplished, of venerable age and flourishing youth, nay of fellow Christians, *because they are our ENEMYS*, as tho' this were not the very reason why Christ commands us to save, lov and serv them. But we are filld with indignation and horror at the murder of a miser, a black-guard, a convict, a heathen, an extortioner, even tho' he be our enemy, and the persecutor of the widow and orphan. Such is the delusion, of which war has made us the slaves.—ED.

NOTE C.

No one doubts, that the practice of going armd, which formerly prevaild, was a perpetual incentiv to personal conflicts. It is the same with nations, or rather governments. The better they are prepar'd for war, the more likely it is they will go to war. The vast majority of wars hav arisen, nominally, from some ostensible cause of injury, insult, or anticipated danger; but, in reality, from the fact *that the government was ready*. Rulers, who are ready, never want motivs and causes. All history proves that the prepar'd for war never lackd the inclination and the pretext. All history disproves the truth of Washington's sentiment: "To be prepar'd for war is one of the most efectual means of preserving peace." *To be thus prepar'd* is the efficient cause of almost all the wars that have ever existed. The unprepar'd scarcely ever go to war: and the prepar'd hav been as often, if not oftener, attackd, *because they were prepar'd*, than the unprepar'd, because they were unprepar'd.—ED.

NOTE D.

Let us illustrate this. Is a man, who it is known will not fight a duel, more liable to insult and violence, than a man who will fight? Is it not the reverse? How rarely is the man of peace

insulted or struck? His firmness, calmness, and consciousness of being right, give him an irresistible influence.—Where you find one man, who would insult, much less strike, such a person, you will find a hundred, if not a thousand, who would strike a man of different principles and practice. This is individual experience. There is no *national* experience to *contradict* it. The only *national* example of a people unarmed on principle, and resolved to wage neither offensive nor defensive war, is that of Pennsylvania, which enjoyed peace for seventy years under the administration of William Penn and his followers. Can Christians, not those who are such only in form and profession, but those who are such in spirit and in truth, in the simplicity and faith of the Gospel, can they doubt that any other people, governed by the same principles, would be equally protected? If they do doubt, where is their trust in God?—Ed.

NOTE E.

The abolition of the rights of primogeniture in this country, is among the leading causes in our state of society, which hold out the prospect, that we can never be a military people. The dedication of the first born to the rank of gentlemen of fortune, and of younger sons among the gentry, almost as a matter of course, to the profession of arms, as in Europe, is an evil that we shall never know. An equal distribution of property is eminently fitted to break up the unnatural distinctions of society in Europe: and among the rest, the established, and I may add, privileged order of the military. Fortunately for our country, the army and the navy *are only tolerated as matters of absolute necessity in the opinion of the people*. The signs of the times indicate the decay and final downfall of the *militia* system, as unnecessary and inconvenient,—a corrupter of morals and a waste of precious time. The restriction of the army especially, to the exceedingly narrow limits assigned to it, by the good sense and economical spirit of the American people, is another very favorable symptom. An army always exercises a strong personal as well as social influence: the navy very little of either.—Ed.

NOTE F.

It is impossible not to see how entirely the history of mankind, as it has been actually written, consists of wars and battels, of the biography of warriors, and of the various incidents of military and naval achievements. If all these be taken out of ancient history, *evry ten volumes will be reduced to one.* The same is true of modern history, tho' not to the same extent. Nor can any exception be made in favor of Christian nations, the worshipers of the Prince of Peace. They have dedicated as much of time, talents, wealth and life to the cause of war, as the Pagan, who worships the god of war, or the Mahometan, whose prophet was more of a warrior than of a moralist or divine. Is it wonderful that the rulers and inhabitants of Christian countrys persist in war, as just and expedient, when the Christian clergy for sixteen centurys have been the apologists and vindicators of war? May the clergy of our day in the spirit of faith, humility and love, review the principles and example of their predecesors in the ministry of charity and meekness, of forbearance, compassion and forgiveness. Let them do so in the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, and with all singleness of heart: and the Christian clergy will become the enemys of war in every form, its friends in none.—ED.

NOTE G.

This remark is equally true of the militia officer and of the privates even of uniform volunteer corps in the militia. Hence the wisdom of the sentiment of Dr. Channing in a speech, (before the Massachusetts Peace Society I believ,) that he would be glad to see the distinguishing dress of the soldier abolishd. If this could be done, the militia system would soon perish. What but the gay dress, with the shining epaulet, waving plume and costly belt, keeps up the pride and taste, and spirit of such corps? Abolish these insignia of the citizen warrior, and the whole system would languish, and in a few years would be in a worse condition than the beat companys of ununiformd militia. In this respect of dress, we cannot help again remarking the diference between the army and navy. The simplicity of dress in the latter, the fact that we have no corresponding class, and the frequent

absences from the country, make the navy dress comparatively harmless. But the dress of the army, especialy of the officers; the existence of correspondent classes in the militia; the imitation and emulation consequent upon this; the subjection to the same system of disciplin; the constant residence within the country; and occasional parades and reviews, all contribute to the exercise of a baneful influence on the taste and sentiment of the community. I regard the ostentatious dress of uniform companys, as on a footing with the splendid dresses in the courts of princes and on the theatre. They who are bent on preserving the three systems, know that a distinctiv dress, calculated to rivet attention, gratify curiosity, and fire the imagination, is indispensable to their preservation. Abolish the gay and glittering badges of courtiers, soldiers, and actors, and the courts of princes, the militia system and the theatre must perish.—ED.

NOTE H.

I quote with pleasure the following passage from the Pittsburg speech of Mr. Webster, 8th July, 1833: “It has always seemd extremely strange to me, that the objects of government should be limited so much to beligerent operations; that its dutys should seem to be considerd as referable so exclusivly to wars with other nations. Certainly, in a day of Christianity, in a day of light and knowlege, of benevolent feeling and action, it should be the business of government to turn its attention inward: to remember that the objects of its supervision are rational, immortal beings; and to seek to promote all great interests, so far as may be within its constitutional power; and surely within that range are objects far more worthy of zeal and assiduity, than such as look to our external relations, to war, or victory, or triumph.” This, I have no doubt, is the sentiment of the great body of intelligent men in our country. It may be pronounc’d a national sentiment. The warrior must always hold a secondary rank in any just estimate of the history of our country. The statesman and civilian hav always been the leading spirits, in public affairs. Hence, in our country, most fortunately for the cause of Christianity, the standard of true glory must becom more and more identfyd with the cause of peace, with education in the people, and literature in

the ruler, with the sense of duty and the spirit of usefulness, with the capacity for and the love of doing good, with religion, morals and philosophy.—ED.

NOTE I.

How little patriotism enters into the motifs of the officer and soldier, may be illustrated by these considerations. If the officer fights *from the love of country*, why, if he has a competency, does he accept any pay? Would he not feel dishonoured by permitting a father, brother, or friend to pay him for defending them; unless his circumstances made it *a duty to receive compensation*? When the war is over, why do you find that officers, who are rich, and those who have a competency as well as those who are poor, apply for aid, and are anxious to obtain half pay, bounty lands, and any other compensation for military service? Let a man act the same part by his father, brother or friend: and who would give him any credit for a sense of duty and for affection towards them? Yet the very persons, who ask and receive these rewards, consider the obligations of patriotism as higher and holier than those of blood or friendship: and would think their country ungrateful, and mankind little less than senseless and unfeeling, if they did not acknowledge and applaud their patriotism. The claim of a *soldier* to be styled a patriot is still more groundless. Look at the example of the late war with Great Britain, said to have been so favorite a measure with the people. Yet the government was compelled to advance the bounties in land and money, and the regular pay, in a manner which *proves beyond all doubt*, that patriotism was no part of the soldier's motif for enlisting. So with the men who furnished money to the government. What should we say of the sense of duty and of the affections of a man, who, taking advantage of the necessities of a father, brother or friend, should lend him money and take his bond for 100 dollars, when he only received 95, 90, or 85 dollars? *Yet this was exactly the patriotism of the money lenders of the last war.* Let any one, who reads the history of the war of 1776 and 1812, say, whether, *if patriotism was the ruling passion*, it is possible to account for the apathy and unwillingness of the great body of the people, to aid the government either in person or with funds. And what shall we say of the embarrassments of

the finances; of the severe laws adopted to enforce the military and militia systems; of the miserable condition of the army, many and many a time as to arms, clothing and provisions; of the difficulty of keeping the militia in camp, even for a few months; and of the uniform testimony to their comparative inefficiency in the field. *If patriotism had been the all-absorbing motiv of the people and the army, there never would have been a deficiency in men and money, no, not for a single day.* Thousands of men and tens of thousands of dollars would have been at the command of the government, every where and at all times. The history of both wars, *dispassionately* considered, can leave no doubt, that *patriotism was not the ruling motiv*: otherwise, such numerous and glaring proofs of the contrary would not blacken the pages of our history. It is time that the people of this country took a plain, matter of fact, common sense view of this subject. Whenever they do, and I am sure the period is at hand, they will be constrained to confess, that patriotism had but a small share in the conduct of the people, of the money lenders and contractors, of the officers and soldiers. I trust I may speak thus frankly and boldly the honest convictions of my soul, without giving just cause of offence. Liberty of speech, independence of opinion, and the duty to exercise both, according to our sense of what is right, are at once both the privilege and duty of the Christian and American.—Ed.

NOTE J.

I am surprised that Dymond should have conceded the case of *self-defence* to be an instance of patriotism. Who would ascribe pure and noble motives to a man, who should defend himself against a wild beast, or against the robber or assassin? Now, this is precisely the situation of a people, who arm for the unmingled purpose of defending themselves. “They are governed by selfish, not patriotic motives: and there is no more virtue and merit in *national*, than *individual self-defence*. No one would think of bestowing similar praise on a crew, who should defend themselves against a pirate, whatever commendation might be lavished on their gallantry and skill. Self-defence is no more patriotism in a people, than in the crew of a vessel or in an individual.—Ed.

NOTE K.

The great error of the clergy has been, not that they have preachd and prayd *in favour of* WAR, tho' they have often done both, but that they have *not* preachd and prayd *in favor of* PEACE. Is it not absolutely astonishing, is it not enough to fill the clergy as a body with dismay, and remorse, and confusion of face, that not one in ten thousand sermons, I believe I might rather say one in a hundred thousand, has been dedicated to the subject of war and peace? What extraordinary blindness and delusion have led them *so exceedingly seldom*, to apply the plain, universal, undoubted obligations of Christian love, forbearance, forgiveness, humility, to the cause of war? The fall of Alexander Hamilton in a duel, probably occasioned a *greater* number of sermons against dueling, than have been preachd in this country against war, during a century. It cannot be that the clergy are not aware of the crimes and vices, of the atrocities committed and of the miseries endur'd in war. It can only be, because they have not applyd the rules of Christian morals to the *public*, as they have to the *private* conduct of men. Had the clergy been faithful to these simple regulations for the heart and conscience of *all* men, *without exception*, Peace Societys would never have been heard of, or needed. But *their* silence has left the world to pursue its own course. Now, war is the *most powerful, corrupt and reckless enemy, that society has had to contend with from the beginning*: It is equally the destroyer of life, property, virtue and happiness. It enslaves alike nations and individuals. It overturns governments, pollutes and shatters, if it does not annihilate institutions, and consumes the resources of a country and the flower of its youth. It causes and perpetuates national envy, hostility and jealousy. It familiarizes the mind with scenes of carnage, violence and injustice, of fraud and cunning, in a word, with almost every vice and every crime. It has never ceased to be the favorite and terrible instrument of selfish, ambitious and wicked rulers: and has always been the great enemy of the virtue and education, of the comfort, prosperity and happiness of the PEOPLE. When I reflect that this is a faithful portrait of war, as attested by every historian of nations, the SILENCE of a CHRISTIAN clergy appears to me one of the most striking and unaccountable phenomena, in the history of mankind. That they have often been the powerful and eloquent advocates of war; that they have been still more generally its apologists, and have been

almost universally silent as to its UNCHRISTIAN character, admits of no doubt. Strange and unnatural as this appears, when we consider war merely as the foe of justice and humanity, how much more so, when we reflect that it is also the enemy of religion and morals, despising equally the sanctions of that, and the golden rules of this. Is not the day far spent, which beholds the ministers of the meek and humble Jesus, the Prince of peace and love, thus unconcerned at the ravages of this mightiest enemy of society and the church? I at least, believe, with the strength of a dauntless faith, with the energy of unquenched and unquenchable hope, that in twenty years, hundreds of clergymen will be the fearless constant advocates of peace: and that war and the warrior will be denounced as unchristian, from a thousand pulpits.—ED.

NOTE L.

When the advocate of peace relies on the conduct of our Savior at this crisis, to prove that armed resistance to tyranny and oppression is unchristian, we are reminded of the text, “how then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled that thus it must be?” “Hence it seems to be concluded, that it would have been impossible for our Savior to employ such instruments, consistently with his mission. But why could he not? Was it inconsistent, because it had been foreordained? *Was it not rather foreordained, because it would be inconsistent?* It was then inconsistent with his character, principles and mission: not merely by force of the fact, that it had been foreordained; but because it had been so ordered on account of its inconsistency. Our Savior’s declaration amounted therefore to this: “I came into the world to be numbered with the transgressors, and to die the death of the cross. I came, not to resist evil; but to lay down my life, a ransom for many. I do not resist with arms, not because I have not the power and the right to do so; but *because one such act would be an abandonment and repeal of all I have taught?*” Perhaps it will be said, our Savior could not have resisted at all, without defeating the very objects for which he came into the world: that his act is not therefore any proof that his followers ought *not* to resist, unless it be equally clear, that by so doing, they would defeat the end, for which they came into the world. These now are the very things we insist on. Christ

could not have resisted without defeating those ends. But why was it ordaind, or at all events permitted, that he should be assaild by an armed force, seizd, led to the judgment hall of a heathen governor, condemn'd unjustly, and executed on the cross: and *all without resistance*? Why, but to illustrate the very principles we are contending for? the Christian doctrine of non-resistance. For this, he came into the world to teach the poor and despisd, to be himself hated and persecuted, to be falsely accusd, and to die the death of a malefactor on the cross. If non-resistance thro' life and in death were not indispensable to his system of morals, why should all these things have found such a prominent place in his history? Other methods could easily have been provided, had there not been a peculiar fitness and virtue in these. Jesus, therefore, did not resist, not merely because it had been foreordaind that he should not, but because resistance would have been inconsistent with the end for which he had come into the world, and, therefore, non-resistance had been foreordaind, as the only suitable instrument for him.

Now as to his followers. Is not their great end to imitate him, in all things, in which they can? If then, like him, they may be revild and persecuted, be unjustly seizd, condemn'd, and put to death, do they not defeat the great end of life, the imitation of Christ, if they resist by rebellion and arms, instead of copying his non-resistance? Has the Christian any greater end in view, than to illustrate in his own life and death, the life and death of his master? Thus to imitate Jesus, may not be the fulfilment of prophecy; but it certainly is obedience to his precepts and example. Now the fulfilment of duty is to Christians, like the fulfilment of prophecy to the Savior. Non-resistance was *foreordaind* in the latter, because inconsistent with the objects of *his* life and death: and it was *commanded* in the former; because *equally* irreconcilable with the objects of *their* life and death. Non-resistance was foreordaind in him, as an example to them: and it is required of them, as a test of obedience to him.

NOTE M.

This argument, drawn from the case of the centurion, could be of no avail, unless it were shown, which cannot be done, that Christ in every other case availed himself of the opportunity offered by the personal character of those who applied to him for aid, or with him whom he was conversing, to inculcate his doctrines as contrasted with, or illustrated by their characters. Might we not as reasonably say, that he approved the religion of the Samaritan leper, or of the Syrophenician woman, because he did not condemn their religious observances, and advise them to follow him. Among the chief rulers, many believed in him; but because of the Pharisees, they did not confess him, lest they should be put out of the synagogue: for they loved the praise of man, more than the praise of God." John xii. 42, 43. Who would justify the conclusion, because we find no special condemnation of them, that he approved? Christ talked with the Samaritan woman, who lived with a man not her husband; and even revealed to her that he was the Messiah; yet while he told her "ye worship ye know not what," he did not condemn her mode of life. Shall we thence infer that he approved it? Jesus raised from the dead the daughter of Jairus, a ruler of the synagogue. Because he did not make it a condition, that he should follow him, are we thence to conclude, that it was to him a matter of perfect indifference, whether Jairus became his disciple or continued a Jew? But there is another consideration still more striking. The centurion was a *Roman* soldier. The wars of the Romans, from the foundation of the city to the time of our Savior, a period of nearly eight hundred years, had been, with scarcely any exception, wars of the most selfish and sanguinary ambition: an almost uninterrupted series of robberies and murders on a gigantic scale. Now, those who rely on the case of the centurion, certainly do not mean to justify, or even excuse the Roman wars, which were for the most part of unmingled ferocity, ambition and injustice. Do they mean then to argue that Jesus Christ could have approved the profession of a man, who had dedicated his life to the promotion of such wars? Would they represent the pure, meek and merciful Savior, as doing what they would shudder themselves to do? Whatever might be thought of the wars in Italy, against the Cimbri and Gauls, against Hannibal and Pyrrhus, certainly there can be but

one opinion as to the deeply criminal character of the wars carryd on out of Italy. Yet these were the wars, which stampd the character of the Roman army, and of the profession of arms in our Savior's time. Whatever an infidel might dare to say, no Christian certainly would venture even to suggest, that Jesus could have approv'd such wars and such a profession.—ED.

NOTE N.

The case of the centurion and Peter is not as strong as that of the centurion and Jesus. Peter was miraculously commissiond to go to him, as a heathen, not as a soldier. He had but one thing to do, viz. to execute this commission. It is not surprising therefore that he took no notice of his profession, when his *only* concern was with his religion. To change his profession would not be to abandon his religion; but to change this would involv the abandonment of that *as a matter of course*, if we are to rely as we must, on the testimonys against the military profession, during the first and second centurys cited by Dymond in a subsequent part of this work.—ED.

NOTE O.

Bp. Mann, Dr. S. Clarke and Whitby, hold the same language as the writers cited by Dymond in his note. I cannot however agree with them in this figurativ interpretation of the text; because, as I shall proceed to show, it had far higher and nobler uses. This metaphorical explanation of the text never would have been thought of, had the commentators been able to give any other. But in truth, the difficulty in the passage from Luke xxii. 36, does not lie in disproving the conclusion, drawn from it by our opponents; for they themselv cannot believ that our Savior intended his followers to arm and defend him or themselv, with military weapons. The real difficulty is in finding the true relation of the passage to the context, and thence, its true meaning. I offer the following views.

1. The passage itself and the whole context hav no conceivable relation to arms and military warfare.

2. Jesus could not have meant to prepare them for the use of the second; becaus when the occasion actualy occurd, he condemn'd it in the most decisiv manner; tho', before Peter struck, "when they, which were about him, saw what would follow, they said unto him, Lord, shall we smite with the sword?" but he gave no answer then. Luke xxii. 49.

3. Is not this the most striking of that class of passages, in which our Savior meant one thing, but the disciples understood another. Such were the instances of their supposing he spoke of bread, when he meant the leaven of the Pharisees, Math. xvi. 12: of their understanding sleep, when he meant that Lazarus was dead, John xi. 13: of their not comprehending him when he spoke of being put to death and rising again, Luke xviii. 34, and John xx. 9: and when he said, "Fear not, daughter of Zion, behold thy king cometh to thee, sitting upon an ass's colt." John xii. 15. In these instances, they were undeceivd at a suitable time, sometimes immediately, as in the case of Lazarus; sometimes long after, as in the instance of his resurection. Now when the disciples replyd, "Lord, behold here are two swords," Luke xxii. 38, he did not then undeceiv them; because neither the time, nor place, nor circumstances, call'd for the explanation. He therefore only replyd, "it is enough," which it is presumd will be admitted to be *equivalent to a prohibition against buying any more*. This of itself is conclusiv to show, that Jesus did not mean them to arm themselves; *but that the two swords were only needed to enable him at a suitable time to enforce his meaning*. Acordingly, that occasion arrived, when Peter had drawn his sword, and struck off the ear of the high priest's servant. Matt. xxvi. 51. *Our Savior then by a miracle restored the ear, thus repairing instantly the injury done, and furnishing conclusiv testimony, had he not said a word, that he condemn'd the act of Peter*. But not content with this unequivocal proof of disapprobation, he adds, "Put up again thy sword into its place, for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword." Now let us state any paralel case between father and child, teacher and scholar, master and servant, ruler and subject. Let the son, the pupil, the domestic, the citizen do what they conceiv to be their duty, by the parent, instructor, master, governor; and let these only exhibit similar acts and sentiments,

and who could doubt a moment *that they amounted to the clearest condemnation.*

4. I am disposed to regard this passage in another very important light. The previous passages furnish an instance of our Savior's preparing Peter with full notice, for a severe rebuke of his self-confidence; may not this passage have been introduced by Jesus,* (knowing that they had the swords, knowing what their remark would be, and knowing how Peter would use one of them,) in order to afford him the fittest opportunity, not by precept merely, as when John and James would have calld down fire from heaven, Luke ix. 54—but by a most striking example, *to reprove the fiery zeal, and readiness to shed blood, on the part of Peter?* If our Savior had neither heald the ear, nor spoken as he did to Peter, would not the argument in favor of arms and military warfare hav been conclusiv? Surely then the *opposit* inference must be equally clear, from an *opposit state of facts.*

5. Let me add another remark. Was not the whole passage from ver. 36 to ver. 38 intended to prepare the way for illustrating in the conduct of Peter, the striking difference between *the courage and weapons of the soldier*, which Christ needed not but condemn'd, and the *fortitude and spiritual arms*, which he requird and approv'd in his disciples? Was it not intended to furnish a noble comentary on the texts, "Resist not evil," "Love your enemys," "Bless them that curse you," &c. Is not this the commentary? Follow not the ways of the world, which rejoices to return evil for evil,† which covets the opportunity and the means to chastise those who oppose or offend it. But I say unto you, "*with the power to punish, punish not: with the sword at your side, draw it not?*" Was it not as tho' Christ had said, "With the strongest temptation to break the law of love, humility, forbearance, forgiveness, forget not, that *the very temptation is to be the test of your faithfulness.* Sell your garment and buy a sword, to prove your self-command and lowliness of spirit, that the world, when they see you armd, may be struck by the astonishing fact, that the sword itself is with the faithful disciple of the meek and

* We have a very happy ilustration of this mode of proceeding in John, ch. vi. 5: When Christ said to Philip, where shall we buy bread, that these may eat: (and this he said to prove him, for he himself knew what he would do?)

† How are we shocked at the sentiment of Chateaubriand, (*Genie du Christme.* p. 2, b. 5, ch. 4,) when speaking of the disdainful spirit manifested by men of strong minds towards Christianity, he says) "and which (religion) would very justly return contempt for contempt."

lowly Jesus, not an instrument of violence, but a trial of his patience and love, and a test of his obedience and self-command." Is not this consistent with the whole scheme of Christian probation? Now, Peter had boasted, "Lord, I am ready to go with thee both into prison and to death," and of this he gave unequivocal proof, according to the world's notions, by the act of violence which he committed. But this mode of illustrating his devotion was condemn'd on the part of our Savior, by word and deed. And when Peter, after having follow'd him to the high priest's palace, (another unequivocal proof, according to the world's ideas, of his devotion,) had thrice deny'd him, Jesus turn'd and look'd on him, to reproach and condemn *his WANT of the ONLY* courage that becomes a Christian. Was it not as much as to say, "Thou wast ready to go with me to prison and death, provided I would allow thee to do it sword in hand, and with the violence of arm'd warfare; but thou art not willing to follow me to prison and death, in the only way I approve, with the fortitude of faith, not with the resistance of valor? The sword of the warrior I condemn: the sword of the spirit I sanction and approve.

6. I am struck by another view. The reason assign'd is remarkable for its two-fold application, and the difference between them. As apply'd to the case of each individual, who might take the sword, it is not universal and strictly true, that ev'ry such person perishes by the sword; for history and our own experience prove the contrary: and this is consistent with the truth of prophecy, when it embraces equally individuals and communitys. But the prediction has been literally fulfill'd in the case of communitys. All nations hav not only been tormented by the sword, but hav succesivly perish'd by the sword. Now war is a national, not an individual affair. Is not then the prohibition, "Put up thy sword," especialy applicable to war; because the prophetic reason assign'd has been so strikingly verify'd in the case of war, *for what is the history of mankind but the history of war?* and what is the history of nations but that of their rise, progres, decline and ruin *by the sword*, as the chief instrument alike of their glory and disgrace, of their power and punishment.

7. Another ilustration seems deserving of notice. In the 24th vers there was a strife among them, which should be accounted the greatest. He rebukes them by an alusion to the kings of the Gentiles, who exercise lordship over them. Hence we infer, that the dispute related to *temporal* greatness. *Now, the kings of the*

Gentiles owe their greatness to the sword. It originated in, and was maintained by the sword. Was not the rebuke then directly this? Covet not the greatness, which is inseparable from war. And how is this enforced? "But ye shall not be so; but he that is greatest among you, let him be as the younger: and he that is chief, as he that serveth." Is it possible to imagine a more striking and comprehensive condemnation of the whole war system; for such had ever been the Gentile system? The practice of such precepts is impossible in war. What an appropriate rebuke was it afterwards, when Peter employed the peculiar instrument of Gentile greatness to say, "Put up thy sword." I have told you, ver. 29, "I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed unto me." As though he had said, my kingdom has nothing in common with the kingdom of the Gentiles, no violence, or anger, or revenge, or war; but gentleness, self-control, forgiveness, peace. Such is the kingdom, which I appoint unto you.

8. I regard the act and sentiment of our Savior, as intended to draw a striking contrast between the Jewish and his own dispensation. A country had been stripped of its inhabitants by the sword. A nation in their stead, rescued out of Egypt and led through the wilderness by miracles, was planted by the sword. A civil government was founded, armed with the sword, and *the law of retaliation was a prominent feature of its civil code.* They who could ask, "Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel?" and who had often shown, how little their dark and confused understandings comprehended the universal and spiritual character of the kingdom of Christ, were very likely to employ, in the administration of the affairs of that kingdom, the very instruments which Moses and Joshua, Gideon and Jephthah, David, and indeed all the saints of the Old Testament dispensation, had employed unrebuked. When therefore he had spoken in the same conversation of their "sitting on thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel," the rebuke must have been felt in its full force, "Put up thy sword." Was it not as much as to say, Moses and all who followed him, employed the sword; but I prohibit it, forever, in my kingdom. My kingdom shall be established, defended and preserved; but needs not the law of retaliation, or the sword. Look not for models to imitate and instruments to employ, in the records of the Mosaic dispensation; but *seek for THOSE in my life, and for THESE in the sermon on the Mount.*

NOTE P.

Is it not remarkable that Dymond should not have noticed the first of the precepts, "Do violence to no man." I might remark, that the Greek word might well be translated (as Schleusner has shown, by authority and illustration,) "put no man in fear," which, as the preliminary step, contains equally the prohibition "Do violence to no man." Now, war is a system, which is perpetually *putting others in fear*, both the innocent and the guilty; and is perpetually *doing violence* to both classes of persons. The prohibition is general. The exception is not "do violence to no man," except ye are ordered by your officers. How then, consistently with this precept, if he were disposed, out of an honest and good heart, to keep it faithfully, could a soldier put an enemy in fear, or wound or maim, much less kill him? If we are to interpret the precept in its simplicity, who can doubt? Besides, the command is, do violence to *no man*: not to no man *except he be the enemy of your country*. Nor is it to do violence *only* to the enemies of your country. But the language is, do violence to *no man*. It occurs to me, that Dymond did not rely on this passage in the answer of the Baptist, because he apprehended that the third clause, "Be content with your wages," was inconsistent with my interpretation of the first. But I apprehend not. Be content with your wages, relates manifestly not to the *first*, but to the second clause, "Neither accuse any one falsely," and this points undoubtedly to the vile corruption of the Roman soldiery, growing out of the civil wars of Marius and Sylla, of Pompey and Cæsar, of Augustus and Anthony. But let us take the second and third precepts independently. Why should we not then interpret the first and second thus? Do violence to no man at any time: and be content with your wages as long as you are not required to do violence to any one? but the instant you are required to do violence to any man, give up your wages. May we not illustrate this by the command of Paul: "Servants obey in all things your masters according to the flesh." But can it be doubted the meaning of the Apostle, in relation to the case of a Heathen master and Christian servant, is, obey in all things that are *lawful* in a Christian servant. I take it to be the same in the case of John the Baptist and the soldiers. It is well remarked by Dimond, that John confessedly belonged to that system, which required an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth; and therefore even if my interpreta-

tion be rejected, the case does not weaken the *Christian* argument. Besides, the soldiers being heathen, did not come to be baptis'd as the publicans did, who were Jews. I take it no heathen became the disciple of John; for nothing but the *miraculous* case of Cornelius and his friends could convince Peter, and those of the circumcision who were with him, that the Gentiles were to be brought into the Christian church. John therefore might very well give them his advice, not as a *divine* teacher sent to instruct, convert, and baptise them; for *he was not sent to them at all*; but as a matter of kindness, without being call'd to approve or condemn their mode of life.

NOTE Q.

When Frederick set out for Silesia in 1740, at the head of 80,000 men, it was propos'd that his standard should bear the motto "*Pro Deo et Patria*," "*For God and Country*." But the king struck out the word God, saying it was not proper to introduce the name of the Deity in the quarrels of men; adding, that for himself *he was going to war for a PROVINCE, not for RELIGION*. What a rebuke was this from an *infidel* monarch to Christian kings, and still more to all *professing* Christians, when they use the name of God to vindicate wars that have nothing to do with religion! No war indeed can have any *rightful* connection with Christianity. Such an instrument, it is presum'd, no one in our age can advocate, as a lawful means for the advancement of religion. But if such destruction of life, happiness and property cannot be justify'd as a means for the attainment of the highest and most valuable end, viz. the Christianization of men, how can any *inferior* end justify the employment of *such an instrument*? The resort to arms is justify'd as a matter of right: not of mere power. Of course, it must rest on principles of *duty*, not of selfishness, caprice, or expediency. Now, if such means are *unlawful* in the discharge of our *highest* dutys, how can they be *lawful* in the discharge of *inferior* dutys? If I cannot *rightfully kill and rob my fellow men to serv God*, how can I rightfully do such things to serv myself?

NOTE R.

To the honor of the Episcopal church of the United States, let it be mentiond, that in the organization of the American church, this feature in the article of the English church has been *omitted by the latter*. What a singular testimony to the cause of peace, by men who had just come out of the war of the revolution! Shall we not confess the hand of an overruling Providence in this clear and absolute refusal to acknowlege the Christian lawfulness of war? The clause of the English article reads thus: "It is lawful for Christian men, at the commandment of the magistrate, to wear weapons and serv in the wars." If any one wishes to be satisfyd how impossible it is to vindicate war on Christian principles, he has only to read Burnet's Commentary on this clause of the article, and then to ask himself the question, "Is it possible that an apostle would hav written such an explanation of the sermon on the Mount?" It is not less remarkable, that the same article of the English church asserts the lawfulness of *capital* punishment for heinous and grievous offences, whilst the corresponding article of the Episcopal church is silent on the subject. *What indeed is war but a gigantic system of capital punishments of the innocent for the guilty, administerd by armys and navys, instead of the executioner?*

NOTE S.

Vespasian acted on Paley's principle, when he allowd the slaughter at Varicheæ; for his friends persuaded him *that nothing against the Jews could be any impiety*: and that he ought to prefer what was *profitable*, before what was *fit* to be done, where both could not be made *consistent*. Josephus, The War, b. 3, ch. 10, § 10. This example contains, in fact, the whole substance of the doctrin of war. It is *expediency*, according to *human calculation*, setting aside *duty* according to *divine* commands.

NOTE T.

It appears to me, that a striking illustration of the absolute duty and expediency of a simple acquiescence in the peace principles of the sermon on the Mount, may be deriv'd from human institutions. The principle contended for by Paley and such other writers is, that men have the right to make an exception in favor of war, altho' it is admitted that war "is nothing less than a temporary repeal of all the principles of virtue:" and that "it is a system, out of which almost all the virtues are excluded, and in which nearly all the vices are incorporated." Now let us apply the principle to the case of human institutions. What writer, on the principles of social law, which governs communities within themselves, or in relation to each other, ever could or would acknowledge in the subject of a monarchy or the citizen of a republic, such a dispensing power. When the human legislator has spoken, no individual, or combination of individuals can exercise such a power of dispensation, as that contended for by the advocates of war. The human lawgiver makes exceptions to his own rules, according to his own judgment; but he recognises no similar discretionary power in those for whom he legislates. To exercise such a power, is to invade his prerogative. There are cases, in which the human legislator offers an alternative; and then the discretion of the individual is limited to a decision between the two parts of that alternative. If however he offers *no* alternative, but simply commands or prohibits, and annexes a punishment, whether fine or imprisonment, the scourge or the gallows, the individual cannot lawfully disobey; if he acknowledges the right of the legislator to make the law. He cannot *rightfully* violate the law by submitting even voluntarily, to the appointed punishment; for the lawmaker does not establish the punishment as an *end*, but only as a *means*. The individual cannot therefore *substitute the means for the end*; because in so doing he *defeats the object of the law*, and thwarts the rightful purpose; whilst he denies the authority of the lawgiver. It seems to me, that no one can question the soundness of these principles and conclusions. If then they are acknowledged in the case of *human* laws, on what grounds can they be doubted in the case of divine laws? *These* are of higher authority, of more extensive application, of greater importance, and of a more durable character, than *those*. Is it possible then, that a principle can be admitted for the suspension

or repeal of *divine* laws, which is utterly rejected in the case of *human* laws? If such a principle be deny'd in the instance of an *inferior* obligation, how can it be conceded in that of a *superior*?

Let us take an illustration from human codes. All writers agree that the members of a community are bound to obey its laws. But some have made a distinction between those laws, which prohibit that which is *evil in itself*, as murder, robbery, perjury, and those which forbid what is merely *inexpedient* in the opinion of each community, as the killing of particular birds or animals, the regulation of weights and measures, &c. I shall not examine the soundness of the distinction, which however I utterly deny; but for the sake of argument shall grant it. Then upon the very principles of this distinction, nothing can justify war; because *murder and robbery are clearly evils in themselves even in a human code*. But no such distinction can be acknowledged, in a code of moral laws, divinely given to man. The distinction in the case of *human* codes turns upon this, that what is *evil in itself*, is made such by a higher authority than that of man, viz. by the law of nature or by revelation. The very fact that nature or the Bible forbids an act, is acknowledged as taking away all discretion over the subject; and that when society has annexed a penalty to the violation of the law, no individual can justify or even excuse himself for a breach of the law, by submitting to the penalty imposed. The very ground then on which the distinction rests, shows that in the case of a *divine* law, men can have no discretionary power to make exceptions. The exceptions must be found in the divine code itself, or must be so clearly deduced from its principles, and so clearly sustained by examples, as to leave *no* doubt.

NOTE U.

Is it possible to believe, that Jesus Christ did not intend his moral precepts to bind the consciences of *rulers* as well as of *individuals*? He did or he did not. If he did not as to any one precept, neither did he as to all the rest; for he has made no difference. Now, if he intended none of them to bind, it follows, that *CHRISTIAN rulers as PUBLIC men, are no more bound by the moral obligations of revealed religion than HEATHEN rulers*. Will any one contend for this? I answer with confidence no one. Then

he meant *all* his precepts to bind equally rulers and private men. It is vain to argue, as Paley and all his coadjutors do, on principles of expediency, and the assum'd necessity of a difference between public and private affairs. The simple and unanswerable reply is—the religion of Jesus Christ is of paramount authority; superior to all *human* laws and institutions, and design'd to *abolish all* that are inconsistent with its principles. It is a religion of *divine obligation*, and never can be subject to the rules of *human calculation and compromise*.

Jesus Christ did *not* ordain his precepts for the government of *heathen* rulers; because he intended that all heathen rulers should be converted and become Christians. Now, the instant a heathen ruler became a Christian, he must either hav acknowledg'd Christian obligation to be binding on him, both as a public and a private man, or he must hav abandond his office. If as a private man, he could not worship idols, could he as a public man promote idolatry? If as an individual he could not steal or rob from those who had stolen from or robbd his own family, could he as an officer justify theft or robbery against a neighboring nation, which had committed such crimes against his country? If as a father, son, husband, brother, he could not rightfully kill *those* who had murderd his children or parents, his wife or sisters, how could he as a ruler justly in war cause the death of thousands of the *innocent* among his own subjects, as well as among his enemies, to punish one, perhaps a dozen, who had insulted him, or injur'd the crew of a ship, or the people of a city? *We hold it to be IMPOSSIBLE on CHRISTIAN principles, and ONLY POSSIBLE on HEATHEN.*

One consideratian strikes me as of great importance. There is not a virtue of private life, which is not also call'd for in public life; and call'd for, under higher sanctions and for more important purposes. Hence, if we could conceiv of a code of morals for *public* men, as *distinct* from one for *private* life, it would be distinguish'd by these features. Its rules would be more comprehensiv and severe, its promises more animating, its denunciations more terrible, and in would breathe a purer, nobler, holier morality, than the system design'd for private life. But what scheme can be imagin'd for public life, which shall exhibit these qualities in a *higher* degree, than the Christian? But the Christian is the last revelation man is taught to expect. This, then, is a code both of public and private morals, or mankind never has had, and never will hav a

code of public morals. But, it will be granted, that society never has existed without such a public code ; and that in all ages and countrys among the heathen, the public has differd from the private code, only in the features I hav mentiond. Christianity then, as a substitute for heathenism, is necesarily a substitute for its code of public, as well as for its code of private morals ; for they ar in truth inseparable in theory, as they ever hav been in practice.

The same may be said of vices. There is not one that degrades and impairs the worth and usefulness of a man in private life, which does not produce similar efects in a greater degree in the case of the public man. It is because he cannot do his duty as a public man, if he hav not the virtues, and be not free from the vices of the private man, that he is bound to shun these and possess those.

All concede that the example and influence of rulers is of the last importance in morals, manners, education, religion. Must they not, then, from the necessity of the case, from the very nature of their stations, be under a double obligation to do as public men all that Christianity exacts of them as private men? Can they as public men, revile and slander others; misrepresent and conceal the truth, return injurys, strike down the insolent, or become duelists to punish a sarcasm or an insult on their public character, when, for the same things done to them in their private capacity, Christian morals would restrain them? Heathenism may justify such distinctions, but *Christianity* cannot.

Again it is simply impossible, that there can be a code of morals *only for individuals*, first, because moral rules ar *social* rules in their very nature; and second, because, except in the case of the hermit, the solitary prisoner, or the cast away on a desolate island, *man never has existed but in society*. All moral precepts ar then ordaind with a view to, and for the sake of society. Would it not then be exceedingly strange that such rules should not be obligatory upon those, on whom society so much depended, for its moral tone and improvement? Moral rules are establishd for the sake of society. *So are rulers*. Must not these then be subject to those; since both are but *means* or *instruments* ordaind for the same purpose?

It is conceded that all public institutions are founded on the relations and morals of private life ; that *those* depend for their purity, strength, value and improvement, upon *these*. Is it not

then obvious, that the system of public must, if faithfully administered, conform to the system of private morals? If then the Christian be the code of private morals in any country, the ruler must be subject to the same; because public morals are the creature of private: and the only sufficient standard of public morals is the only true standard of private, viz: the New Testament. If the question be asked what is a ruler to do, whose standard of morals is higher than that of the community. The answer is very plain. *Let him do his CHRISTIAN duty as a public man, without fear or favor; and the instant he cannot LET HIM RESIGN.* How common is the remark that a people will not bear a better government than they are fit for. But the argument of Paley and his auxiliaries is that rulers have a right to administer the government on moral principles, *inferior* to those which are acknowledged to be the moral standard of the community. In other words, *they have a right and indeed are bound, as public men to violate and dishonor the moral standard of the community.* Can such be Christian rulers? Are they not heathen?

Again. Did not Jesus Christ know that the time would come, when there would be Christian nations and Christian rulers? Is it then possible, that he meant to ordain *no code of morals for public men!* Did he mean the rulers of Christian communities to be Christians in all their private, but heathens in all their public relations? Is there any other alternative unless we adopt as a precept of Christian morals, the dangerous and inconsistent rule, that they are to be Christians in all their public relations, *except when calculations of human expediency call for a departure.* Then they may justify robbery and murder, fraud, falsehood and deception, prevarication, concealment and misrepresentation, violence and hypocrisy in all their countless forms. Can this be reconciled to the moral code of Jesus? Could such rulers be members of his spiritual body, and heirs of everlasting life? But is it not seen, will it not be acknowledged, that the great beauty and excellence of the Christian system lie here, that it is a code of morals of supreme authority for the government of man in all his private relations, because they are the basis of all his public, civil and political relations. The heathen system reversed this order; for there the public code made any thing right or wrong in the individual; because there was no private code of paramount authority. But the Christian scheme binds the individual in all his private and social relations, indissolubly, universally. Hence, whatever is right or

wrong in private, is equally so in public life; because no human power can release him in public life, from the obligations which bind him in private. The heathen, on entering public life subjects his whole scheme of private morals to the public will. He may execute his sons with Brutus and Manlius, or murder his daughter with Virginius. He may commit suicide with Seneca or Lucan, or sell his debtor and family, like the Roman creditor. He may cast out his deformed children, murder or intoxicate his slaves, and teach his son the arts of a thief, with Lycurgus. But the Christian, when he enters public life, subjects all his *official* conduct to the supreme obligations of the Christian code; for there is no human power that can repeal or dispense with their paramount authority. He is a Christian before he is a ruler; and he cannot lawfully cease to be a Christian, because he becomes a ruler. I may add another argument. Why should the public man be exempt from any of the Christian obligations of the private man? Does not the private man belong to the community? Is he not bound to promote its advancement in virtue, knowledge and happiness, to the full extent of his means and opportunities, just as much as the public man? Is he not thus bound by Christian obligations, and can he employ other than Christian means? When he becomes a public man, how are the nature and extent of the obligations changed? The only difference that I can see is, that the very people, whom he was previously bound as a Christian to serve, have appointed him to serve them in a field of more enlarged usefulness. But are not the ends, the acts, the means, the motives the same? Is there any difference? except that the sphere of duty is higher and more comprehensive; the objects more important; the consequences more desirable; and the number of persons actually affected, incomparably greater? And is it possible that these can be reasons for relaxing the force and curtailing the extent of Christian obligation? Are they not, on the contrary, unanswerable reasons for requiring in the *public* man, a more scrupulous and stern regard for the obligations of Christian morals, than is exacted of the private? I insist upon it then, that *the New Testament is the only genuine moral constitution of society, and its principles the only safe and wise foundation of all civil and political establishments.** I insist that the Christian is

* See Address of T. S. Grimke on the character and objects of Science, before the Literary and Philosophical Society of South Carolina, p. 28. New Haven, 1831.

equally the moral code of public and private life: I insist that the ruler is bound by it in his public capacity because he is a Christian and not a heathen.—ED.

NOTE V.

The whole of Paley's argument amounts, undoubtedly, to these contradictions: as *individuals*, we cannot lawfully do evil that good may come of it; but as *public* men we may: as *individuals* we cannot innocently act on the principle, that the end justifies the means; but as *public* men, we may: as private persons, we cannot rightfully kill, rob, defraud or commit perjury; but as public men we may. Can that system of public morals be Christian which acknowledges these rules? Again, as private men, we cannot lawfully punish the innocent by killing, imprisoning or robbing them, to compel the guilty to do us justice; but as public men we may. The *private* man cannot innocently punish the servant; because his master has insulted or defrauded him; but the *public* man may slay or imprison the subject, and may even make widows and orphans of countless wives and children, and reduce them to poverty, because their rulers have acted insolently or unjustly. The *private* man cannot rightfully practise frauds and deceptions, concealment and misrepresentations, to redress injuries or avenge insults; for if he does, he will be counted a cheat, a liar, or a swindler. But the very acts, thus branded as infamous in the private man, are extolled as glorious and praiseworthy in the naval or military commander. Let any one turn to history and read what are called the stratagems of war, and judge, whether a private man would not be degraded in his opinion, if he should employ similar means, for the attainment of similar ends. Must not the natural tendency of history then in its existing forms, be to deprave the moral sense of youth, and to interfere with the pure and simple standard of Christian morals? No one can doubt, who admits that history does influence the minds and hearts of its youthful readers.

NOTE W.

The same remark may be made of Dr. Dwight's Sermon on killing. Sermon 115, 4th vol. p. 167, 168. Is it not absolutely amazing that the reconcilableness of wars with the New Testament is dispos'd of by Christian ministers *thus briefly and confidently?* Wars almost universally involv the commission of the greatest crimes and indulgence in the greatest vices. They blind and brutalize both the people and their rulers, and destroy life, and property, and happiness, to an incalculable extent. They hav been the instruments of tyranny, injustice, and oppression, of ambition, avarice, and revenge, both at home and abroad: hav overthrown governments, with which the people were satisfy'd, and enslav'd unoffending nations. In short, they hav made the history of mankind little less than a record of fraud and violence, of murder and robbery, of rebellion and usurpation, of national crimes and national punishments. If all this be duly considerd, how is it possible that Christians do not see, *that Christianity, as a religion of justice, humanity, love, forbearance, and forgiveness, must hav contemplated, and does require the total abolition of war.* I agree to the maxim, that the mere abuse of a thing does not render its use unlawful or inexpedient; but I also assert as a maxim equally indisputable, that, *whenever an institution has been abus'd in the vast majority of instances, and has faild to produce the great ends for which it is claimd, viz. the good of the people, even the heathen are bound to abandon it on mere principles of human expediency.* How then shall the Christian vindicate war, an instrument which in ninety-nine out of evry hundred cases, causes misery and ruin to the people, tho' it brings sport and glory to their rulers? War, heathenism, ignorance, superstition, and despotism, hav been tryd for nearly sixty centurys: and hav been found almost invariably to be the instruments of the tyrant and oppressor, of the enemys of God and man. Yet they still prevail; because Christians vindicate all but heathenism, tho' the rest are the select, the peculiar instruments of heathenism. *Shall the time never come, when Christians shall employ only Christian means?* Shall the sermon on the mount never be the law for nations and rulers, as well as for the private man? We answer, it shall be, just as surely as Christ livd to bless communitys as well as individuals; and died to save the ruler as well as the subject.

NOTE X.

It appears to me that Dymond has not dwelt sufficiently on civil obedience: and has not pointed out with the necessary distinctness, the land-marks which separate the case of war from that of ordinary obedience to the magistrate. War is undoubtedly defended by its advocates, on the ground, that it is a *means* not an *end*. No one would vindicate the institution of a military republic, the very end of whose being should be war. We have now no advocates of Grecian and Roman institutions, any more than of the feudal system, and the orders of chivalry. These were all founded on the principles, that war is the noblest employment of man; that it is inseparable from the best forms of government, and the best constituted states of society; and that peace is not so much the object to be obtained by war, as war is itself the very end of peace. Peace was but a truce in war, not war a suspension of peace. But these sentiments have, in a great measure, perished among Christian nations. While, however, peace is allowed to be the true natural state of man, both at home and abroad, it is still insisted, that all defensive war is lawful, and that offensive war, having really a defensive character is equally so. Now, *the only* instrument of war is the *taking of life*. I say *the only* instrument; because, altho' imprisonment, the destruction of property by land and by sea, the seizure and confiscation of goods, intimidation, and a variety of stratagems, are also employed; yet these are but *subordinate* means, incident to the *chief* means, *the right to kill*. So entirely is this the case, and so absolutely true is it, that *the right to take life* is the *sole* basis of the war system, that if this claim be abandoned, the war system must perish. All the implements of war, all the education of the officers and soldiers, all the science of the engineer and tactician, have but *two objects in view, to destroy the enemy, whom they assert the right to kill, and to defend themselves, whom they admit that the enemy in his opinion, at least, has the same right to kill*. The arts of war, and the profession of arms would have no existence then, if the sixth commandment "thou shalt not kill," be acknowledged as equally the law of nations and individuals. Here, then, is at once the broad, palpable distinction between the system of war and that of civil government. *The first cannot exist without the right to kill, the other can*. In the former, the right to kill is *the very soul, the whole life* of the system: in the latter, it is a mere

question of *expediency*. To abolish the entire war system by enforcing the commandment, "thou shalt not kill," leaves, therefore, the whole civil system untouched. Hence it is obvious, that the denial of the lawfulness of war has nothing to do with the question of obedience to the magistrate. It has, indeed, no other effect, than to apply to the authority of the civil magistrate on the question of war, the same rule, which governs in the case of *capital punishment*. The magistrate requires me to sit on a jury, which is to try a man for his life: or he enjoins upon me to carry into effect the sentence of capital punishment, as the executioner. If I admitted his right to take life, I could not lawfully refuse; but as I deny this right, I must refuse. I refuse to bear arms, because I deny that he can lawfully take life. I refuse to be a public executioner, for the same reason. This is the whole extent to which the authority of the civil magistrate is interfer'd with by obedience to the precept, "thou shalt not kill." I refuse to have any hand in war in any form or manner; because it is, in my opinion, a system of murder. I refuse to have any hand in the execution of laws which assert the right to kill: because I cannot innocently be the instrument of taking life. This principle is the polar star of my obedience. Whatever the object may be, however laudable or useful, I refuse to obey, *if the effect of obedience is to destroy life*. We are now prepar'd to ask the question, how does the advocate of Peace impair the just authority and strength of civil government? With this, the prominent exception, made because it is matter of conscience, he is ready to act his part in the administration of political or civil affairs. There is no office which he is not bound to fill, provided the taking of life be not one of its duties, or one of the means to be employed. He does, indeed, utterly deny the right to take life, whether in case of war, or in the case of resisting, arresting, or executing a felon. But then he is consistent; for he equally denies that any tyranny or oppression on the part of rulers, can justify a resort to conspiracy, rebellion, or insurrection. The principle is the same; for he denies even to the oppressor the right to take the life of the oppressor. So far from weakening government, peace principles actually strengthen it; and the true objection, if there be any, is that they make government *too strong rather than too weak*. But, in so doing, the advocate of Peace, does no more than the Savior, and his apostles, and the primitive Christians did, *they took things as they found them*: and instead of employing *force to remedy the evils of society*

and government, and to expel tyrannical and oppressiv rulers, they themselves submitted, and taught the same duty to others. Their example illustrates the true standard of civil obedience. If the ruler require me to do or to forbear what my conscience tells me the Gospel forbids or commands, I simply refuse, and say to him in the language of the apostles, "We ought to obey God rather than man." If he require me to worship idols or to slay my fellow man, I refuse, because I regard both as forbidden. But if he require me to pay taxes, altho' one object of the taxes be the support of idolatry, or the waging of war, I comply, simply because he has a clear right to levy taxes, and the responsibility of applying them is with him, not with me. He is lawfully possessd of the power on the principle of civil obedience, as taught us in the New Testament; taxes are among the usual and necessary instruments for the administration of government; the use to which he shall apply them, is not my province, but his: he requires nothing unlawful of me, and therefore I comply. Here then is the distinction. If he commands what is unlawful, as a means for the attainment of even a lawful end, I refuse obedience. But if he commands what is lawful, intending when the command has been performd by me, to employ the fruit of my obedience in the accomplishment of unlawful purposes in which I hav no hand, I obey, because *he requires of me* only what is rightful. I hav nothing to do with his motiv or his object. I would illustrate this by the case of a debt. I am indebted to another. He demands payment. I am not at liberty to refuse, because I happen to know, or hav reason to believ that he will employ the money, when paid, for unlawful or immoral purposes. This follows from the principle already stated. My duty is very clear, to pay the debt: the use of the money, when paid, is at once his right and responsibility. This may be aptly illustrated by a modification of the case stated. I am indebted to another; but the debt is *not* due. He calls for payment, *not* having a right to do so, and I happen to know, that his reason for wishing the money then, is to make an improper use of it. I am bound to refuse; because not being bound to pay then, I am *volunteering* to grant a *favor*, knowing that it will be abus'd. On the same principle I can conscientiously pay taxes, knowing, that among other objects, the public money will be applyd to pay judges and jurors for trying and condemning criminals to capital punishment; to pay the salary of the president of a college, who teaches that public prayer is

unchristian, and the clergy a set of imposters; or to pay the expenses of war. This seems to me the only safe and wise principle, and it furnishes a suitable criterion for civil obedience. We may illustrate still farther. The magistrate, instead of a general tax law divides the taxes, and lays on the advocates of Peace the *war* tax. They cannot conscientiously pay it; because *they* are thus made the *sole and direct instrument* of carrying on the war, and without their compliance, it must be at a stand. So, in like manner, if he commands the friends of Peace to garrison a fort, or man a vessel of war, they must refuse because they are requir'd to do what is unchristian. Again, if he calls out the citizens to labor on public works, and allots the building of a court-house to the Friends of Peace, but that of a fortress to the advocates of war, those may comply as conscientiously as these. But if he reverses the order, the former cannot innocently obey him; because they would then be the direct instruments of doing unchristian acts. The doctrine, then, of Christian obedience to the civil magistrate, seems to me to rest on clear and immutable principles. The will of God is a supreme law; that of man a subordinate system. The law of God is personal to each individual. He is to understand, to interpret, to execute it for himself. The opinion of all the rest of the world can avail nothing against his own convictions of duty. No human power can then lawfully compel disobedience to that conviction; nor can protect him against the consequences of disobedience. He must obey God first, and man next; God supremely, man subordinately. Whatever law of society commands or forbids then, what the law of God prohibits or enjoins, must be disobeyed at every hazard. Obedience is due to the civil magistrate, *not* as a duty to *society*, but as a duty to *God*. God only can then lawfully fix the land-marks of that duty.

NOTE Y.

And I would reply, that it was repealed by the sixth commandment. Thou shalt not kill. Each is a universal law: and they are therefore, irreconcilable. The precept to Noah was given, when neither society nor government existed. If therefore it was political, as well as individual in its character, it could only be so, because the public man may lawfully do what is permitted to the private man. The sixth commandment, on the contrary,

was given when society and government both existed; and if God had not afterwards, in the Mosaic institutions, commanded the punishment of death in many cases, who can doubt that the Jewish rulers never could have inflicted the punishment of death consistently with that commandment? Assuredly it will not be deny'd that the tables of the law bound equally the Jewish ruler and the private Israelite. Now, it is conceded, that the Mosaic code, as a political and civil institution, is abolish'd; but all Christians admit, that the tables of the law are unrepeal'd, and are a part of the Christian code of morals. They are *unrepeal'd*, because they bound the Jewish ruler, *not* as *civil*, but as *moral* laws. They are a part of the Christian scheme; because they are moral, not political institutions. Hence, when the rich young man inquir'd of Jesus, "What shall I do to inherit *eternal* life?" the answer was, "Thou knowest the commandments." Do not commit adultery, Do not kill, &c. They are then a part of the Christian moral code; for Christ has thus republish'd and sanction'd the tables of the law. "Thou shalt not kill, is then as much a precept of Christ as any part of the sermon on the mount. Now, what text of the New Testament has republish'd and sanction'd the precept given to Noah, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." So far from adopting such a rule, how could it have been done consistently with the precepts "Render not evil for evil;" "Overcome evil with good;" "Love your enemies;" "Bless them that curse you;" "Do good to them that hate you?" The Christian command is then universal, "Thou shalt not kill:" and as the Christian lawgiver has made no exceptions, man cannot lawfully make one. The Christian ruler is then bound by this moral rule: because he was a Christian before he became a ruler; just as the Jewish ruler was bound because he was a Jew before he became a ruler. Neither could absolve himself from the obligation to obey the precept; because in becoming a ruler, he did not cease to be a Jew, or a Christian. The Jewish ruler could only depart when the particular precept of his civil code dispens'd in *that* case with the *universal* precept of the *moral* code, *both* being deriv'd directly from the *same* authority. The Christian ruler can *never* depart, because his code has no exception. I hold the punishment of death to be therefore a clear violation of Christian morals.

NOTE Z.

An attempt is sometimes made to cast a reproach on the cause of peace, and on the principles of its advocates, as tho' it impress'd a slavish submission to tyranny and oppression. Those who speak thus, identify the cause of peace with the doctrine of non-resistance, as taught by the friends of despotism. What, we are ask'd, would you submit to have your dearest rights trampled upon, and not resist? Would you allow yourself to be depriv'd of your political, and civil, and religious rights, without a struggle? Would you sit down, like a coward, and suffer yourself to be insolently and unjustly disfranchis'd; and not peril life itself to punish the aggressor, and rescue from him the fruits of his tyranny? I answer calmly; because I feel no concern at being call'd a coward by the world, that I should not act as the above questions suppose, that I ought to act. If it be ask'd, what then would you do, my reply is a very simple one: I should do precisely what I believe the Apostles, and the primitive Christians would, and nothing more? And what is that? They would, in my opinion, have done precisely what the world would style an act of cowardice and baseness.—*First*. They would have plac'd their whole trust, calmly and undoubtingly, in God, and not in themselves or in their fellow men. *Second*. Prayer to God for their persecutors and oppressors would have been their first petition, and the second for themselves, that strength, faith, and resignation, love to their enemies, and humility of spirit, might be vouchsaf'd. *Third*. They would have resolv'd, that come what might, they would never employ armed resistance, that they would never engage in rebellion or insurrection. *Fourth*. But they would equally resolve, never to do any act requir'd of them by their oppressor, which conscience told them he had not a right to require, and they could not conscientiously do. This I take to be the doctrine of Christian non-resistance. The world may call it cowardly and mean; but that shakes not the Christian's purpose. *Names are things with the world*: not so with the Christian. Names are things with him, only when the Bible determines them to be *one and the same*. The question with him never can be, whether society and its rulers style him a coward, a rebel, a traitor; if the precepts of Jesus teach him, that to be such in the estimate of the world, is, in the sight of God, true courage and true fidelity to him. Let us now bring this question of non-resistance to

the best practical test, the experience of the primitiv ages of the Christian church. I take for granted that no one can doubt the following positions of principle and fact:—*First.* The Christians had a *clear right* to the enjoyment of all the privileges and advantages of the communitys in which they livd: and this right is equally sustaind by reason, natural justice, and religion. *Second.* The heathen rulers were utterly unjustifiable in depriving the primitiv Christians of those privileges and advantages: still less had they a right to persecute and destroy them for being Christians. *Third.* The heathen rulers acted the part of despots and oppressors to the primitiv Christians. *Fourth.* The primitiv Christians were subjected for their faithfulness, most wantonly, unjustly, and cruelly, to sufferings scarcely surpassed by those predicted to the Jews, in case of their *disobedience*. If ever men had a right to *rebel* and to employ an *armd resistance*, it was these primitiv disciples. Their enemys were equally the enemys of *God himself*. The rights invaded were not the creatures of *society* and protected by *human* constitutions; but were the gift of God, and secur'd by the New Testament, the great charter of Christian rights. Yet they did not rebel, they did not resort to an *armd resistance*. And why not? Simply, *because they knew that such means were inconsistent with the Christian character*. Were they restraind by fear? No one can allege that. Were they restraind by calculations of the probabilitys of success and failure? None can suspect that. Were they restraind by personal and selfish considerations? Who is so ignorant or so reckless of truth, as to bring such an accusation against men, who counted life, liberty, property, domestic enjoyments and social intercourse, as the very dust under their feet? The primitiv Christians did not then resist their oppressors by rebellion and with the sword, simply because they knew these to be *UNCHRISTIAN MEANS*. Let us assume that the primitiv Christians believd insurrection and *armd warfare* to be *lawful* weapons against tyranny and injustice. Why then did they not use them? Can any possible motiv be assignd for the omission, consistent with the right to use them? I answer fearlessly, none. If they had believd that they could, conscientiously, arm against the Heathen, as the Protestants did against the Catholics, would they not hav gone to the battel-field with the calm and undoubting confidence with which David went forth to meet Goliah? Will any one venture to say, that the trust of the Puritan or Hugonot in the righteousness of his cause, and in

the approbation of Heaven, could hav equald that of the primitiv Christians. These would hav fought against *paganism*, which was to be utterly destroyd and banishd from the whole earth by Christians; while *those* fought against an *acknowlegd Christian* church, that only needed *reformation*. Again, if the primitiv Christians had believd military warfare lawful, it would hav been the universal sentiment of the church. Would not that church, with the immense number of devoted followers evry where throughout the Roman empire, hav been vastly an overmatch for the Roman armys and generals? What but the spirit of liberty, wild and licentious as it was, enabled the Greeks and Romans, and the French armys of the revolution, to accomplish such prodigys under such disadvantages?—But would any Christian compare the depth, and strength, and enthusiazm, and durability of the motivs, that would hav influenc'd Christian soldiers in the suppos'd case, with those of the ancient Heathen and the French republicans? We know with absolute certainty, there is no comparison in any of the elements that go to make up the consummate officer and the invincible soldier. If the primitiv church had regarded *military warfare* as *lawful*, it would hav been employd: and the Roman empire would hav been conquerd by Christian armys long before the northern Barbarians came forth to destroy it. Nor must we forget, that the primitiv church would hav been impell'd to this course, not only by the convictions that they fought for their *dearest* rights against *tyrants and oppressors*, but that they fought in the cause of *God* against *His* enemys, and that victory would hav enabled them, by the possession of the whole political power of the empire, to spread the true religion evry where, with unexampled rapidity and success. Such would hav been *human* calculation; and such were the calculations of Protestants when they armd against Catholics, of the Roundheads when they wag'd war with the Cavaliers, and of the Covenantors of Scotland; but the primitiv Christians believ'd God to be wiser than man. They would, therefore, neither defend themselv's with arms, nor employ the sword of rebellion and conquest, simply because they knew *both to be unlawful in Christians*. It was then foolishness to believ, and they acted out that belief, that truth is propagated faster *by the destruction of its friends by its-enemys, than by the destruction of its enemys by its friends*. If then it was *unlawful*, and *therefore inexpedient*, (as Ecclesiastical history abundantly testifys,) for

the primitiv Christians to employ armd resistance in *their* case, it never can be lawful, and therefore never expedient, to employ it in any *other* case. If the end did not justify *such* means with them, what *other* end ever can?

There is another most interesting view of this subject. All Christians will agree that the Roman Empire was to be destroyd, just as certainly, as the nations of Canaan were to be rooted up for the implanting of the children of Israel. That this destruction was to form a most conspicuous scene in the administration of God's moral government of the world, cannot be doubted. The prophecy was to be fulfilld; "all they that take the sword, shall perish with the sword." Why were not Paul and Peter and John, and all the apostles commissiond like Moses and Joshua, and sent forth sword in hand to conquer pagan communitys, and make them Christian; to overturn heathen Governments and establish Christian rulers evry where? Rome was to perish by the *sword*, but not by *Christian* hands. The *chosen* people of God, were not such, as of old, to fight his battels, and vindicate by the sword, their rights to possess and rule the earth. *The HEATHEN* were calld forth from the forests of the north, to slaughter, and plunder, and utterly destroy the tyrants and oppressors, the robbers and murderers of the whole earth. War was a *lawful* instrument to the Jew, because it was *expressly commanded*. It was *lawful* to the heathen; because to him the precept stood *unrepeald*, "whoso sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed." But to the Christian *war* must *ever* be an *unlawful* instrument; because to him the universal moral precept, "thou shalt not kill," never has been repeald. *War is peculiarly, emphatically, God's instrument, not man's.*

Let us not forget in this connexion, that the Roman empire was thus destroyd, *after it had become Christian*. I speak of it as Christian, in the common acceptation of the word. *It was in truth still a heathen empire, because it was still administerd on heathen principles.* Instead of the sermon on the mount, and a host of missionarys with the law of love, humility, forbearance, forgiveness, sent forth to Christianize and civilize the heathen, *Mars was still the god of the Roman empire:* and the same system of robbery and murder, as far as practicable, still prevaild. That public law of the empire, was the antichristian law, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. The sword was the great instrument to accomplish all public ends: and armys were the only

safeguard relyd on by Christian rulers. As a Public then, and as a Government, the Roman empire was *still Pagan*. It was meet then that it should perish by *heathen hands*: and the destroying angel himself, seems as it were, to hav opend thro' the forests of Germany a highway of nations for the Scourge of God, to tread it down and break it in pieces. It was meet that it should thus perish; for Christian rulers had become the worshipers of Mars, and relyd on the sword, not on faith and love. It was meet that the most awful and terrible fulfilment of the prophecy, which the world had ever seen, should now be given; *because Christians had actualy subdued the Roman empire without the sword; but relyd only on the sword to defend it.*

NOTE A A.

I am surprisd that Dymond has not notic'd here the authentic history of the conduct of the Quakers in Ireland, during the Rebellion of 1798, by Thomas Hancock, a physician of Liverpool. It is a most striking and affecting testimony to the truth, power and beauty of peace principles. The ages of martyrdom exhibit nothing superior to this little volume, as a record of the trial and triumph of faith, humility and love. What majesty, simplicity and purity in this practical commentary on the sermon on the mount! What a contrast to armys of soldiers, with that sermon in their knapsacks, led by officers, servants of the Prince of Peace, and encourag'd by the prayers and preaching of Christian ministers, as military chaplains! Oh! what a contrast is this for Jesus and the belovd disciple, and the spirits of the just to behold! When shall the Christian Ministry as teachers of Christian youths, be willing to substitute such models of Christian character as Hancock on Peace, for such models of heathen character, as Cæsar's Commentaries and the Life of Agricola? When shall they cease to teach, that "the *moral* efect of Cæsar's Commentaries *cannot be unfavorable*;" that "the great Epics of Homer and Virgil address themselv's to the susceptibilitys of *taste*, and *not* to the *moral sense*;" and that "it would be difficult to find in modern times a specimen of biography *equally instructiv* with the Life of Agricola?" Now, it is impossible to deny on Christian principles, that *Cæsar and Agricola* were neither more nor less than

robbers and murderers by wholesale. Still less can we doubt, that the *real morals* of Homer are *not* to be found in the *speculations* of the *critic* and *philosopher*; but, in the *practical* commentary of *Alexander of Macedon*, and in the sentiment of Cleomenes. “Homer is the poet of *Spartans*, because he sings of *war*; Hesiod of the *Helots* (i. e. of *slaves*) because *agriculture* is his theme.” Did Alexander and Cleomenes admire the *Iliad*, as a work of taste because it was fitted to make critics, poets and fine writers? Did they not acknowledg and glory in its transcendent influence over the *moral* sense,—transforming the coward into the warrior, the slave into the hero? Would the Macedonian have recommended Hesiod to his invading army; or the Spartan have suffered the minstrel to chant the *Iliad* among the *Helots*? The libations of Alexander at the tombs of the heroes of the *Iliad*; the crown placed on the pillar of Achilles; the enshrinement of the *Iliad* in that precious casket of Darius; and his sentiment, that Achilles was eminently fortunate in such a bard as Homer, prove *the influence of the poet over the moral sense*, with an eloquence and force of argument, that cannot be gainsayd, by the *speculativ* opinions of all the critics and moral philosophers of Christendom. The influence of Homer is far better comprehended and express’d by a writer of the last century. “Immortal bard! Thou alone didst sound the charge at Thermopylæ! Thou alone didst conquer at Marathon and Salamis! That a paltry corner of Europe should stand first in the rolls of fame is solely owing to thy divine genius.”

“Like quicksilver, the rhetoric they display,
Shines as it runs; but grasp’d at, slips away.”

NOTE B B.

We are very little sensible, even in this country, of the prodigious amount of money, drawn from the people and expended in war. By a report of the Secretary of the Treasury it appears, that the amount expended on the military establishment, including fortifications, up to 31st of December, 1831, was (\$185,000,000) one hundred and eighty-five millions of dollars, and on the naval establishment (108,000,000) one hundred and

eight millions; making an aggregate of (\$293,000,000) two hundred and ninety-three millions of dollars. To this amount, of itself sufficiently large, to show what an insatiate tax-gatherer war is, we must add (\$21,750,000) twenty-one millions seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars and upwards, paid in revolutionary and other pensions; making in the whole the gigantic aggregate of (\$314,850,000) three hundred and fourteen millions eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars.

We boast of the economy of our government, compar'd to those of the old world. But the peace cause proposes a retrenchment which far exceeds any system of economy ever yet imagin'd, much less attempted. The money spent upon war in our country, if employ'd to the advancement of the highest interests of the people, their religious, moral and intellectual improvement, would hav made us indeed, thro' all our borders, a free, educated, peaceful, Christian people. These hundreds of millions, thus expended in murder and robbery, in the promotion of false honor and the acquisition of false glory, would hav coverd our land with thousands upon thousands of schools, academys and colleges! Then should we hav presented a far more glorious and enviable spectacle than that which is now our boast, a people *self-governd* and understanding their *rights*; for we should hav been a people governd of *God*, and understanding our *dutys*.

I may mention as one of the modes in which money is spent in war, the distribution of prize money, which is certainly so much los to the enemy at all events. And in the course of the many wars wag'd by any given nation, the gains and losses would be pretty well equaliz'd; so that the prize money is actualy a tax on the nation, or rather a most unjust and unequal exaction from the very *small* number in comparison of the whole, whose losses of property constitute prize money. Some idea may be formd on this subject from the distribution of East India prize money, lately made in England, in which the commander in chief receivd £30,987 6s 1d, nearly \$130,000—and each soldier only 13s. 8½d. less than three dollars.

NOTE C C.

How admirable and appropriate is the following passage from Cowper's Task, B. 4. Whilst even Christian Ministers are so lavish in their praise of Horace, Juvenal and Persius, as *moral* writers, is it not strange, that they should have so entirely overlooked the great merits of Cowper's moral writings? In point of substantial worth, they are much more valuable than the writings of the Roman satirists; not only because they are the compositions of a *Christian* moralist, but because they have a more immediate and efficient application to our own institutions, manners and customs. I would rather be the author of the Task of Cowper, than of all the boasted Satires of Horace, Juvenal and Persius. The day must yet come, when Pagan authors shall be cast out of the school-room of Christian youth, and Christian writers shall take their place.

'Tis universal soldiership has stabb'd
 The heart of merit in the meaner class.
 Arms, through the vanity and brainless rage
 Of those that bear them, in whatever cause,
 Seem most at variance with all moral good,
 And incompatible with serious thought.
 The clown, the child of nature, without guile,
 Blest with an infant's ignorance of all
 But his own simple pleasures; now and then
 A wrestling match, a foot-race, or a fair;
 Is balloted, and trembles at the news:
 Sheepish he doffs his hat, and mumbling swears
 A bible oath to be whatever they please,
 To do he knows not what. The task perform'd,
 That instant he becomes the sergeant's care,
 His pupil, and his torment, and his jest.
 His awkward gait, his introverted toes,
 Bent knees, round shoulders, and dejected looks,
 Procure him many a curse. By slow degrees,
 Unapt to learn, and form'd of stubborn stuff,
 He yet by slow degrees puts off himself,
 Grows conscious of a change, and likes it well:
 He stands erect; his slouch becomes a walk;
 He steps right onward, martial in his air,

His form and movement, is as smart above
 As meal and larded locks can make him, wears
 His hat, or his plum'd helmet, with a grace;
 And, his three years of heroship expired,
 Returns indignant to the slighted plough.
 He hates the field, in which no fife or drum
 Attends him: drives his cattle to a march,
 And sighs for the smart comrades he has left.
 'Twere well if his exterior change were all—
 But with his clumsy port the wretch has lost
 His ignorance and harmless manners too,
 To swear, to game, to drink; to show at home
 By lewdness, idleness, and Sabbath breach,
 The great proficiency he made abroad;
 T' astonish and to grieve his gazing friends;
 To break some maiden's and his mother's heart;
 To be a pest where he was useful once;
 Are his sole aim, and all his glory now.

NOTE D D.

That dueling is a consequence of the military system, cannot be doubted. Without war, we should have no laws of honor; no honorable mode of adjusting disputes; no "insults and injuries, that can be wash'd out only in the blood of the offender." Without war we should hear nothing of that sensitive honor, which "feels a stain like a wound; nothing of that pure and lofty chivalry," which sets at defiance the laws both of God and man; nothing of that standard of morals, which justifies the father, husband, son, and patriot, in placing his life at the disposal of the gambler, and man of fashion, of the frivolous and worthless; nothing of that code of duty which justifies murder and suicide; nothing of that *courage*, which enters *silently* and *respectfully* into the courts of human justice; but rushes *blood-stained* and tumultuously to the bar of the Eternal Judge of the living and the dead. If then the system of false and sanguinary honor, be maintained by the war system, and would perish without it, shall we not assign the existence of dueling as a strong argument against war? The war system is in truth the dueling system of nations, founded on similar principles, sustained by similar arguments, appealing

to the same motives, leading to like results, and employing the same instruments of murder and suicide. The law of honor is the law of supreme obligation to each. Pride is the exhaustless fountain of the crimes of both systems.

“Tho’ various foes against the truth combine,
Pride above all opposes her design:
Pride, of a growth superior to the rest,
The subtlest serpent with the loftiest crest,
Swells at the thought and kindling into rage,
Would hiss the cherub Mercy from the stage.”

Cowper's Truth.

What a contrast between the *pride* of the *duelist* and *warrior*, and the *humility* of the *Christian*! “Blessed are the poor in spirit,” is, to adopt the sentiment of a venerable clergyman, “*the first thought of the first sermon, of the first preacher the world ever saw!*” Could the duelist or the warrior take this as his motto? What a text for the chaplain to a regiment or a frigate! What a text for the day before a battle; or the day after, at the burial of thousands of the slain; or in the chapel of a hospital for the maimed and mangled! If *humility* be as I do believe it, the very *BEST virtue of practical religion*, then the law of honor “and the law of war” are equally and irreconcilably among the deadliest enemies of the meek and lowly Jesus!

I cannot forbear from inserting here the commission of a chaplain to a regiment, as a solemn subject of meditation for the Christian clergy.

The State of South Carolina:

TO THE REV. ———, D.D.

We, reposing special trust and confidence in your courage and good conduct, and in your fidelity and attachment to the United States of America, have commissioned and appointed you, and by these presents do commission and appoint you the said ———, chaplain of the ——— regiment of Militia, in ———. And you are to follow and observe all such orders and instructions you shall from time to time receive from the Governor, the commander in chief for the time being, or any of your superior officers, according to the rules and discipline of war, pursuant to the laws of this State and of the United States; and all inferior offi-

cers and others belonging to the said regiment, are hereby requir'd and commanded to obey you as their chaplain.

What a document for the messenger of peace, and love, and humility! What a title to forgiveness and to the joys of heaven! What a commentary on the petition "thy kingdom come;" and on the prophecy, "all they that take the sword shall perish by the sword." What a contrast to the commission of the Savior, "Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them, &c.; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever *I have* commanded you."

NOTE E E.

The text suggests a distinction which I hav never seen notic'd; but which recomends itself to good sense, justice and humanity, and still more to religion. I refer to the difference between the *citizens* of *popular* governments, and the *subjects* of *despotisms*. In the *first* case, the act of the ruler may be well regarded as the act of the people themselvs; for he is appointed by, responsible to, and punishable by them. If it be right then to punish on Christian principles, common sense and justice approve the punishment of citizens, who ar their own masters, for the misconduct of rulers, who ar their servants? But on what equitable and rational principle can we justify the revers of the rule, when we punish the innocent for the guilty, viz. *subjects* for the folly and wickedness of *sovereigns*. Whatever we might say of the *army* of a despot, could we but regard the *mass* of his *subjects* at home, as not only innocent, but as even sufferers themselvs by his deeds of violence and injustice to us? By what rule then of reason or equity, could we justify ourselvs in butchering them by thousands, and destroying their cottages and fields, to punish the insolence or injurys of their monarchs? Yet *this* has been the character of *almost all* the wars that hav ever existed. In *very few* instances hav the *people* actualy had any thing to do with war, except as themselvs the victims of cruelty and oppression. Justice and good sense equally forbid our regarding the wars, wag'd by arbitrary governments, whether monarchys or aristo-

cracys, as *national* sins in any proper meaning of the word. It is only in the *Representativ Republic* of these *United States*, that war can be justly and truly regarded as a *national* sin. In no other instance whatever, since the beginning of time, could war be regarded as the *deliberate appropriate act of the people*. But with us it is such. The will of *the people* can declare war, can continue it, can support it, can stop it at pleasure. **THE PEOPLE AT LARGE ARE THE GUILTY.** For the first time in the history of man, we exhibit the awful, affecting spectacle of a **NATION** arraigned at the bar of reason and justice, of natural and revealed religion, and convicted of thousands of acts of suicide and murder, and of hundreds of thousands of deeds of violence, fraud, cruelty and oppression. How solemn and responsible is then the character of the American Government, in the eyes of all reflecting men, and especially of Christians! Let us tremble, lest our proud distinction, that **WE ARE THE ONLY SELF-GOVERND PEOPLE** the world has ever seen, be not our deepest shame and guilt.

NOTE F F.

This principle, that the command of a *divine* lawgiver never can be superseded by that of a *human* legislator, is most amply illustrated by the very familiar cases that occur in the administration of justice in our own country. Thus the by-law of a corporation, which violates an act of assembly, is admitted universally to be no law. So also, an act of assembly, which interferes in a case of concurrent jurisdiction, with an act of congress, must yield to it. If any provision of a State Constitution infringes the Constitution of the Union, the paramount authority of the latter is acknowledged and the former gives way. All this proceeds on the principle, that the *inferior* cannot lawfully supersede the commands of the *superior*. But is not the divine legislator superior to any human lawgiver? Now, all human government, is according to the scriptures, ordained of God, and civil obedience is declared to be a religious, as well as a political duty. The power of rulers is *represented as vested* in them by God: and submission is required for conscience' sake, that is as a duty to God, not a duty to man. When, therefore, the ruler requires of the citizen what God has forbidden, it is plainly the case of an inferior jurisdiction, re-

quiring disobedience to the commands of a superior power, to which obedience is due, not only from the individual, but from itself. It is the case of one, who exercises a delegated authority, employing it to compel disobedience to the paramount authority of that very power, which gave him being.

It ought to be remarkd, that it is quite imaterial to this argument, whether we refer human government and rulers to the divine will, or not. In either view, the divine command is of supreme authority. If the human legislator derives his power from God, then beyond all doubt he can ordain nothing contrary to what God has ordaind. If, on the other hand, he does not derive his power from God, it is equally clear, that he cannot suspend or repeal the command of God; because he cannot receive his authority from any being superior to God. He must then receive it from an *inferior* source; and which, being therefore beyond all doubt subject to the will of God, cannot exempt him from the obligation to obey that very law, which he attempts to compel his fellow subjects to violate.

BY THOMAS S. GRIMKE,

OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA.

ADDRESS

ON THE

TRUTH, DIGNITY, POWER AND BEAUTY

OF THE

PRINCIPLES OF PEACE,

AND ON THE

UNCHRISTIAN CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE

OF

War and the Warrior.

DELIVERED IN THE CENTER CHURCH AT NEW-HAVEN, DURING THE
SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE OF CONNECTICUT, AT THE REQUEST
OF THE CONNECTICUT PEACE SOCIETY, ON SUNDAY EVENING,

MAY 6, 1832.

BY THOMAS S. GRIMKÉ,
OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA.

"For not on wild adventure had I rushd
"With giddy speed, in some delirious fit
"Of fancy, but in many a tranquil hour,
"Weighed well the attempt, till hope matured to faith."

Madoc.

ADDRESS

BY

TRUTH, DIGNITY, POWER AND BEAUTY

OF THE

PRINCIPLES OF PEACE

AND OF THE

CHRISTIAN CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE

EXTRACT FROM THE RECORDS OF THE CONNECTICUT PEACE
SOCIETY.

“*Voted*, That the Board of Trustees highly appreciate the
merits of Mr. GRIMKE's excellent Address, and most cordially
present him their thanks for the same.”

H. GREW, *Secretary*.

MAY 6, 1833.

BY THOMAS S. GRIMKE,
OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA.

“For not on wild adventures had I roved
“With ready speed, in some distant
“Of fancy, but in many a lonely hour
“Weighed well the struggle, till hope returned to faith.”

ADDRESS.

WAR is the law of violence, PEACE the law of lov. That law of violence prevaild without mitigation, from the murder of Abel to the advent of the Prince of Peace. During all that period of forty centurys, war appeard to be the great end of all the institutions of society. Governments seemd to be successfully organiz'd, only when strong for the destruction of others. Rulers appeard to be fortunate in their administration, and ilustrious in their achievments, only when marches and battel-fields, burning citys and shatterd navys were the trophys of their renown. The warrior was the great man of those ages, for his art presented the chief means of aggrandizement, with nations and individuals, at home and abroad. Peace, the natural state of man, whether he consults his dutys, his interests, or his happiness, was regarded as worthy only of the vulgar, ignorant multitude: and as the natural state, *not of the free, but of the slave*. The spirit of all those ages was embodyd in the sentiment of Cleomenes: Homer is the poet of the Spartans, because he sings of war, Hesiod of the Helots, because agriculture is his theme.*

* The sentiment of Cleomenes seems to be the prevailing sentiment that breaths through the education of Christian youth. War, in some form or other is forever present. History, bio-

War, the unnatural state of man, if he respects his obligations, welfare, and improvement, was considered as the only natural state of government in all its forms of despotism,

graphy, poetry, in all our seminaries, as the tributes of genius and taste to the character and achievements of the pagan warrior. Why should the children of a *Christian* people, be forever under the influence of men, so entirely *the revers* of what *they* ought to be? Is there any one, who, if he could, would send his children daily to the camp or the fort, to keep the company of the officer and the soldier? And yet, is not the same thing actually done in a more imposing form and with more effect, by our schemes of education? The youthful fancy is filled with images of war, with pictures of campaigns, and sieges, and battles. Let it not be said that the real effect of all this, is to disgust youth by exhibiting the horrors and miseries of war, and to produce aversion, not approbation. This might be true, if only the shocking and revolting picture of war were exhibited; the battle-field, the day after battle; the city strewn with its dead, plundered and burnt; the terrors of panic-struck and broken squadrons; the hunger, and thirst, and dangers, and sufferings of retreating armies; the tortures and loathsomeness of the hospital and prisonship. But how can we so deceive ourselves? The *reality* we *know*, produces no such effect, and yet we vainly *imagine* that it may flow from a *mere narrative*, destitute of the thrilling interest and appalling horrors of personal experience. Let it not be likened to the act of the Spartans, in exhibiting to their children, drunken Helots. The parallel might hold if only the miseries and horrors of war were exhibited. But the Spartans knew too well the force of temptation to venture on setting before their youth, the graces and fascinations and enjoyments of the wreath and the rosy wine, of the festive song and the boon companion. But Christian teachers, insensible to the force and truth of the example set by semi-barbarian pagans, follow the practice of the Egyptians, who placed a skeleton at the festive board, under the idle hope, that it would exercise a restraining influence over the company. Charles the 5th carried about with him in all his campaigns a French translation of Thucydides: and Henry the 4th, and Lewis the 14th translated Cæsar. They acted consistently; while Seleucus

oligarchy, and democracy. Even in the comparatively free states of Greece and Italy, amidst their hideous compounds of despotic aristocracy and turbulent licentious democracy, *War was the master passion of the people, the master spring of government.* The republicans of antiquity appear to have lived in vain, unless they died in battle; and all the vital powers of their government were so entirely military, that they perished, as soon as they lost the capacity to make war successfully. Such institutions and states of society, present one of the most remarkable proofs of the folly and depravity of man. In them we behold the singular and revolting spectacle of **THE PEOPLE** constructing their governments, and administering their public concerns on the cruel, unjust, and ruinous maxims of tyrants and conquerors. With War, as the prevailing spirit of all their institutions, the republics of antiquity have demonstrated *how utterly unfit the people are to govern themselves, if the law of violence be the fundamental law of their social compact.* They have demonstrated that if nations, though comparatively free and enlightened, live by the sword, they shall perish by the sword: *That the law of violence is the law of murder to others, of suicide to ourselves.**

Nicator (the conqueror) acted inconsistently, when he placed Hesiod under his pillow. Christian seminaries not only imitated the inconsistency of Seleucus, but they teach practically that unless a youth devotes ten years of his life to the translation of such books as Henry and Lewis admired, *he cannot be prepared for Christian duty and Christian usefulness.*

* The great objection to war is not so much the number of lives and the amount of property which it destroys, as its moral influence on nations and individuals. It creates and perpetuates national jealousy, fear, hatred, and envy. The last things that it teaches are humility, peace, and love, forbearance, and forgiveness. It is continually suspending the intercourse of nations, and preventing them from exercising a mutual influence of kind

We might hav imagin'd, if history had not attested the revers, that an experiment of four thousand years would hav suffic'd to prove, that the rational and valuable ends of so-

offices and useful actions. It makes the destruction or crippling of each other the great end of national existence, and the ruin of a powerful people becomes the jubilee of the world. If it sweeps away the poor, yet as Antisthenes said, it makes more than it consumes. The same is equally true of the vicious and the criminal. It arms the wicked and cruel, the ambitious and the arrogant with a power to oppress and torment, which peace could never confer: and, indeed, it makes those who would be the delight of mankind, a curs to their own age, and to many an age after them. It exhibits man, according to the opinion of Anacharsis, the Scythian, as his own worst enemy, exemplifying forever the sentiment of Burns:

“ Man's inhumanity to man
Makes countless thousands mourn.”

Nor is this all. It makes it the *duty, glory, and interest of Christians, yes, of Christians! to slay and plunder one another.* Those who had met, but a short time before hostilities commenc'd, as partakers of the sacramental bread and wine; who had united in the same truly Christian cause of the Bible and Tract, of the Sunday School and Missions, ar absolv'd by war, from these highest and holiest obligations to each other. The mercenary soldier of Switzerland, and the freemason, hav privileges which Christianity confers not. The Christian warrior would slay his adversary without mercy or remors, if his only plea was that he was a brother in Christ; but if he gave the sign of the masonic fraternity, or was a Swiss, he would be spar'd by his fellow-member or fellow-countryman. The folly or injustice of a king, the insolence or frauds of his ministry, the violence of an officer, or the misconduct of a magistrate, ar held not only to excuse, *but to justify and require* CHRISTIANS to murder and rob the *inocent*, and to visit on countless familys poverty and affliction. War arrogates to itself the prerogativ of the Creator only to involv the *inocent multitude* in the punishment of *the guilty*

ciety, can never be attained, by constructing its institutions in conformity with the standard of war. But the sword and the torch had been eloquent in vain. A thousand battel-fields, white with the bones of brothers, were counted as idle advocates in the cause of justice and humanity. Ten thousand cities, abandond to the cruelty and licentiousnes of the soldiery, and burnt, or dismantled, or raz'd to the ground, pleaded in vain against the law of violence. The river, the lake, the sea, crimsond with the blood of fellow-citizens, and neighbors, and strangers, had lifted up their voices in vain to denounce the folly and wickedness of war. The shrieks and agonys, the rage and hatred, the wounds and curses of the battel-field, and the storm and the sack, had scatterd in vain their terrible warnings throughout all lands. In vain had the insolent Lysander destroyd the walls and burnt the fleets of Athens, to the music of her own female flute players. In vain had Scipio, amid the ruins of Carthage, in the spirit of a gloomy seer, applyd to Rome herself, the prophecy of Agamemnon.

few. It exhibits the extraordinary spectacle of CHRISTIANS spending years in studying the best methods of destroying the greatest number of their brethren, within the shortest time, and with the greatest impunity to themselvs, and then devoting all their powers of mind and body to the exemplification of these Moloch accomplishments, in the siege and on the battel-field. War corrupts the moral taste and hardens the heart; cherishes and strengthens the base and violent passions; destroys the distinguishing features of Christian charity, its *universality*, and its love of *enemys*: turns into mockery and contempt, the *TEST virtue of Christians*, HUMILITY; weakens the sense of moral obligation, banishes the spirit of improvement, usefulness, and benevolence, and inculcates the horrible maxim, *that murder and robbery ar matters of state expediency.*

" The day shall come, the great avenging day,
 " Which Troy's proud glories in the dust shall lay:
 " When Priam's power, and Priam's self shall fall,
 " And one prodigious ruin swallow all."*

In vain had Pyrrhus exclaimd, as for all the warrior gamblers of antiquity, " One such victory more, and I am undone." In vain had the disgrace and the sufferings of Miltiades and Nicias, of Themistocles, Pausanias and Alcibiades; of Marius and Sylla, of Hannibal, Pompey and Cæsar, filld the nations with pity and dismay. The lamentations of the widow and the tears of the orphan, the broken hearts of age and the blasted hopes of youth and beauty and love, had pleaded in vain against the law of violence. The earth had drunk in the lifeblood of the slain and hidden their mangled bodys in her bosom: and there the garden, the orchard and the harvest florishd once more beautiful in the tints of nature, and rich in the melody of fount, and leaf, and breeze. The waters had swallowd into their depths the dying and the dead, and the ruind fleets both of victor and vanquishd; and again the waves danc'd in their sportivness, or rushd in their fury, over the battel-plain of hostile navys. The innocence of childhood had forgotten the pa-

* These lines ar spoken by Agamemnon in the fourth Book, v. 161, as a part of a speech to Menelaus, and *the very same* occur in the sixth Book, v. 448, in the address of Hector to Andromache. Pope has translated these last so very differently from those in the fourth Book, that none could ever suspect them to be the same in the original. If a modern poet, whatever might be his genius, learning and taste, had ventur'd on the endless repetition of the same epithets, lines and even passages, like Homer, or had dar'd, like Lucretius, to copy in one book, twenty-five lines out of a preceding book, the critic's lash inscrib'd with the motto, "*Judex damnatur, cum nocens, absolvi-tur,*" would hav given him no rest, even in the grave.

rent's death, the widow had recovered the lost smile of former years, the miserable old man had been gathered to his fathers, and affection had found new objects for its attachments.

The ancient and modern Assyrian, the Babylonish, Median and Persian empires; the kingdoms of ancient and modern Egypt, of Judah and Israel, and of all the successors of Alexander; the commercial states of Tyre, and Rhodes, and Carthage;”* the republics of Greece and Italy, and the

* The question has occurred to me as among the most interesting in the history of man, what would have been the fate of the ancient world if Carthage had conquered Rome? The policy of Rome was *exclusively warlike*. That of Carthage was *fundamentally commercial*. They were to the ancient world, what France and England are to the modern. And who can doubt that the influence of England, since she became decidedly commercial, has been more beneficial than that of the modern Romans, as Fisher Ames styles the French? Had Carthage triumphed, it is certain that the commercial spirit would have penetrated every where; and must have become the characteristic of every city, colony and province of the Carthaginian empire. *The spirit of commerce is essentially peaceful*. It humanizes the savage, civilizes the barbarian, and elevates the polished. It is the patron of arts and sciences; it is consistent with, for it fosters, enlightens, and strengthens freedom. Commercial states have always been to a greater extent than others (*cœteris paribus*) the patrons of arts and the seats of liberty. It is true, we have not even a vestige of Carthaginian literature and arts; but we owe it first to the fact, that the history of military nations, like that of Greece and Rome, is miserably barren in all that belongs to the history of society, political, commercial, and literary; and next to the fact, that the Romans, in their fury and jealousy, destroyed the Carthaginian state and people as utterly as their metropolis. Shall I be told that the ascendancy of Carthage would have involved the loss of the whole body of Latin literature? Grant it—and what have Roman letters done

barbarians of Spain and Gaul, of Germany, Switzerland and Belgium, had submitted to the all-conquering eagle. The terrible judgment, "All they that take the sword, shall

for mankind, comparable to the misery and ruin, the frauds and violence, the crimes and vices, which Rome, thro' a life of more than a thousand years, scatterd like the ashes and lava of *Ætna*, over all the neighboring countrys? Nor must we forget that the Latin language is little better than a very inferior idiom of the noble Greek, and Latin literature, almost a slavish imitator of the richer, more various and sublimer literature of Greece. Now, if we suppose Carthage instead of Rome to hav conquerd Greece and her Asiatic colonys, it is obvious, that the commercial policy of the former was far more consistent with the institutions and pursuits of all the Grecian states except Sparta, than the military policy of the latter. Is it not then probable, that Greece would hav been regenerated under the peaceful influences of Carthage, when she was trodden under foot and annihilated by the warlike policy of Rome? Between the Grecian states and the Roman power, there was no bond of union, but that of fear and weakness on the one side, of insolence and power on the other. But between them and Carthage, there would hav been the strong bond of *mutual interest*. Would not the entire character of all those communitys hav been chang'd ; and instead of sleeping the sleep of death in the arms of Roman despotism, would they not hav arisen to a new and better life, that of commercial enterprize ? Grecian letters, as the literature, not of dead states and enslav'd communitys, but of a living people, would hav exerted a commanding influence over the whole of the countrys explor'd and coloniz'd by Carthaginian commerce, or conquerd by Carthaginian power. And to extend our view still farther, how much more consonant to the genius of Christianity, and how much better fitted to receiv and extend its influence, would hav been a host of commercial states, around the Mediterranean, than the provincial tyrany of imperial Rome? For myself, therefore, I should not hesitate to prefer the ascendancy of the commercial oligarchy of Carthage, to that of the military aristocracy of Rome.

perish with the sword," had been written in letters of blood on the land and the ocean, on the palaces of kings, and the cottages of peasants, on the senate houses of the people, and the temples of their fals and cruel gods. The Roman empire, the grave of a hundred states, was destined to illustrate more remarkably than all the preceding nations, that the law of violence is a self-destroyer, remorseless and insatiable. Her power had been constantly extending, during a period of nearly eight hundred years, till a single city, with its fields and gardens, had swelled to the magnitude of a giant empire, embracing the fairest portions of Africa, Europe and Asia. *But her law had ever been and was still the law of violence.* Her battle shout of defiance had pierced the deep gloom of the Hercynian forest; and the Goth, the Burgundian, the Vandal and the Hun, came down to the feast of victory, at the trumpet-summons. Their progress was terrific, as when the mountain torrent rushes in its fury, to sweep away the vineyard and the harvest, the peasant's cabin, the shepherd and his flock. Again the race was to the swift and the battle to the strong. The Pyrenees and the Alps and the Balkan range were feeble barriers against the children of eternal snows; and as the barbarians poured down from those mountain summits the wild music of their battle songs over the beautiful and delicious regions of Iberia, Italy, and Greece, the Roman empire confessed in her agony of fear, *that the sword was her only title to all her dominions, from the rising to the setting sun.* What pencil can faithfully picture the terrible realities of that ferocious struggle between the barbarians and the civilized, with all their science and literature, with all their arts of peace and of war? The Roman empire, the mightiest, the most magnificent, the costliest structure of the whole ancient world, perished by the sword and faggot of barbarians, (ITSELF THE COLOSSAL TEMPLE OF WAR.) The sublime *propylæa*, that

lookd abroad over the great desart and up the vally of the Nile: The grand and beautiful portico, that fac'd the Mediterranean, lay prostrate in ruins. The august colonades, that towerd along the shores of the Atlantic and the banks of the Euphrates, were defac'd and shatterd. The vast roof which had shelterd a hundred nations, the walls, whose ample circuit had embrac'd a continent of territory, were rent, and cast down, and scatterd far and wide. Even the very shrine and altar of the god of war, the self-styl'd eternal city, was burnt, and sackd and enslav'd by Alaric and Attila, by Genseric, Totila and Theodoric. Of all that spacious and majestic structure, nothing remaind in western Europe, but a chaos of ruins, and here and there a pillar, solitary and solemn, as those of Colonna, Palmyra or Chelminar. The only inscription, which the conquerers vouchsaf'd for the monument of the most illustrious and powerful of ancient empires, was the prophecy so fearfully fulfilld, "*They that take the sword shall perish with the sword.*"

To the provincial military tyranys of imperial Rome, succeeded the feudal aristocracys and monarchys of the victors; whilst the sudden rise and rapid progress of the martial and illustrious dominion of the Saracens, contributed to perpetuate the law of violence. The whole structure of society in the civiliz'd portions of Europe then became more decidedly military, than it had ever been; for the feudal system was singularly adapted to a state of endles warfare, at home and abroad. According to the genius of that system, *martial law was the great, the universal law of society.* The people as well as the rulers, were all soldiers, and evry community exhibited the spectacle of a standing army and a permanent encampment. Age after age rolld away, and at length the arts of peace so far prevaild over those of war, *that SOCIETY lost its military character, but the administration of GOVERNMENT and the spirit of RULERS*

remained the same. The people had indeed been chang'd, under the influence of religion and letters, of agriculture, manufactures and commerce. *They*, indeed, had converted their spears into pruninghooks and their swords into ploughshares; but the great and permanent institutions of society partook not of the same spirit. The sword was still the scepter of the monarch, and the casque of the warrior his favorit crown. Governments, instead of being the fountains of peace abroad and happiness at home, became the instruments of misery and injustice, in the hands of conquerors and tyrants. The people, in the mean time, went onward in the improvement of their condition; yet still they exercis'd comparatively no influence on the character of rulers. Altho' the institutions of society can hav but ONE rational object, *the good of the people*, yet the end was forever sacrific'd to the means, the good of the people to the power of rulers. This state of things still prevails, for experience testifies that if the law of *war*, be no longer the fundamental law of European *society*, it is still the fundamental law of their *governments*. The fate of all those nations still depends, to a vast extent, on the *personal* character of monarchs and their counselors; and such must continu to be the destiny of that continent, until the progress of events shall hav reconstructed their governments, and hav remodeld the whole scheme of administration in conformity with the great truth, **THE PEOPLE ARE MASTERS, AND THE RULERS, SERVANTS.** Thus far, the chief responsibility of their rulers has been to the law of violence, to the ax and the scaffold. And altho' something has been gradually done in some portions of Europe, to meliorate the political condition of the people, and restrain the power and ambition of rulers; yet, if the advancement of reform be in after years, correspondent to the past, the American republic will number a hundred states, before the work shall have been accomplishd. Fortunately

for the world, it can hardly be said, that there is now in it any *state of society*, constituted on the principles of war. No military republics, like those of Greece and Rome, torment the nations and entail on their own posterity the curs of fire and sword. The feudal system, as the domestic and social constitution of European communitys, has utterly perished. We may well be surpris'd that the Athenians should have petitioned Valentinian for the restoration of the Eleusinian mysterys ; but what would be the measure of our wonder, if the people of Western Europe should desire the re-establishment of the power, so tremendously abus'd by feudal lords and monarchs ? As soon should we expect the age of Arthur and the Round Table, of Charlemagne and his Paladius to return, as to see the people in any country again, modelled on the military principles of the feudosocial compact. Hence, the great object of reform is GOVERNMENT ; and its reconstruction any where, on principles of responsibility to the people, will be a glorious triumph in the cause of Peace.

It must be obvious, that the interest and happiness of **THE PEOPLE**, are hostile to war ; that if left to themselves, however ignorant and uneducated, they would scarcely ever make war ; that of the battles and sieges which have brought such misery into the world, not one in a hundred would have occurred, had it depended on the people ; that war has no charms for them ; that peace is full of attractions ; that all their personal habits and social intercourse, all their employments, affections and duties, are inimical to war and friendly to peace. How demoniac then, is that spirit (and such was the spirit of all the founders of the ancient republics and of the feudal states) which debauches the people by ambition and the love of military fame, and breathes into all their institutions, as its living principle, the spirit of bloodshed and violence ! The good sense, the duties and affections of the people revolt

at such things; and the ascendancy of their influence in its natural wholesome state, must exterminate war.

I hav said that the most ignorant states of society contain in themselv the elements of peace, not of war. Who can believ that the mass of society in the countrys ravag'd by the ancient or modern warrior, enterd into the spirit of those wars, any otherwise than as sufferers, burning with rage and revenge at their miserys? This is equally true, of nearly all the wars, that hav ever existed. The most ignorant and unrefin'd, as well as the most enlightend and polishd states of society are equally hostil to war, in their dutys, interests, afections and employments. Justly to represent these, is the great duty of government. To giv them an authoritativ voice in affairs of state, is the great object of evry tru friend of the people; but the people, unless educated, cannot exercise a wholesome authoritativ control over rulers. The friends of peace therefore must exert their influence chiefly in evry such country, through the medium of EDUCATION.

What then shall that scheme of education be? Shall it contain in itself the elements of peace or war? Education is the most eficient and lasting means for revolutionizing society. This can make the peaceful, warlike, and the warlike, peaceful; the ignorant, intelligent, and the civiliz'd barbarous; the enlightend superstitious, and the superstitious enlightend; the cruel compassionate, and the meek, ferocious; the freeman a slave, and the slave a freeman; the pagan a Christian, and the Christian an idolater. *The great object of education ought then to be, to stamp on evry such state of society, the peaceful character.* EDUCATE FOR PEACE, NOT FOR WAR. Giv the religion of peace, if it be not already there; and let all the institutions of education, breathe its spirit, and bear its divine image. Giv as instructors and models, Jesus and his Apostles; the first, the truest, the only enlightend friends of the people. They only, of all

the lawgivers and rulers and teachers that ever livd, hav seen and acted on the principle, *that the interests and happiness of the people are inseparable from PEACE and irreconcilable with WAR*; that the habitations of peace ar the dwelling-places of love, humility, forbearance, resignation and evry Christian virtue; while the mansions of *war*, ar the natural abodes of crimes and vices, of all destructiv passions, *of heathen virtues, not of Christian perfections*. Christianity teaches, that war is the enemy—peace the friend of God and man. Education then must be imbued deeply, vitality, extensively, with the spirit of the religion of peace. If not, it is the enemy of that religion, and its influences ar perpetually at work to undermine the precepts, and destroy the examples of Christ and his Apostles. *With the RELIGION of peace, the people must hav the EDUCATION of peace, if their best interests are consulted*. The principles and operations of war, the character, achievements and glory of the warrior, hav no sympathys with the education of peace, as they hav none with the religion of peace. They ar enemys and monsters in the one, as well as in the other system. I speak therefore, the language of a faithful, enlightend friend of the people, when I declare that their highest good is not consulted, unless **THE WHOLE SCHEME OF EDUCATION** *be in its elements, practice and influence, decidedly, unchangeably PEACEFUL*.

Let us bring this to the test of experiment. Suppose then, two states of society, of the same description, equally ignorant and unciviliz'd, both of them heathen, subject to the same imperfect forms of government, and more or less addicted to war. To the one, let us send Christian missionarys, with the pure religion of peace, and the simple education of peace—to the other, the same Christian missionary, with the New Testament in one hand, and in the other, the present education of Christian countrys. The former carry in their right

hands, the scriptures, and in their left, works on natural and moral science, and on all the arts of peace, untainted by war and the warrior. The latter bears the same holy works, but with them are intermingled history and biography, poetry and eloquence, breathing the spirit, extolling the achievements, and displaying in fascinating colors, the glory of the warrior's life, and the loftier glory of his death. Do we not at once perceive the beautiful consistency and harmony of the one system; the incongruity and discord of the other? Can we doubt the results? The former will make a truly Christian people, Christian in thought, word and deed, at home and abroad, to their neighbors and strangers, to friends and enemies. The latter will produce a state of society, precisely such as exists in the most highly favored Christian countries; half heathen and half Christian; half peaceful and half warlike; consisting of elements forever at war with each other, because in their very nature irreconcilable. Who can hesitate one moment which to prefer? Who does not see, that, in one state of society all the influences which act on the child, the youth, the man, are Christian, peaceful; whilst in the other the irrational union exists, between light and darkness, violence and peace, love and revenge, humility and pride, the apostle and the warrior, Christ and the god of war.*

* I look upon the missions to the heathen in our day as among the most interesting of colonial experiments. We think nothing of them now: and look at them with as little concern, as the nations of Europe once looked at the forlorn and helpless settlements, scattered along the coast of North America, apparently, as carelessly and unprofitably as the very seaweed cast by the storm on the beach. But the wonderful, the unexampled career of *these* may teach us, what *those* are destined to become. The refugees to North America left England at the most important crisis in the history of society in that country; when protestantism was deeply felt and civil and political liberty were better

Impious, vile, unnatural and ruinous as is the union between pagan and Christian influences in education, it is pre-understood, than they had ever been before. The missionaries leave our country under similar, but superior auspices. They leave us at a time, when religion has been delivered from its great enemies, intolerance and church establishments, and when civil and political liberty have the best safeguards they have ever had, in our written constitutions and forms of government; and in the principles of a free press, and of general education, universally acknowledged and reduced to practice. They carry with them also a purer and simpler morality, and a spirit of benevolence, more various, practical and enlightening, than has ever yet been known. Our ancestors came to the barren shores and the pathless wilderness, from *personal* considerations entirely, though of a pure and noble character. But the missionary goes forth, solely under the influence of the *most disinterested* motives of *self sacrifice*, to instruct the ignorant, to civilize the savage or the barbarous, to reclaim the wandering and idle, to bless the miserable, and to christianize the heathen. If such results, so fair and glorious, have sprung from the principles of our ancestors, how much more grand and beautiful must be the results, that are destined to spring from the purer and nobler, the more simple, comprehensive and beneficent principles carried forth by the missionaries! And do we not see the prodigious difference between the *warlike* habits and martial spirit of the North American colonists, so continually called into action by the Indians, French and Spaniards; and the *peaceful* character of our missionary families—unchangably such, whether in Ceylon, Burmah or Madagascar, at the cape of Good Hope, or amid the islands of the Pacific? The law of *violence* banished our ancestors from their native land; but the law of *peace*, draws the missionary, as with the cords of love, to leave his home for the land of strangers. I regard missionary families, as peculiarly *colonies of peace*: and hail them as the founders of better states of society, than we have ever seen; because altogether more consistent with the simple, pure, humble, peaceful spirit of Christianity.

cisely that, which exists in Christian countrys, and is perpetuated by all their schemes, in defiance of the principles and example, the life and death of the Redeemer and his apostles. Let the course of study in the schools, academys and colleges, even of our own land be examind, and not one will be found constructed on the basis of Christian influences, of peace and love, of humility, long suffering, forgiveness and resignation. He will find the paramount influences evry where, ar heathen, those of Greek and Roman heroes, those of the fabulous, heroic and historic ages of classic antiquity. The history of wars, and the biographys of warriors ar almost the only food of that kind vouchsaf'd to the youthful mind. The acts of the apostles, ar taught scarcely any where: the commentarys of Cæsar and the life of Agricola, robbers and murderers in the sight of God, evry where; while the lives of Howard and Martyn, of Johnson and Dwight, of Penn, Jones, Spencer and Burke, men of whom even the Christian world is unworthy, ar studyd no where. The gospels are seldom text-books of instruction. The *Æneid* and *Iliad* always. Thus the unfailing operation of all our schemes is to bring war and the warrior, in evry variety of form, to act on the mind and heart, the imagination and memory, the pleasures and prospects of Christian youth, thro' the whole course of their education, ar we not thus coupling indissolubly in the marriage-bonds of education, peace and violence, virtue and vice, life and death? Is it possible that this can be right? Is it not like the pagan, to weav garlands for the feast of friendship from the desolate ivy, the wild tapestry of ruins? Ar we not watering the fruits and flowers of paradise, with waters from the sea of Sodom?

And who ar the guilty? If the voices of the just made perfect, of angels and archangels could reply, that fearful answer to evry Christian, and especialy to evry Christian

minister, would be, "*Thou art the man!*" *The virtues of Jesus Christ ar the very revers of what ar calld the heroic virtues of classic antiquity.* We know that he never would hav acted like the great men of Greece and Rome: *that the object of HIS system was uterly to abolish THEIRS:* that, his or theirs, must eventually rule the world; that one or the other, must perish.—*Now, whichever conquers, can only conquer thro' the power of EDUCATION.* Giv to *the religion of peace the education of peace*, and its victory is sure. Giv to it the education of war and violence, the influence of heathen heroism and glory, and whilst these prevail, it never can conquer. The lion and the lamb do indeed lie down together; but the lamb is the slave or the victim of the lion. Hitherto, such has been the lot of Christianity. It has ever been the slave of heathen influences, of anger and violence, and evry evil passion: it has been forever the victim of war and the warrior. And why?—because its professors, and abov all, its holy ministry, hav not vindicated its authority, cost what it might, against war and the warrior in evry form; because they hav not held property, life, liberty, character, as nothing in comparison of fidelity to the peace principles of Jesus Christ. Is it not absolutely astonishing, that those who hav bound on their souls the vow of humility, love, forgiveness, forbearance, ar yet constantly employd, by their schemes of education, in impairing and even destroying, those peaceful, holy influences? With fear and trembling, with a deep feeling of awe and respect, with profound emotions of gratitude to the clergy for what they hav done, and with a strong faith in their entire regeneration in future years, I speak what I believ a solemn truth. *Their compromise with war and the warrior, has produc'd incalculable mischiefs to religion, liberty, education and peace.* They hav tolerated, when they ought to hav condemnd on principle, unconditionally and inexorably, tho' calmly and

afectionately, war and the warrior in evry form. They acknowledge their master to be the Prince of peace. They know that he never would hav raisd or commanded an army, that he would not hav employd war, in any shape or under any emergency, as an instrument to punish his enemys or deliver his people. They must acknowledge, that if he were the ruler of a nation, and is he not the rightful ruler of all? he would command them to return good for evil, blessing for cursing, love for hatred, entreatys for insult, peace for war. They cannot deny, that, a nation governd by implicit faith in Christ, and by a simple conformity to his laws, would hav neither army nor navy, that an arsenal or a cannon foundry, would be unknown among them; that sword and helmet, banner and lance, could not be found there; that a fortress would be as little tolerated, as a temple of idols; and the glory of the warrior would be as earnestly condemn'd and as carefully banishd, as the leprosy or the plague.

All this, the Christian ministry know. *They condemn dueling in evry form, between individuals, but they excuse and even justify it, between nations.* They deny the lawfulness of dueling, and that it affords either remedy or satisfaction to an injur'd individual; yet, they tolerate in nations similarly situated, an appeal to arms. If a friend should call out the treacherous confidant who had slanderd and betrayd him; if a parent should avenge in a duel, the injurys to his son; if the son should challenge the man, who had insulted his father; if the brother should summon to mortal combat the seducer of his sister; yea, even if the husband, in obedience to the law of honor, should slay the wretch, who had blasted his hopes, degraded his children, and polluted his home, *Christian ministers would not dare to justify, or even to excuse him.* To the friend, the parent, the son, the brother, the husband, they would say, Jesus would hav forgiven, and hav prayd for such enemys—he would hav

sav'd both body and soul, not hav destroy'd them. He demands this sacrifice as a proof that you ar his disciples. Go and do likewise. Now it must be conceded that, a nation can sustain no injury, comparable to those of the insulted and dishonour'd friend, and brother, parent, son and husband. Nor can they put it on the ground that nations hav no arbiter, whilst individuals may appeal to the laws of the country; *for the most aggravated and cruel private injurys ar the very ones, which the laws of society do not redress.* Wars, if not the creatures of passion, caprice, or ambition, originate almost entirely from questions of property; but duels, from insulted honor, outrag'd feelings, and a violation of the most sacred domestic rights.

It becomes then the Christian ministry, and I ask it of them as a dutiful son, as a faithful friend, as an affectionate, respectful counselor, to consider solemnly and prayerfully, whether they are acting the part, which becomes the messengers of the Prince of peace. I entreat them to examin seriously of what spirit they ar, and whether to them, on the all-important subject of peace and war, may not be addressd the pathetic complaint of the prophet and the psalmist, "I was wounded in the house of my friends," "my familiar friend hath lifted up his heel against me." The clergy, both as individuals and as a body, hav been the decided enemys of *private* war and of the *duelist*, ever since the delirium of the age of chivalry had pass'd away; but hav they not been more or less the vindicators and apologists of *public* war and of the *warrior* in various forms? They forbid the *private* man to do, what they know the Savior never would hav done; yet they sanction the *public* man, *and private men, under his control*, in punishing insult or avenging injury, when they know that Christ never would. And, on what principle is it, that the Christian minister can approach the throne of God, in the name and through the

intercession of the meek and lowly Jesus, the Prince of peace, and ask a blessing on the warrior's arms, even of his own country, or return thanks to Heaven for his success in battel?*

* The sentiment of Commodore Decatur, "Our country—may she always be right; but right or wrong, may she always be victorious!" is unsustainable on any principle of sound morals, and is at war with Christian duty. It would be admirable morality in a pagan warrior, and would even have been quite in keeping with the casuistry of the middle ages, and the martial religion of the crusaders. Such a sentiment, however, is utterly irreconcilable with a proper sense of justice, much more of religion. That which we are justify'd in desiring, we have a right to pray for; but would any man be justify'd in praying that his father or mother, his child or best friend should succeed *in an unjust law suit*? If he knew that his son or brother had gone out to fight in single combat, a man whom he had insulted and injur'd, would he dare to offer up the *impious* prayer, that the wrong doer might slay his adversary? The only prayer which the Christian could dare to make, would be, that the duel might be prevented, or if inevitable, that both might escape unhurt, and become sincere penitents for their guilt and folly. I do not understand that morality, if morality it may be call'd, which justifies in a *nation*, deeds of fraud and violence, that, in a *private* man, would excite abhorrence, and call down summary and terrible vengeance. A multitude, calling themselves a nation, or represented by a government, cannot authorise that which is impious or unjust in the individuals. I know of no distinction between national and individual morality; but this, that the latter is the only true basis of the former: and that this actually is of a more dignify'd solemn and important character than that. The morality of a *public* man, should ever be of a sublimer cast, of holier obligation, than that of the citizen; because, though the principle of duty be the same, the elevated station, the commanding authority, the comprehensiv influence and vary'd relations of the former, *make his virtues incomparably more valuable, his vices incomparably more perilous.*

on behalf of the avenger of private insults or injurys, be mockery and blasphemy! Now, what sensible, practical difference is there between the prayer, that an injur'd and insulted father or husband might disable or slay his adversary, and the prayer that an army of a wrong'd and dishonour'd people might prosper in its work of wounds and death, in scattering and destroying its enemys? Can the Christian minister return thanks to God, that, the father and the husband hav mangled or slain in a duel the seducer of his daughter and his wife? How then, can he offer the prayer of thanksgiving to God, in the name and thro' the mediation of Jesus, that fleets and armys, hav aveng'd by the slaughter of thousands, wrongs and insults, vastly inferior? How can the Christian intercede or return thanks, for the success of those, who instead of requiting evil with good, and cursing with blessing, go forth to inflict evil for evil, and curs for curs; by destroying thousands of lives and millions of property; and by turning the sweet fountains of ten thousand innocent homes, into the bitter waters of poverty and affliction? **HAV THEY NOT THUS DRAWN A DISTINCTION, WHICH CHRIST AND HIS APOSTLES NEVER DREW?** Let me then beseech the clergy and all Christians, to think well of these things! O that they would bear with me, meekly and attentivly, whilst I expostulate with them and remonstrate, in no spirit of disrespect or uncharitableness!—Oh! that, instead of being offended at my freedom of speech, they would bring their sentiments and conduct, as individuals and as a body, to the test of the gospel, of prayer and of faith!

Let me now retrace my steps, and then proceed with the argument—I hav said, that the military constitution of society and government, or of the latter only, hav been the cause of war; that the wishes and interests of the people, whether ignorant or enlightend, ar hostil to war; that the

great remedy for war is to give to these interests, a controlling influence over public affairs; that, in educated communities there is little difficulty, but in a country, where the people are ignorant, there is great difficulty, in embodying popular influence, wisely and safely and effectually in such forms of government, as to subject rulers to the popular will. I have said, moreover, that education was the great instrument of moral revolution, with ignorant communities, that this should be the chief means of the friends of peace, in all such countries: that education ought to be decidedly Christian, and to be such, must be decidedly peaceful: that the principles and practices of war and warriors, are utterly inadmissible in such a system, because irreconcilable with it: that authors, imbued with the spirit of war and abounding in military narrative, were enemies to the religion and education of peace: that Greek and Roman chiefs and the heroic virtues of classic heathenism were the enemies of Christ and of Christian perfections. I have ventured to say, that Christians and the Christian ministry are deeply to be condemn'd for the part which they have acted on the great subject of peace and war: that their compromise with the warrior and his trade of bloodshed and rapine, has done incalculable mischief to the cause of religion, liberty, education and peace.

Let us now resume our argument—the clergy in Christian countries have always exercised a great and extensive influence over education. *But their influence has never been exerted deeply, comprehensively, decidedly, in favor of peace.* Not only have they tolerated war among nations; but they have made the warrior, with his art and his glory, in all the attractive forms of eloquence, of poetry, of history and biography, the daily companion of youth. Not only, by the books which they have selected, but by the perseverance and enthusiasm with which they have explained and commended

them, as the master-works of the human mind, *the clergy have taught practically, that CHRISTIAN virtues are mean and worthless, in comparison of HEROIC virtues.* And yet, if a Christian minister have in him the spirit of the meek and lowly Jesus, and make the sermon on the mount, and the gospel of John, his text book of morals, can he believe that the disciple, whom Jesus loved, would have chosen war and the warrior, in so many fascinating forms, as the companions of youth? Is it possible that such a clergyman can believe the spirit and example of Cæsar and Agricola, of Roman kings and consuls, of the heroes in Virgil and Homer, not unfriendly to Christian morals? Can he believe that an apostle would ever have written such books for the instruction of youth? or would have adopted them into his scheme of education? If it be denied that the spirit of such works is decidedly martial and the leading characters warriors, I can only be silent from astonishment.* But if this be con-

* Hobbes professed to have translated Thucydides, principally with a view to expose the follies of a democracy. What the history of Thucydides is, and what the character of the Peloponnesian war and of the Grecian States, may be judged from what Gray says (2d. vol. Connect. p. 126) that the war arose from an inconsiderable commencement, originating in a dispute between Corcyra and Corinth about Epidamnus, and, drawing in all the powerful states of Greece, terminated in the ruin of Athens. The conduct of the different nations, *when palliated or extolled by the historian, affords few proofs of moderation or equity.* (p. 128.) The aggrandizement (of the Athenians) and the gratification of (their) revenge, constitute prominent subjects of his (Pericles,) praise, in an eloquent oration to the memory of those who perished in the first campaign (128.) Demosthenes in his oration on the crown, speaking of the Athenians, describes precisely the spirit, which as Gray confesses, (p. 185) “was calculated to involve them in eternal warfare, and violation of justice towards others.” “Their whole history” says the orator, “was

ceded, can it then be denyd that they must be unfavorable to the pure, meek, humble spirit of Christianity? Such books

a series of noble contests for *preeminence*, the *WHOLE period of their existence having been spent in braving dangers for the sake of glory and renown.*" Not satisfy'd with the mere narrativ of wars, and battels, and sieges, Arrian professes to hav writen the history of Alexander's expedition, by *divine* assistance: and Dion Cassius, as to his narrativ, professes to hav been excited to its composition by a *divine* dream: whilst Alexander himself professd during the siege of Tyre, to hav receivd promises of *divine* assistance. It is impossible to disguise, much less to deny, the fact that without the wars and warriors of Greece and Rome, their history, so extensiv, dazzling and entertaining, would be like Satan transformd in Pandemonium.

" His visage drawn he felt to sharp and spare,
His arms clung to his ribs, his legs intertwining
Each other ; till supplanted down he fell."

and " the shape, star-bright of the most proud and powerful of fallen angels, appear'd a hideous, loathsome serpent. The history of Greece and Rome is in no proper sense the history of society. Even as the history of states, it is chiefly the political biography of hundreds of warriors, triumphant in a long succession of ages, by all the vile and atrocious arts of violence, fraud, cruelty and ambition. *Is the spirit of such books salutary to Christian youth?* Can it be otherwise than hostile to the mild and holy influences of love, peace, humility, purity? We should be equally consistent in *principle*, were we to select as text books of education, biographys of the duelist and assassin, and of the dexterous in crime, cunning and falsehood. The lesson which all ancient history teaches, is this :

" Not with the burial of the sword this strife
Must end, but of the warrior. - *Never thrives*
The tree of Peace, till planted by the brave
Upon his Enemy and Grave. Peace-loving fools
Fly hence !"—

It is one of the blessings of this country, that classical education has ever been so imperfect as to produce comparatively

were written, it must be granted, in the spirit of war, without a doubt on the writer's mind of its lawfulness. Shall I be told that, the spirit and object of the writer, hav no influence on the minds of youth? If they hav none, the writer is not worth studying. Genius and taste, style and thought ar wasted, if they leav not decided and durable impressions on the hearts and understandings of youth, and do not exercise a commanding influence in the formation of character. But the advocates of such works actualy extol them; because they do exercise a great influence over the facultys and afections; and the insensibility of Christians,

speaking but little mischief on this score; for it cannot be doubted by all who ar conversant with the subject, that *not one in a thousand* of those who learn Latin and Greek, imbibe the spirit of ancient literature. May it ever be so, for I regard that spirit as decidedly hostil in the young, to the genius, influence and progress of Christianity. What the tru character of that influence is, may be seen most faithfully and eloquently depicted in the Diary of a Physician, vol. i. p. 51 and 174; in "A Scholar's Death Bed," and "A Man about Town." The former is a most natural and affecting picture of the *infidel classical scholar*, the latter a striking and awful portrait of the *blasphemous, dissolute and reckless classical scholar*. They ar solemn warnings of the *genuin* influence of the classics, when exercis'd over the mind, heart and character of youth, unrestrain'd by Christianity. The same influence is exerted, in a greater or less degree, on all our youth. Is it not then a solemn question for Christians, and especially for the Christian clergy, whether our *semi-Pagan, semi-Christian* state of society, in religion and morality, and in the actual condition of the conscience and afections, be not ascribable to the *unchristian character*, and of course to a greater or less extent; in evry case, to the *unchristian influence* of the classics. The "Scholar," and the "Man about Town," ar the *natural legitimate* fruits of the doctrines, morals and literature of the *classics*. They never could hav been such of the doctrins, morals and literature of the BIBLE.

and above all, of the Christian clergy to their unfriendly effects on Christian morals, is the highest proof that can be given of their pernicious tendency. Assuredly, when the servants of the Prince of Peace are the eulogists of war and warriors, and welcome their influence to the bosoms of youth in so many attractive shapes, we must acknowledge, with grief and surprise, that they are themselves enslav'd by the same spirit.

There was a time, when, for ages, the clergy were absolute masters of all education. Oh! that they had then been faithful to the great trust committed to them! Had they constructed all their schemes on the principles of peace, and devoted the immense revenues of the church to the general education of the people, in the spirit of peace, they would, indeed, have been among mortals, the most signal and illustrious of the benefactors of mankind. But they saw not, or disregarded the dangerous influences of war in education, and the truth, beauty, and power of the principles of peace. Ages rolled away; the reformation came; the clergy acquired a new and higher power than that of priestly authority, the power of knowledge and talents, of virtue and piety, acting on free and enlighten'd consciences. Yet, still the clergy appear'd insensible of this high and solemn duty, to exclude the influences of war from their schemes of education, and to substitute humility and love, purity and holiness, and all the influences of peace. Three hundred years have glided away, and still Christians, and the clergy are nominally on the side of peace, practically on the side of war, in all their systems of education. And yet the cause of peace can never triumph, until the Christian clergy, individually, and as a body, shall condemn universally and unconditionally, war, and the warrior in every form, as they have condemn'd private violence and the duelist. Nor can the spirit of peace ever be the leading characteristic and vital principle of education, until

Christians and the clergy shall, in like manner, as far as depends on them, substitute Christian for heathen education, and the Christian perfections of humility, forbearance, love, and forgiveness, for the heathen virtues of pride, hatred of enemys, and revenge, inseparable from the classic poets and historians. Peace can never triumph, till education, in all its departments, shall teach youth, that those which ar call'd *heroic* virtues, ar expressly prohibited by Christ, both in precept and example; that the only warrior, if I may venture the term, whom Christ acknowleges, is the **MARTYR**, laying down property, liberty, and life, in his cause; but resolute not to bear arms in defence of them, or in vindication of his master's rights. Peace can never triumph, until children shall be universally taught, theorecticaly and practicaly, that a peasant, with a Christian spirit, is a nobler and a lovelier object to angels, than Cæsar or Alexander, Charles the twelfth or Napoleon. Peace can never be the ruling spirit of Christian countrys, until the Christian ministry, and professing Christians shall acknowlege and teach, boldly and invariably, that even a slave, if the meek, pure, humble disciple of Jesus, is more precious in the sight of God, than the most illustrious of orators, or historians, or poets, when adorn'd only with the heroic virtues of Greece and Rome. How hard is it to convince Christians of these things! How hard to bring them to act on the broad, simple, uncompromising precepts of the gospel! How next to impossible does it seem for them to regulate their thoughts, words, and deeds, and all the influences they ar perpetually exerting over others, by the purifying love and self-sacrificing humility of the gospel! War has sworn on the altar of human victims, eternal enmity to that love and humility, yet Christians and the holy ministry of peace, love, and humility, not only justify war, and the warrior, but scatter their influence with a prodigal

hand and perpetuate them with emulous enthusiasm, in all the forms of education.

How insensible hav Christians, and abov all the Christian clergy, appeard to one sublime, remarkable truth; a truth so obvious, so important, that its rejection by all Christendom is equally astonishing and lamentable. That truth is, that, *in the mysterious providence of God, the law of violence and retaliation was universally tolerated and often directly employd by God himself in his moral government of the world,* until the advent of the Prince of Peace;*

* Perhaps the question may be askd, why ar not the historical books of the Old Testament equally condemn'd with Greek and Roman history? The answer is obvious. 1st, They ar actually *inspir'd* books, and to read them as a part of revelation, is a duty of evry believer. 2d, They exhibit wars, for the most part, as actual manifestations of the power, actual vindications of the authority, and actual proofs of the justice and righteous vengeance of God. 3d, They contain none of the fascinations, none of the deep interest, none of the poetical and oratorical colorings so prodigally bestowd on the Grecian and Roman historys. The sacred historians giv the simple, naked truth. Their object is not to commend the warrior; to extol his glory, to kindle admiration and emulation of his achievments. But this is the very end of classic story, the very soul of all the historical compositions of Greece and Rome. It is tru, that Olaus Magnus, in his Gothic vision of the Scriptures, omitted the books of Kings; lest, as he said, they should cherish the warlike spirit of his countrymen. But to say nothing of this sacrilege, is it not obvious, that he misunderstood the character and influence of the entire body of the sacred writings. The study of the Bible has nothing to do with the study of war and its arts, but the study of the classics draws along with it inseparably the study of the martial history, biography, and mythology of Greece and Rome. The law of violence and fraud is stampd upon evry page. The kingdom of the warrior is universal there. The reign of terror is evry where seen: and, as in the Acropolis of Athens, so here, the

BUT FROM THAT MOMENT THE LAW OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL MORALS, WAS ABSOLUTELY AND FOREVER CHANG'D. Nor is this contrast surprising, when we compare the Jewish and Christian dispensations. The Mosaic institutes, were a vast and complex scheme of national morals and social dutys, of civil and political administration, of religious rites and ecclesiastical arrangements, of sacrifices and ceremonys, costly and magnificent, various, complicated, and minute. It was the system of a nation and a government, with a rich and splendid national church. But Christianity was a scheme, the very opposite of all this; for its influence was altogether *individual and social*: its worship was simple and spiritual; its founders and rulers, the poor and humble. Its character as a church, was universal; its prominent virtues were humility and self-sacrifice, forgiveness of enemys, and love to all mankind. *Hence the law of violence and retaliation, was for ever abolishd: and the law of peace and love, of humility, forbearance, forgiveness, irrevocably ordaind in its stead.* Yet the general tenor of the precepts of Christians, and the general spirit of their schemes of government and education, hav utterly denyd that the law of violence and retaliation is forever abolishd, as the great law for individuals, communitys and governments. The Jews rejected the meek and humble Jesus, expecting a conquering Messiah; and they were animated and sustaind in the ruinous war against Vespasian and Titus, by their misconstruction of the prophecys respecting the Messiah. And hav not Christians, whilst acknowleging the meek and humble Jesus as their Messiah, *practically rejected him* by denying the authority of his precepts, and disregarding the beauty of his example? Hav images of false and cruel gods, and of the most reckles and rapacious of all destroyers, the warrior, ar crowded together, and ar continually passing before the eye, with fearful rapidity and imposing splendor.

not Christians actually governd themselves and their communitys, as tho' the god of war, or the martial prophet of Mecca, not the Prince of Peace, was their Messiah? Hav they not as individuals, as subjects, and as rulers, acted as tho' they did not doubt that the Christian bore the character of the Jewish Messiah? And that they had a right in his name and by his authority, to suspend the law of peace, humility, and love, and to re-establish the law of retaliation and violence? The domestic and international history of Christian countrys, on the great subject of peace and war, is undeniably the history of Heathen communitys. With some few exceptions in the mode of warfare, and the treatment of prisoners, the wars of Christian nations are not distinguishable from those of the Pagan, in their origin, conduct, and termination. The reason is manifest. *War in any shape, from any motive, and carry'd on in any mode, is uterly indefensible on Christian principles, and uterly irreconcilable with a Christian spirit.* When will the disciples, and abov all, the ministers of the Prince of Peace, acknowlege in theory and practice, this great and solemn truth? When will they admit, that God is wiser than man, and knows best the principles, upon which his moral government ought to be administerd among men?

There was a time, when the distinguishing mark of Christians was, that they would not bear arms. But, for more than sixteen hundred years, peace has been the lost Pleiad, in the constelation of Christian virtues. From the commencement of the history of Christian nations and governments, they hav ceas'd to bear that mark, and more than sixteen centurys hav recorded their inextinguishable wars. O! that Christians had persever'd in the primitiv spirit, *which regarded the character of a soldier as pagan, not Christian!* O! that they had abided inflexibly by the rule, never to bear arms! Then would the primitiv church hav

bequeathd an illustrious, invaluable example to all posterity. Then pagan, not Christian governments, would hav been overturnd. Then the northern invaders, after conquering the monarchs and armys of heathenism, would themselv hav been subdud and civiliz'd by the all-prevailing law of Christian peace and love. But, unfortunately, Christianity was first enslav'd by the warlike character of classic paganism, and afterward by the martial spirit of the barbarous heathen. Had its disciples inflexibly resisted the first, they never would hav dishonord their Founder and his church by the last.

Their maxims, from the moment the Redeemer ascended, should hav been these, "Let the heathen take arms against each other and even against us, but come what may, Christians never will bear arms against each other, or against them. Christianity never shall be defended or spread abroad by force of arms.* Christians never shall employ the sword

* It appears exceedingly strange, that any one should ever hav imagin'd that he had a right to *propagate Christianity by force of arms*. Yet this was practicaly the sentiment of Christians from the time the church became a national establishment, indentifyd with the state; and partaking of the military character of the government. Indeed, the conclusion seems irresistible; if war be a lawful instrument to compel others to do their duty to Christians, it would be still more lawful when used to compel them to do their duty to themselves, by embracing Christianity. If it were a righteous means, on the successful employment of which, the blessing of God might be askd, when the object was merely a subordinate temporal good, still less doubt could be felt, when the object was supreme in importance and endless in duration. This capital error in Christian morality, that war was lawful to avenge injurys, to compel satisfaction, and to constrain the Heathen to believ, has been the source of countless millions of crimes and vices, and of corruption, calamity and suffering, unexampled in the history of man. To those

to protect property, character, liberty, or life. Let the heathen rule us with a rod of iron. Let them insult, persecute, oppress, torment, slay us. Let them confiscate property, slander character, cast us into prison, strip us of life itself. Let them separate husband and wife, parent and child; let them seduce the brother to betray the brother, and the friend the friend. Let them poison the comfort and happiness of private and social life: and heap on us all the enormities and

who believe in the perfect law of love, and still more to those who feel its controlling power in their hearts, how awful and affecting is such a spectacle. Instead of the sanctuary, behold the battle-field. Instead of an assembly of saints, pure in heart, fervent in prayer, meek in spirit, behold an army of warriors, already the slayers of tens of thousands of their fellow men, and trained to destroy, without remorse or pity, all who resist them. And yet their victims are the children of the same Universal Father; the very battle-field is the Temple of the living God: they themselves are his servants: the very winds which waft to his throne the shock of battle and the shrieks of the wounded, are the messengers commissioned to bear on wings of love the hymn of praise, and the prayer of penitence. And when Christians have slaughtered those who would not believe the truth of a religion, whose votaries are capable of such atrocities, behold

“ —————In the moment of our victory

“ We purified our hands from blood, and knelt

“ And pour'd to heaven the grateful prayer of praise,

“ And raised the choral psalm—————.”

Phocion was condemned to die on the day sacred to the festival of Jove; and as the procession passed by the prison, they wept, and took from their heads the crowns of rejoicing, because to them such a day seemed too holy for the cruel deeds of the executioner. And yet Christians turn even the Sabbath into a day of battle, and shed, not their own tears of penitence, but the blood of their fellow men, as an acceptable offering from his servants to the Prince of Peace, love and humility.

crueltys, that malice can suggest and tyranny execute. Still, we will bear it all ; nor shall the sword ever be employd to deliver, much less to avenge us. Be it our duty, to exhibit the consistency and beauty, the unconquerable strength, the inflexible constancy of Christian love, humility and forgiveness. Cost what it may, we will return good for evil, and blessing for cursing: We will love them that hate us, and pray for such as persecute and oppress us. Thus and thus only will we conquer our enemys, and convert the heathen to Christianity." Then would they indeed hav conquerd, for the law of love and humility and forgiveness is invincible in the hands of faith and hope. Thus would the whole Roman empire, and all the barbarian hordes that overran it, hav been subdu'd by the pure and holy religion of peace ; not by that misnam'd Christian church with the warrior's helmet on her head, with his sword in her right hand, and a bloody cross in the left, as her battel ensign.

For ages the church was indeed a warrior, and resembled the Marphisa of poetical chivalry, not the Bride of the Lamb, meek, humble and resign'd. Her prelates, in glittering armor, were seen on the war steed, brandishing the iron mace of the pagan Alamar ; while they shrunk from the Christian sword of Tancred or Gonzalvo. Century after century elaps'd, and at length the church laid aside her sword and shield ; and her clergy withdrew from the camp and the battel-field ; but Christian rulers and communitys still wag'd war, and all their institutions were still imbu'd with its spirit. Such, substantially, is still the fact ; and such it must remain, till professing Christians, and especialy the clergy, shall abjure their compromise with war and the warrior ; and banish their influence, as far as depends on them, absolutely and forever from the education of Christian youth. The dawn of that day, I fear, is still far distant in the Christendom of Europe. O ! that its morning star were now

shining, in the purity and beauty of gospel truth, on the hearts of the clergy of my own, my belovd country! O! that that clergy would realize, in the spirit of faith and hope, that the reign of the Prince of Peace can never commence, till the chosen messengers of his love, shall abjure forever, all allegiance to war and the warrior, and teach universally and intrepidly, that, humility and love, forbearance and forgiveness, are the great, the indispensable elements of Christian morals and of all the education of Christian youth. O! that the clergy would meditate profoundly, humbly, prayerfully on these things: and exhibit the first fruits of the harvest of peace, in their own hearts and lives, thro'out all their instructions and in all their influence on education.

How insensible have Christians and the Christian ministry been to the inestimable value of the peace principle! How little have they realiz'd its truth, power, beauty! And yet, its truth is attested by Jesus himself: its power is exhibited in the invincible authority of love, when contrasted with violence and hatred: its beauty is the admiration of seraphs, and the very archangels delight to look into its pure and lovely mysteries. And what is peace, rightly understood, but heaven upon earth; a heaven in each bosom, in each community, a heaven in the whole world! And is this only a beautiful vision of the imagination? No; it is the child of heaven-kindled hope, of heaven-strengthened faith. The ancient traveller, over the deserts of Arabia, without pathway or an earthly help, was guided, as the mariner over the trackless ocean, with unerring precision, from oasis to palm grove and fountain, by the celestial aid of sun and stars. And shall not love and humility, and all the Christian virtues, the greater and lesser lights, ordained to rule the moral world, lead Christians and Christian governments, and Christian communities, thro' the melancholy wastes of war,

to the serene and beautiful regions of Christian universal peace?

There are those, and Christians and Christian ministers are among the number, who believe in a great improvement of man, in private, social, international morals; yet refuse to believe, that, the time shall ever come when war and the warrior, and all the acts of public and private fraud and violence shall have been banished from the earth. What a well-spring of gratitude to God, of love to man, of self-enjoyment, do such persons shut up with impious hands against themselves and all whom they influence! Who would not exchange the misgivings and the gloom, that overhang this sceptical creed, for the inflexible faith, the ardent hope, the holy rejoicing of him who doubts not for a moment the future reign of universal peace? The astronomer looks beyond the mists and rains, the clouds and storms, which obscure his present habitation; and beholds in the azure depths, the radiant orbs and harmonious movements of the vast system, the reign of universal peace. He beholds with the natural eye, that deep serene, undisturbed by the momentary causes which now obscure or hide it from his view: and in the faith and with the hopes of mortal philosophy only, he doubts not, could he ascend thither, that he should behold a glory and beauty and serenity, never realized in his present habitation. Newton feared that the time was to come when the law of gravitation would demand the remedial intervention of the Creator, to re-establish the order and security of the system. But Laplace has demonstrated that no such exigency shall ever exist: that the system of the world contains in itself an all-sufficient, self-restoring power; and that even the very exceptions, which appear as deviations from the general rules of celestial mechanism, are, in truth, but subordinate results of those universal laws, which attest the invariable conformity of experience to theory. And shall not the Chris-

tian, under the sanctions of a higher and better philosophy, look beyond the clouds and darkness that now deform society, to behold with a calm and steadfast faith, the glory and beauty of that future paradise of mortal man, the empire of universal peace? And shall not the Christian, neither deceiv'd nor misled by the disturbing influences of war and violence, feel the inflexible assurance, that no miraculous interposition is call'd for to relieve society from the crimes and vices which derange it, and degrade mankind; but that the purifying, healing, ennobling spirit of love, is able of itself, to work out, in God's appointed time, the regeneration of man, and the triumph of universal peace. I at least feel that inflexible assurance, that delightful hope. I at least can say, in the strong confidence of faith, I believe that the time is to come, when crimes and vices, when war and violence shall be banish'd from the earth; and moral truth, and beauty, and peace, shall make the wilderness of life, the very paradise of God—Yes!

“ ————— I see them dawn,
 “ I see the radiant visions, where they rise,
 “ More lovely, than when Lucifer displays
 “ His beaming forehead thro' the gates of morn,
 “ To lead the train of Phœbus and the spring!”

Yes! I believe that the time is to come, when the warrior, with his plume and his casque and his scimeter, with his martial music and his glittering armor, shall be seen no more forever: when the implements of war, of every age and nation, shall be found only in the cabinets of the curious, or among the historical memorials of the antiquary: when not a battle-ship shall crest the mountain wave, or repose beautiful and majestic on the tranquil bosom of the ocean: when not an army shall wind its dragon folds over hill and valley and plain: when the castle and the tower, the rampart and

the battlement shall be levelled with the ground, and the orchard, the garden and the vinyard shall smile over their graves : when not a fortified town shall be seen on the face of the whole earth, and every citadel shall be dedicated with peculiar rites, as the temple of Christian peace : when Alexander, Cæsar and Napoleon, shall be accounted the Molochs of mankind ;* and the battle fields of Arbela and Pharsalia, of Marengo and Austerlitz, the polluted shrines of a sanguinary and idolatrous superstition : when the illustrious achievements of the most renowned of conquerors shall be remembered only with astonishment, indignation and mourning : when the master works of military science shall be esteemed as mischievous and wicked, as the frauds of astrology and magic : and the Iliad and Æneid, Cæsar, and Livy, and Sallust,†

* The profound philosophy, exalted eloquence and Christian spirit, display'd by Dr. Channing, in his review of the talents, character and achievements of Napoleon,‡ entitle him to the gratitude and admiration of Americans, indeed of all mankind. They are not only among the noblest compositions of the age, but their moral beauty and dignity are of the highest order. I regard them of such value, that I would rather have American youth deeply imbued with the spirit and sentiments of those two essays, than with all that is to be gathered from Demosthenes the orator, and Tully the rhetorician. I should rejoice to see them taught in every college in the union ; and as Corneille had the Cid in his library translated into every language of Europe but one, so should I rejoice to know that the same were the lot of those admirable essays.

† This, I am sensible, will be regarded by some, as little less than folly, by others, as something like fanaticism. But for myself, I know that, in my own opinion at least, I speak forth the words of soberness and truth. I do verily believe that the time is to come, when such books will form no part of the education of youth. They will be superseded by works, altogether superior

‡ Channing's works, p. 67, 135. Christian Examiner, new series, 1827. vol. 4. p. 382, 1828, vol. 5, p. 185.

shall never deform the souls of Christian youth: when the siege and the battel, and the naval action, and all the machinery of NATIONAL MURDER and NATIONAL ROBBERY, by

to them in all that constitutes the real dignity, value, and beauty of literature. That day, I fear, is yet far distant; for the *literature of PEACE, is scarcely even born*. But no one can look at the signs of the times, and not see that there is a spirit abroad, which promises results in favor of religion, education, and peace, *more truly Christian*, than the world has ever seen, or even imagined. The contemplation of this state of things, compar'd with the history of mankind hitherto, strengthens this belief, which originates in the prophecys of Scripture, and is sustained by the pure and simple character of Christianity. I do not in the least doubt, that the whole scheme of education will be reformed in Christian countrys, and that new plans will be adopted, in which Christian duty and Christian usefulness, love, humility, and peace, will be at once the means and end of education. Now, they are scarcely discoverable any where, amid the profusion of Pagan writers, and the masses of mathematical study, so entirely unconnected with the true objects of general education.

Whatever may have been Milton's judgment as a *scholar*, we happen to have what is better, his judgment as a *Christian*, as to the value of all classical literature. Whether he expressed *his own* opinion or not, is immaterial. He has given us his exposition of the *Savior's* opinion. Let any one read the remarkable sentence of excommunication, against the philosophy, poetry, oratory, and politics of Greece and Rome, in *Paradise Regain'd*: B. 4. v. 285 to v. 364, and say if he can doubt a moment that our Savior, in Milton's judgment, would have rejected them, in a scheme of education for Christian youth. Of their philosophy he will acknowledge,

“ Who, therefore, seeks in these
True wisdom, finds her not, or by delusion
Far worse, her false resemblance only meets,
An empty cloud.”

of their poetry he will acknowledge,

T

land and by sea, shall have been swept away forever; when the glory and ambition of individuals and nations shall be found only in the fellowship of love, in deep humility, in the

“ That rather Greece from us (Hebrews) these arts deriv’d
 Ill imitated, whilst they loudest sing
 The vices of their deities and their own
 In fable, hymn, or song.———
 Remove their swelling epithets thick laid,
 As varnish on a harlot’s cheek, the rest,
 Then sown with profit or delight,
 Will far be found unworthy to compare
 With Zion’s songs, to all true tastes excelling.”

Nor must it be forgotten that the judgment of our Savior is pronounc’d in reply to the eloquent commendation of classic literature by Satan, from v. 221 to v. 284. With such a testimony on the true character and influence of the classics, I may well say, that to teach them to Christian youth for the sake of their beautys, is to imitate Artemisia, when she mixd the pulveriz’d bones of Mausolus with odors and water, and drank the compound as a precious beverage. A large portion of the classics, taught in our schools and colleges, consists of history. Henry has justly said, and his remark is pre-eminently true of Greek and Roman history, “The Muse of history has been so much in love with Mars, that she has seldom convers’d with Minerva.” And Cowper, in speaking of the great superiority of the martyr over the patriot, says—

“ ————— Their ashes flew
 No marble tells us whither. With their names
 No bard embalms and sanctifies his song:
 And history, so warm on meaner themes,
 Is cold on this. She execrates, indeed,
 The tyranny that doomed them to the fire,
 But gives the glorious sufferers little praise.”

The Task, B. 5.

The history of Greece and Rome, breathes every where the sentiment of Teres the Thracian, who said, “That when he was not engag’d in war, he, tho’t there was no difference between

emulation of good works,—in the spirit of usefulness and the sense of duty ; in peace, Christian in its character, universal in its dominions.

himself and his grooms." Epaminondas call'd a fine army, without a general, "a wild beast without a head;" and do not the classic historians almost universally exhibit this ferocious and sanguinary beast with its blood-thirsty, insatiable head, as objects of praise and admiration? The spirit of ancient history is found in the proposal of Erianthus to destroy Athens, and turn its site into a sheepwalk: and in the conduct of all Greece when they forbade the rebuilding of the sacred monuments destroy'd by the Persians, that their vow of hatred, like that of Hannibal, might never die. For one reign of Numa (if, indeed, it be not incredible, in such an age and state of society) we have hundreds whose only character is war. For one Phocion, whom the allies of Athens went out to meet, crown'd and rejoicing, we have hundreds of warriors, cruel, unjust, and tyrannical. For one treaty of peace, like Gelon's with Carthage, stipulating the abandonment of the sacrifice of their children, we have scores dictated by insolent power and selfish ambition. Scipio restor'd to the cities of Italy, Spain, Africa, and Sicily, the spoils which Carthage had collected from them in various wars, and the same was the condition of every principal ancient city. "Alexander," says Gray, (2 vol. Connect p. 266.) is justly describ'd by Orosius, "as a great gulf of miseries, and a most dreadful hurricane which laid waste the East." And yet the same writer (Gray) in the very next sentence tells us, "the permanent advantage which resulted from his measures, has prov'd that his plans were not merely stupendous, but conceiv'd with *much wisdom and regard to the general interest of the world.*" !! Such is the consistency of the Christian admirers of the warriors and the classics! Alexander treasur'd up the Iliad in the precious casket of Darius; and plac'd it with his sword as a worthy companion of the destroyer; but Christians enshrine the Homers and Cæsars of antiquity, in the most precious of all caskets, *the immortal souls of Christian children*, and give their writings to youth, as fit companions for the Gospel of the Prince of Peace.

I hav said, that Christians, and even the Christian ministry, hav never realiz'd the truth, power, and beauty of the principles of peace. With the exception of the two first centuries of the Christian era, the vast majority of Christians, hav either tolerated or vindicated war, and hav lavish'd on the achievments of the warrior, the emulation of youth, the admiration of man, and the gratitude of woman. Christians of one denomination only hav had the courage and consistency to abide with the faith of primitiv disciples, and the constancy of martyrs, by the simple command of their Mas-

Let me not be misunderstood—I condemn the classics as studys for YOUTH, as inconsistent with the purity and humility, the forbearance and forgivnes, the love and peace, enjoind by Jesus Christ. *I would therefore, banish them forever from the education of Christian youth.* But when the disciplin of the mind, the enlightenment of the conscience, and the formation of the moral taste hav been completed by a truly Christian course of education, founded on duty and usefulnes, &c., the knowlege of God and his works, then the classics would be harmles. “To the pure, all things are pure,” and they might then look upon the abominations of Heathen poetry, and the atrocitys of Heathen history, as Jeremy Taylor says, the sunbeam is unpoluted by the filth on which it shines. The Christian *man*, fashion'd by the religion of love, humility, and peace, has nothing to dread from the poetry, history, or mythology of Greece. The Christian as a *man*, mingles fearless, and uninjur'd with the vulgar in speech, the corrupt in morals, and the vicious in manner, for he will often reclaim them, and cannot himself be defil'd. But who would act wisely in exposing the boy, the youth, the young man to their influence? Yet such is precisely the conduct of the advocate of the classics, as the text books of Christian *youth*. Let the Christian, when arrivd at maturity of years, study the history of his species, in all the various forms of literature, and in all the languages that his means, and time, and capacity will enable him to master. But spare *the souls of Christian youth* from classic influences, to them, dangerous, destructiv, and unhallow'd.

ter. They hav adopted in theory, and ilustrated by example, the truth, the power, the beauty of the principles of peace. They hav resolv'd to deliver religion from her unnatural union with war, "That foulest spot upon her vestal robe." They hav pledg'd themselvs to inflexible obedience to the law of peace and lov. Well may they stand by that noble purpose; for it is among the highest and holyst of Christian testimonys. Theirs is no visionary banner, with imaginary cross and fanciful inscription, the herald of violence and bloodshed, but the snowy flag of peace, bearing as its motto, "No cross no crown." Theirs is, indeed, the cross of contempt and derision: but it is the same that their Master bore, for he also was despis'd and rejected of men. Theirs is, indeed, the crown of thorns, of mockery and contumely; but theirs is a crown more precious than the diadem of princes; more glorious than the wreath of victory; for it is the crown of humility, love, and peace. William Penn is a nobler, lovelyer being in the sight of God, than the warlike Puritan of New England, the martial cavalier of Virginia, or the chivalrous Hugonot of Carolina. I know there ar those whose pride will be shocked, whose taste will revolt at such a sentiment. But let them test it by the precepts and examples of Him, who rebuk'd even the belov'd disciple, when he would hav calld down fire from heaven, and who would not suffer legions of angels to rescue even himself from the hands of his enemys.

The truth, power, and beauty of the peace principles of the Quakers, hav been ilustrated amidst imminent perils and terrific scenes: and they hav triumphd in defiance of all human calculations and probabilitys. During the Indian wars of New England, the unarmd Quakers were unmolested in person, habitation or property; because they were regarded as men of peace and friends, while in the few instances in which they had not the faith and courage to rely

on the shield of peace, they were shot as enemys, bearing the warrior's badge. During seventy years, the province of Pennsylvania, under the government of the Friends, was at peace with her Indian neighbors, and there only the children of the forest found the Christian to be, wise as the serpent and harmless as the dove. Mythology had fabled, that in the Venetian groves of the Argive Juno and the Etolian Diana, the wild beast was tam'd; the deer and the wolf were companions; and there the fugitiv animal found a place of refuge, never invaded by his pursuer. But thro'out all Christendom, Pennsylvania was the only city of refuge, the only land of peace, in the visible kingdom of the Prince of peace. But the most illustrious and striking example of the truth, beauty and power, of the peace principle, is to be found in the conduct of the Quakers, during the rebellion of 1798, in Ireland.* Never, was any contest in ancient or

* The simple narrativ of Thomas Hancock, M. D. in his little work (publishd in London in 1825, and re-publishd in Philadelphia by Thomas Kite in 1829) on "the principles of peace, exemplifyd in the conduct of the Society of Friends in Ireland, during the rebellion of the year 1798," is a striking manifestation of their power and beauty. Let me recomend most earnestly this little volume to evry Christian, philanthropist, and patriot. Would that it were in evry library in our land; and that evry Sunday school thro'out the world taught it faithfully and zealously. The annals of martyrdom, with all their testimonys to the strength of duty, the power of faith, the spirit of self-sacrifice and *Christian* courage, contain nothing more remarkable and afecting. It is impossible to read it without acknowledging that *the courage of humility and peace is altogether more admirable than that of pride and violence*: that the simple, humble Quaker, returning good for evil, blessing for cursing, kind words for threats, and entreaty for insolence: and resisting firmly, yet meekly and benevolently, evry temptation of fear and danger, is *the only consistent Christian, the only pure and genu-*

modern times; not the struggle of Marius and Sylla, not the feuds of the Highland Clans, nor the war of "La Vendée,"

in subject of the Prince of peace. Can any Christian doubt, had Jesus been there, that he would hav acted precisely as the Friend acted? and that he would not hav imitated, under any conceivable circumstances, the conduct of the patriot rebel or the royalist soldier? Evry one admits that war is a great evil, that it is exceedingly desirable to abolish it; yet, false pride and false honor perpetuate an institution radically wicked and pernicious. No country can be truly Christian, till war, both foreign and domestic be banishd forever: and the law of love, humility and peace be substituted for the law of revenge, pride and violence.

In the conduct of the Quakers of Ireland in 1798, we behold a happy exemplification of the sentiments of Josephus, "That those, who in order to their own security, condemn others to destruction, and use great endeavors about it, fail of their purpose; but that others ar in a surprising manner preservd, and obtain a prosperous condition, almost from the very midst of their calamitys." And how happily is ilustrated by this noble band of self-devoted Christians, the old Greek proverb, "If God be with us, evry thing that is impossible, becomes possible." Or to look to the sacred record, how aptly may we compare their faith and humility, to the conduct of Ezra, as told with such affecting simplicity. "Then I proclaimd a fast there, at the river Ahava, that we might afflict ourselvs before our God, and seek of Him a right way for us, and for our little ones, and for all our substance. *And I was asham'd to require of the king a band of soldiers and horsemen, to help us against the enemy in the way: because we had spoken unto the king, saying, The hand of our God is upon all them that seek Him, but His power and His wrath is against all them that forsake Him.* So we fasted and besought our God for this: and He was entreated of us." Ch. 8. v. 21, 22, 23.

With the Christian example of the Quakers, let me couple the zeal, fidelity and perseverance of Mr. William Ladd, of Minot, Maine, and of the Rev. Dr. Worcester, of Brighton, Mass.

distinguishd by ferocity more remorseless, by carnage more wanton, by passions more terrible and desolating. Yet, amid the horrors of that desperate warfare, in the midst of flaming villages and ruin'd fields, of the dying and the dead, of threats, and curses, and imminent death; amid the alternate triumphs of the insolent soldier and the exasperated rebel, the Quakers, strong in the faith of uncompromising obedience, calm and humble, yet inflexible in their purpose, adher'd to their solemn covenant not to bear arms. In vain may chivalry devote them to scorn and infamy, as cowards: in vain may the patriot brand them as traitors to their country: in vain may the freeman spurn them from his presence, or tread them under his feet, as worthy only of chains and bondage; and pour upon them the indignant execration even of the pious Cowper: "Patience itself, is meanness in a slave." Theirs was a courage more venturesome and fearless, than that of the warrior; for they dar'd, *unarm'd*, the fury and resentment both of royalists and united Irish-

whose services in the cause of peace entitle them to the respect and affection of evry good man. They hav earnd and deserv the title of the "apostles of peace," for their unweary'd labors in this most Christian cause. The Solemn Review of the Custom of War, by Dr. Worcester, and the two little volumes of Mr. Ladd, (1st and 2d series of Philanthropos on peace and war) contain many interesting facts and valuable remarks. They deserve to be read universal, for I doubt not they would convince hundreds if not thousands, as the "Friend of Peace, and other tracts of the Massachusetts Peace Society," convinced Mr. Ladd that war is a great evil, which might be banishd from civiliz'd society, and *that it is the duty of evry man* to lend a helping hand to bring about so desirable an event. For myself, I thank them and Thomas Hancock, for the instruction and encouragement they hav afforded me. I would go further to see their faces and enjoy their conversation, than to visit men illustrious for military and naval achievements.

men. Theirs was a nobler and better allegiance, than that of the soldier to his king, or of the patriot to his country; for it was the allegiance of man to God, of faithful subjects to the Prince of peace. They were freemen by a holier, higher title, than the patriot of Greece, or Holland, or Britain; they were citizens of a more illustrious republic than Rome, or Switzerland, or America can boast, for theirs was the glorious liberty of the sons of God; theirs was the commonwealth of the Christian Israel; theirs the Holy City of the living God. Theirs was the courage, the allegiance, the liberty, not of the mortal warrior, patriot and freeman, but of the Redeemer himself, of the glorious company of the apostles, of the noble army of martyrs. Let him who questions the courage of the Savior, the patriotism of apostles, the martyr's unquenchable love of freedom, dare to cast on the followers of Penn, the bitter reproach of cowardice, treason, or a slavish spirit. If their self-sacrifice purchase for them the title of cowards, traitors, slaves, let the angel and the archangel be branded with these epithets; for theirs too, is the courage, the fidelity, the liberty, not of the warrior-patriot, and warrior-freeman; but of love and duty, and obedience to the law of peace.

[For the remarks respecting the revolutionary war, which follow in this Address, Mr. Grimke is to be considered responsible. On this subject, various opinions exist in the minds of members of peace societies and of others eminent for talent and piety.]

Let me then subject the truth, the beauty, the power of peace principles, to the most affecting and interesting trial, which Americans can contemplate—the crisis of the revolution. I feel, I deeply feel, the solemnity of the subject. I trust that I realize the awful responsibility to God, the world, my country, involvd in the views which I am now to present. I know that, thousands and tens of thousands

stand ready to charge me with ingratitude to the statesmen and patriots of 1776, with the insensibility of a slave and a coward to the sufferings and triumphs of the glorious dead. I know that accusing voices will arise from every part of our land, and bid me, with the bitterness of sarcasm and the energy of indignation, to begone from the land of the most illustrious of freemen, and be a slave in Portugal, or Russia, at Naples, or Madrid. BE IT SO. *I shrink not from the accountability of condemning, universally, unconditionally, the warlike MEANS employd to accomplish the revolution.* Its objects were worthy of Christian wisdom, liberty and benevolence. But war and the warrior, violence and bloodshed in every form, were instruments unworthy of a Christian people, and forbidden by the religion they professd. To the heathen patriot the sword and the shield, are natural, rightful weapons; but to the Christian patriot, they are prohibited as irreconcilable with faith in God, and love to man.

I would have had the patriots of the revolution, resolve that, come what might, not a sword should be drawn, not a drop of blood should be shed in vindication of American rights. I would have had them worship, not in the temple of Mars, but in the sanctuary of peace. Their offerings should have been, not the wounded and the slaughtered, not the shock of battle, not the wreath of the conqueror, nor the terrors of the vanquished. With their supplications for strength and courage and victory, should never have mingled the agonies and shrieks, the rage and blasphemies of the battle field. Their anthems of thanksgiving and praise, should not have been polluted by the thunder of cannon, or the notes of the trumpet. In their Christian temples should never have been seen, the pomp of martial processions, the glittering helm, and the standard consecrated by the blood of its defenders. Thro'out their realm, should have been found not a battle field, the grave yard of national violence and

crimes: not the onward march of hope, not the flight of despair, nor the encampment of hostile armies. They should have adorned and vindicated the truth, the power, the beauty of the principles of peace. Their banner should have been the DOVE, meek, gentle, compassionate, faithful; not the EAGLE, fierce and sanguinary, the monarch of birds of prey, the ensign of conquerors and tyrants. I would have had them live and die, if death was their lot, as became the Christian patriot, not on the battle field of murder and suicide, but on the scaffold or in the flames of martyrdom. I would have had them, not breathing out threatenings and slaughter, like another Saul, against the enemies of their country; but yielding their spirits a willing sacrifice, in the cause of freedom, to Christian humility, faith and love. I would have had them say to the advocate of war under the plea of necessity, and the sanction of all other Christian nations, "We ought to obey God rather than man." I would have had them realize the pure and holy love, the sublime devotion, the inflexible faith, the generous hopes and glorious destiny of a CHRISTIAN people. I would have had them realize, that God had indeed wink'd at the times of this ignorance, when the Christian was a soldier; but that he now commanded all men every where to repent, and to refrain from war. I would have had them realize, that the dispensation of violence and bloodshed, of valor and the warrior had passed away, and the dispensation of peace and forbearance, of fortitude and martyrdom had succeeded. I would have had them realize that they had not come, like the warrior-Israelites of old, to the mount that might be touch'd, and that burn'd with fire; nor unto blackness and darkness and tempest; nor yet to garments roll'd in blood, and the confus'd noise of the warrior. I would have had them realize, that they had come, not to these, but to the cross of agony and mockery and shame, to the martyr mount of Calvary, to the city of the living God,

and to Jesus the mediator of the new covenant, the covenant of humility and forgiveness, of faith, and love and peace.

O! what a glorious scene would then have been displayed to the astonishment and admiration of the world! How would the Christians of sixteen centuries have stood rebuk'd,

“And felt how awful goodness is, and seen
Virtue in her shape, how lovely!———”

Behold a people more intelligent, happy and free, than any that had ever existed. Their rights are invaded, their present interests neglected, their permanent welfare hazarded. Their injuries are inflicted by those, who were bound to protect and bless them: by the ministry of a parent-king, by the representatives of brothers. The indignities and threats employed against them, are messengers of wrath from the land of their despised and persecuted ancestors. Scorn and insult and violence are wafted by every breeze from the home of the intelligent and free, of the patriot, philanthropist and Christian. Never was a nobler opportunity offered to a nation of Christians, by calm resignation, inflexible constancy and generous self-sacrifice, to attest, in the presence of the world, their faith, obedience and love; and to vindicate the truth, power and beauty of the principles of peace.

And is the inquiry made by the advocates of war, how should they have acted?—The answer is easy, if we take as our guide the sentiments of Peter and John, “Whether it be right in the sight of God, to hearken unto you, more than unto God, judge ye.” I would have had them say to the British king and his ministry, to the parliament and people of England, “We are your children and your brethren: protection and justice, encouragement and assistance from you, are our birthright. We have a British title to be free, prosperous and happy. Yet have you dealt with us, as strangers and

hirelings, and even as enemys. We hav petitiond and expostulated and reasond in vain. We hav besought you, by the ties of a common ancestry, by the exalted privileges of a free constitution, and the holy fellowship of Christians, to spare us the bitter cup of a brother's contumely, of a parent's anger. To mockery—you hav added revilings, to revilings—injustice, to injustice—threats, to threats—violence and punishment. We hav borne it all, as becomes those on whose soul is the vow to love our enemys; to bless them that curs, to do good to them that hate us. We hav borne it, as becomes those whose trust is in God, not as the god of battels, but as the God of mercy and righteousness, of peace and love. Go on then in your career of injustice and contempt and injury. Double the measure of our humiliation and sufferings. Brand our entreatys with the name of cowardice; call our humility meannes; our respect for you, the language of servility; and trample on our love, as the folly of the dotard or the ravings of the enthusiast. Send among us the insolent tax-gatherer, and the more insolent soldier. Command the delegates of your power, in the chair of state or in the courts of justice, in the army or the navy, to harass and persecute and oppress. Cast the father into prison, confiscate his property, banish the wife of his bosom, scater the children of his afections: Let the perjury of magistrates, and the corruption or timidity of jurors, condemn the innocent to death, and stain the scaffold or the faggot, with the blood of Christian martyrs, in the cause of Christian freedom. All this, and more than this, we ar ready to bear, with a love that cannot be quenched, with a constancy inflexible and undying, with a faith calm and humble, yet fixed and invincible. Yours is indeed the power to afflict and torment, be it our lot to suffer with fortitude and resignation; for ours is a nobler, better power, to bless and forgiv. In vain may you hope to prevail. Yours ar

the instruments of weaknes and fear, of tyranny and violence. We shall prevail; for ours ar the weapons of righteousnes, peace and love, the gift of God himself. As there is truth in his promises, you must yield, we shall conquer. Passion and prejudice, pride and disappointment may sustain you for a while; but our love, and hope, and faith, ar imperishable, unconquerable. *Our purpose is irrevocably taken: we will be free: we will hav the precious rights of British freemen; but, never shall violence and bloodshed be our arms.* We must conquer, if we faint not. We know that passion and prejudice, anger and pride must yield to firmnes, reason, good sens, and candor. We know, that you yourselvs, when the season of wrath and arrogance shall hav passd away, will wipe the tears from our eys, and wash out the blood-spots from our garments. We know, that, you yourselvs will break the chains of the captiv father, and recal the exil'd mother, and gather their wandering children into your own bosoms. We know that the very tongue which has mockd our sufferings and utterd the sentence of imprisonment or death, will ask forgivnes in the accents of returning love. We know that the very hands, which staind the scaffold or kindled the fire, will build the monument of your own victims, and accord to the land they lovd and died for, the precious privileges purchas'd by the love of Christian patriots, by the death of Christian martyrs."

O! that my country had thus spoken, had thus acted! O! that she had given this noble example of the love, devotion, and faith of a Christian people! O! that she had "appeald to the Supreme Judge of the world," not as the God of battel, but as the Prince of Peace! O! that her people, "with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence," had "pledgd to each other their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor," *in the spirit of Christian martyrs,*

not of patriot warriors! Then, not a drop of blood had been shed, but would hav been precious in the sight of Angels. Then, not a life had been lost, but to the disembodiyd spirit would hav been fulfilld the promis, "this night shalt thou be with me in paradise." Then, not a grave had been opend for the victim of tyranny, but devout men would hav carryd another Stephen to his burial. Then, from the dungeon and the prison-ship would hav been heard the midnight hymn of faith and hope, while on the scaffold and at the stake, would hav ascended the prayer of love, "Father! forgiv them, they know not what they do."

And must not such a people hav conquerd? What power on earth could hav withstood their humility and resignation, the energy of their patriotism, and their constancy amid suferings? Tell me not of a misguided king and a tyranical ministry. Tell me not of a jealous parliment and a still more jealous people. That misguided king was a man of sens and benevolent afections, a Christian prince, whose love for his people was attested by the wish that he might liv to see the day when not a family in his dominions should be without a bible. That oppressiv ministry had the hearts of men and the heads of British statesmen: nor could they hav resisted the monarch, the parliment, and the people. That parliment had too much of British feeling, sentiment, and principle to persevere in such a system of oppression. That people had too generous and manly a spirit to tolerate such tyranny. America, as the land of Christian freemen, calmly, resolutely self-devoted to martyrdom, returning good for evil, and blessing for cursing, unprovok'd by indignitys and unpoluted by hatred, anger or violence, must hav conquerd that monarch, with his ministry, his parliment and his people; for theirs would hav been a heavenly warfare and Christian arms. They must hav conquerd; for the truth, beauty and power of the principles of peace, ar invincible

as a band of angels. In vain, against such a people, may an ambitious, tyranical ministry have appealed to the prejudices of the monarch, the jealousy of parliament, and the passions of the people. In such an age and such a country, with such a government and such a religion, it is impossible they could have long prevailed against a nation of Christians, self-consecrated to martyrdom in vindication of their rights. But America, in the attitude of defiance and resistance appeared to them a rebel in arms, and against such, prejudice, and jealousy, and passion are easily kindled and easily kept alive, from year to year. Without the aid of alternate victory and defeat, without the stimulating narrative of sieges, and battles, and naval warfare; without the appeal to false pride and false honor, the parliament and people of England would themselves have rescued America from the prejudices of the king and the tyranny of his ministers. Then would have triumphed the principles of peace, how spotless in their truth, how divine in their beauty, how invincible in their power! Then, how delightful, how consolatory the victory of Christian patriots, how glorious their triumph of faith and love! Then would the conqueror and the vanquished have been bound together by stronger and holier ties of respect, esteem, and affection. Envy and jealousy, hatred and uncharitableness would have been banished forever: and the attachment of brothers and the fellowship of Christians would have established their unfading empire in the hearts of Britons and Americans. One such martyr-triumph of a Christian people, is worth all the military and naval glory, all the skill and chivalry, all the perils and sufferings of Greece and Rome, of Venice and Switzerland, of England and America. It must be so; for to love, is more sublime than to hate; to forgive is nobler than to revenge; to bless is better than to curse; to pray for our enemies is a loftier heroism than to call down fire upon them. It must be so; for the principles

of peace as a well-spring of purity and virtue, of benevolence and usefulness, of all that is sublime in our duties and generous in our affections; of all that is fair in the esteem of the good, and valuable in the judgment of the wise. It must be so; for the spirit of peace is strong in the energy of faith; it kindles with the hopes of the just made perfect; its piety emulates the adoration of angels; its love is pure and fervent as the love of seraphs; its dominion, immortal as the soul.

I feel an assurance, delightful in its prospects and strong in its faith, that our country is yet destined to be the noblest monument of the principles of peace. It is impossible to contemplate our history, and not feel that we have been ordained, thro' the simple character yet wonderful influence of our institutions, to perform a more conspicuous part in the moral government of the world, than any other people, ancient or modern. O! that we did but realize the high and responsible office to which we have been called, in the administration of Providence; an office so full of dignity, benevolence and beauty: the office of friend, counselor, teacher of the nations of the earth. O! that we did but look back on the *past* with the humility and gratitude which becomes the most favored of nations; on the *present*, with the sense of unworthiness and the diffidence which belongs to true wisdom: on the *future*, with the generous devotion and steadfastness of purpose which springs from the enlightened sense of duty. I *know* that the national institutions of the ancient people of Israel were established by God himself. And I *believe*, with a faith as strong as knowledge, that the peculiar structure of our government and state of society is equally an ordinance of his unseen power. What though in our history, I read of no patriarchs and prophets and divine legislators; of no pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night; not of the terrors of Sinai or the vision of Pizgah; not of the chariot of fire and

the mantel of power ; nor yet of the fiery tempest of Sodom or the severd waves of Jordan ! What tho' in the record of his dealings with us, I read not that he stood and measur'd the earth ; that he beheld and drove asunder the nations ; that the mountains saw him and trembled ; that the deep lifted up *his* hands on high ; that the sun and moon stood still in their habitations. What tho' in the history of the founders of our institutions, I read not of cloven tongues like as of fire, nor of the earthquake at midnight that burst the prison gates ; not of the trance of Peter, nor the vision of Cornelius, nor the mid-day glory that struck Paul with blindnes. Yet do I not doubt that we ar the people of his pasture, and the sheep of his hand. Yet do I not doubt that he is our God and the God of our fathers : and that, in the mysterious order of his Providence, he is leading us onward, thro' ways of pleasantnes and paths of peace, to an inheritance more fair and rich than people hav ever had.

Gentlemen of the Senate and Hous of Representatives, officers and members of the Connecticut Peace Society, fellow citizens and Christian brethren of all New England,

To you the subject of peace comes recomended by arguments the most cogent, with associations the most noble and delightful. Where in ancient or modern times, where in the old, or elsewhere in the new world, is to be found a state of society, of which the freeman and patriot, the scholar, philanthropist and Christian may be so justly proud ? We shall search in vain for a community more republican in general inteligence and purity of morals, in simplicity of manners, in the general distribution of property, in the unrestrained, universal enjoyment of rational freedom, and in the absolute exemption from slavery in all its forms, domestic and civil, political and ecclesiastical. In vain shall we look for a people more generally enlightend on the subject of religion, more free from superstition, profanenes, and fana-

ticism ; more simple in worship ; more mild and benevolent in temper, manners and conduct ; more stedfast and uniform in their veneration for religion, their faithful observance of its precepts, and their liberality in maintaining all its institutions. No other country exhibits a happier combination of public wealth and private independence, of national and domestic industry, frugality and perseverance, of personal and social enterprize. What other compares with New England in that admirable sens which has ever made universal education a public and private duty ; which scatters common schools, abundant as manna, over all the land, and patronizes with a munificence, equald only by its wisdom, all the more elevated, comprehensiv, and durable institutions of literature and education ? In that wise and activ charity, which provides for the poor, the sick, the afflicted, for the widow and orphan ; for the religious wants of fellow countrymen and of heathen lands, New England is pre-eminent. In all that is fair and lovely, virtuous, inteligent, valuable and discreet in woman ; in all that invests the manly character with an air of simplicity and dignity, of practical sens, generous wisdom, and enlightend benevolence, New England has never been surpassd.

To you, then, fellow Christians and fellow Countrymen of New England, the cause of peace comes indeed recomended by the noblest arguments, by the most precious and charming associations. To you she speaks, in a language of commanding authority, of persuasiv eloquence. To you, emphatically and peculiarly a free, enlightend, Christian people, she comes herself *the most glorious and lovely child of rational freedom, of general inteligence, of enlightend religion*. Your government and all your institutions ar, at once, the children, the patrons, and the guardians of peace. The elements of your state of society ar, in a more remarkable degree, than has ever been seen, the elements of peace. Within

yourselves the constituents of war are unknown ; for you have nothing to fear from insurrection or rebellion, from the violence, injustice, or ambition of rulers. Thus privileged and blessed, thus purified, ennobled and adorned, shall not a deep sense of gratitude and duty consecrate such a people in an especial manner, the friends, champions and guardians of peace ? On you is imposed an obligation, higher, holier, stronger, than has bound any other community. To love, to honour, to advocate, to carry forward the cause of peace, at home and abroad, in private and in public ; by the gentle and fascinating influence of woman ; by the frank and resolute example of man ; by the education and the religion of peace ; by the all-pervading authority of popular sentiment, this, this is at once your privilege, your happiness, and your duty.

The vow to do this is on your souls, patriot legislators and magistrates of New England, in the responsible, delicate, and important functions entrusted to you.—Thus to act, is your vow, people of New England. Thus only can you answer to your Maker and Redeemer, to the Union, the world, posterity, for the noble distinction of being the most virtuous and intelligent, the wisest, happiest, freest people, the world has ever seen.—And this is your vow, instructors of the young ; for to you is committed the office of enriching the mind and heart, with the sanctity of virtue, and the usefulness of knowledge, with the beauties of taste, and the discipline of thought, with active benevolence, and calm, peaceful, comprehensive wisdom.—Fathers of every household of New England, it is equally your vow, to teach your children the truth, dignity, and beauty of the principles of peace : to teach them that humility, forbearance, love, and forgiveness are the noblest virtues of the private and public man.—Nor is it less your vow, mothers of New England ; for to your tenderness and skill are entrusted not only the forms and health, but the minds,

and hearts, and souls of children and youth. Remember that on your fidelity, good sens, and affection, rest the hopes of future years, and what your country shall be in the prime of each successiv generation, depends first and chiefly upon you. Christianity has done much for you. It has elevated you abov the boasted female of classic lands, and the lovelyer being of the ages of chivalry. It has blessd you with domestic and social freedom, it has guarded you by the sanctions of civil and political institutions, it has honord you as the Christian wife, mother, daughter, sister; it has given you the simple, but glorious title of Christian women, with the holy plivileges of Christian liberty. Cultivate, then, in your children, the spirit of **PEACE**. Teach them that humility is nobler than valor, forgivnes, than revenge. Teach them the courage of duty, not of strength and passion; the fear of God, not of man.—On you—philanthropists of New England—is laid this solemn vow: never to forget that benevolence is wise, virtuous, elevated, enduring, only when its energys are dedicated with intens devotion, to the cause of peace at home and abroad; of peace, private and public; Christian in spirit, and universal in dominion. Yours is a solemn, delightful duty, to make your entire land the temple of peace, yourselves the ministers at a thousand altars.—And the vow is on your souls, accomplishd scholars of New England, children of Harvard and Yale, of Brown, Amherst, and Hanover, and all the fair sisterhood of literature. To you is entrusted a power, if wisely employd, benevolent in its influence, sublime in its character, magnificent in its results; a power inseparable from the glory and felicity of your country, and the durability of all her institutions. God, in the order of his Providence, hath calld you to bless, honor, and adorn her, with the literature of a free, educated, Christian, **PEACEFUL** people. Yours is a privilege more full of dignity, a duty more full of joy, than ever distinguishd

the land of Sophocles and Virgil, of Tasso and Ercilla, of Racine, Goethe, or Milton. By that vow it is exacted, not only that you add taste to learning, eloquence to wisdom, and genius to industry; not only that the page be pure, instructiv, virtuous; but that the spirit of peace breathe into it a more attractiv beauty, a nobler dignity, an authority more august and venerable.*—And shall not this vow, Chris-

* Of all the branches of literature, it seems probable that **FIC-TION** has hitherto exercis'd more extensiv and various influence than any other. And of the departments of fiction, it cannot be doubted that poetry transcends all others, in the power which it has thus far exerted over the mind, heart, and character. Vers has ever been a favorit in all ages and nations, and in all states of society. In our own country, the general influence of works of fiction, is decidedly less than any other which ever existed; because the multitude of newspapers which pervade the country evry where, and penetrate to its remotest corners, occupy so large a portion of the time which would otherwise be dedicated to works of fiction. Hence it follows, that the sens of duty and the spirit of usefulness and benevolence, the public affairs of at least one state, of the nation, and the current history of the whole world, valuable information in general politics, history, and biography, in the moral and natural sciences, in literature and the arts, in morals, manners and customs, and in religion, whether we regard its history or revolutions, its theory or practice, its doctrins, mysterys, or precepts, ar daily and hourly exercising an influence at once comprehensiv and minute, profound and various, on the improvement of the mind and heart, and the formation of character, thro'out our country. Nor ought we to lose sight of a species of influence that has been brought to bear on the public of this country, with remarkable efficacy already, and which is yet destined to exercise an almost imperial sway. I refer to the unexampl'd multiplication of societys, especialy in the boundles field of benevolence, which duty has thrown open to the Christian, philanthropist, and patriot. Nothing like this power of the newspaper press, and of social action, has ever been witnessd elsewhere:

tians, and above all, Christian ministers of New England, bind your souls, with a strength and depth of obligation far beyond that which binds the patriot, philanthropist, and scho-

and so little can the experience of any other age or people, shed light on the subject, that it only furnishes *contrasts*. We ourselves, even whilst under their influence, have but a faint conception of what they are destin'd to accomplish. We are so accustomed to look abroad, and especially to the ancients, for standards and tests, that we are comparatively blind to the causes of our actual condition and wonderful progress. But this foreign, this antiquated influence, is yielding apace to a development of national, social, and individual resources, without precedent or parallel in the history of man.

This people, however, has yet to learn, that the maxim of Solon is equally the maxim of nations and individuals. "KNOW THYSELF," is indispensable to national as it is to individual improvement, in knowledge, virtue, and happiness. Self-government, the distinguishing feature of this country, its glory and safeguard, depends, after all, in a nation, as in an individual, on self-knowledge. And yet so little is this realiz'd, that while our governments and states of society, our domestic political relations, our constitutional law, our history and revolutions, our prospects and destiny, and our relations and duties to the world, are so different from those of other countries, scarcely any attention is paid to them as a part of education. More time is frequently devoted to a single classic or mathematical work, than to all subjects peculiarly American. Cæsar, Livy, and Tacitus are studied with laborious attention, as tho' an American could not be an enlighten'd and valuable citizen without them, while the history of his own state and nation is utterly neglected. To Cicero's orations on Cataline are devoted more time and pains, than to the Federalist; yet what comparison is there between the value of those and this, to the American citizen? Who ever heard of studying an American speech as a part of education? and yet I cannot doubt, that an intimate acquaintance with the best American speeches, from the revolution down to the present time, is incomparably more valuable to the American,

lar? Yours is, indeed, a glorious destiny, an inestimable heritage; if you realize, in all your thoughts, and words, and deeds, the truth, power, and beauty of the principles of peace. You

whether as a public or private man, than a thorough acquaintance with Cicero and Demosthenes. And I build this opinion, not only on their peculiar value to us as Americans, but on their intrinsic merits. To instance a few among very many, I scruple not to say, that, as *arguments*, the speeches of Chief Justice Marshall, on the case of Jonathan Robbins, in the House of Representatives of the United States, and of Roger Griswold, in the same House, on the Judiciary, are not surpassed by any thing in the Greek or Roman; and, as *orations*, they have produced nothing, in my estimation, superior to Ames's speech on the British treaty, to the Plymouth address of Mr. Webster, and the centennial address of Mr. Quincy.

The same complaint may be justly made, with regard to English history, politics, and oratory. They are of more value than all that Greece and Rome have bequeathed us. Mr. Burke's speeches (including his letter on the French revolution, which may be regarded as the most solemn and eloquent of orations delivered in the name and in the presence of all Europe) are alone of more consequence to an American, than the whole body of Greek and Roman eloquence. I would, certainly, rather be the author of them, whether I regard learning and philosophy, or eloquence and taste, than all the orations of Cicero and Demosthenes. Who can doubt, that to be well read in the best English speeches, made at the bar and in parliament, connected with the civil and political history of England, would be far more useful to an American, in public or private life, than the same knowledge of antiquity; and yet, who has ever heard of studying English eloquence or history, or the English constitution, legal and political, as a part of our education?

There is something radically wrong in all this. Our whole system of education is the very reverse of the maxim, "KNOW THYSELF." It is fitted to make us neither Christians nor Americans; as men neither wise nor well informed; as citizens neither instructed as to our rights and duties, nor enlightened as to our

ar the sacramental host, scatterd evry where amidst a peculiar people, zealous of good works, to be at once, the teachers, friends, and living examples of the spirit of peace. On your fidelity, firmnes, and consistency, depend, chiefly in your own age and country, and not a little in all others, the triumph of those principles. Whilst the disciple, and

best interests, our exalted privileges and glorious destiny. What an ilustration is afforded by a single subject—PEACE. On this, one of the noblest and most important of American dutys, our schemes of education ar uterly barren. And yet peace is indispensable to the preservation of our liberty and union, to our happines and progres, and to our rightful influence in the world. He, indeed, is not, in my estimation at least, a good citizen, a wise patriot, an enlightend instructor, who does not teach zealously and fearlessly, that the sword ought never to be drawn in any controversy between the States themselvs, or between any of them and the National Government. Our country is the noblest monument, in honor of religion, liberty, reason, philanthropy, duty, and usefulness, which man has ever reard. Let that monument never be profan'd and poluted by American blood, shed within our borders by American hands in civil warfare. THIS IS THE GREAT LESSON TO BE TAUGHT TO OUR CHILDREN. With it, all others acquire a sanctity and energy of obligation, a durable and incalculable value, a harmony and perfection, otherwise unattainable. With it we exhibit to the world, for the first time, a national family of peaceful, Christian states, under the vow, never to draw the sword against one another.—Be it then our inflexible resolv, equally wise, humane, and pious, that war shall never be known within our borders.

“Light is the robe of *Peace*, yet strong to save.”

But we shall find, if ever we admit it, to the bitter cost of ourselves and our children's children—that WAR

“———Is the black and melancholy yew,
That strikes into the grave its baleful roots,
And prospers on the dead.———.”

above all, the messenger of the Prince of Peace, shall admire and eulogize war and warriors, his kingdom can never come. Until you shall sweep away all their unholy influences, now acting in so many various forms of education on the minds and hearts of youth, a martial spirit, with its false standard of pride, courage, glory, and honor, with its disregard of the property, happiness, and lives of others, must still prevail. Your banner is the cross of Calvary, and on it are inscribed, in a Saviour's blood, faith, hope, love, humility, forgiveness. These are the elements of peace, implacable foes, triumphant destroyers of war and the warrior. Arise then, and purify yourselves from the stain that is on your souls. Let the day speedily come, when the compromise with war and the warrior, which has dishonored for ages the disciples and the messengers of Jesus, shall have vanished forever from New England. There shall the Christian world behold the noblest monument of faith and love, in thousands of churches and ministers, without an apologist, much less an advocate for war and the warrior. There shall then be displayed, in all its purity, strength, and humility, the spirit of self-sacrifice: there, the eternal truth, the invincible power, the awful beauty of the principles of peace: there the loveliness and harmony, the purity and holiness, the sublimity and glory, which are destined to adorn the earthly kingdom of the Prince of Peace.

EXTRACTS

EXTRACTS

FROM

DIFERENT WRITINGS OF THOMAS S. GRIMKÉ,

ENFORCING, VINDICATING AND ILUSTRATING

THE

PRINCIPLES OF PEACE.

EXTRACTS.

EXTRACT

*From the Address on the Character and Objects of
Science, May, 1827.*

What then shall be our destiny? As a *free* people, it is written in characters, that the world may read, from the great Lakes, to the Gulf of Mexico, from the Atlantic, to the Missouri. As an *educated, investigating, practical* people, it is recorded in letters of light, on the countles institutions for social and individual improvement, that bless and adorn our land. As a *Christian* people, it stands forth in sculptur'd language, on the thousands of temples, which flourish side by side, in harmony and emulation, within our happy borders. As a *peaceful* people, it is registerd, as with the pen of prophecy, on our national, social, individual character; on our sens of justice, and our sentiments of philanthropy; on our consciences—as Christians; our principles—as Americans; our feelings—as men. As a free, as an educated, as a Christian, as a peaceful people, I experience the settled, the delightful assurance, that our country shall liv to the end of time. As soon would I believ, that there is power on earth, “to pluck up the iron-bound shores

of New England, with all their towns, and plant them on the banks of the Miami;"—As soon would I believ, that the commonalty of England will again pass under the iron yoke of the feudal system: as soon would I believ, that the goodly heritage of the Pilgrims can ever be another Sahara, or that the pine forest of the south can become the land of the hill, the vally and the brook, as to believ that this people shall ever ceas to be free, educated, Christian, peaceful.

Let the age of miracles return, and I may despair of the fortunes of my country, as free, educated, Christian, peaceful. Let that age begin with the day, when the sons of God shall present themselves before him, and Satan shall again be permitted to lay waste the patrimony, and smite with Egyptian plagues, the hearts of the faithful. Let the Archangel, terrible and mighty, tho' fallen, go forth to hurl down on our devoted land, the tempest of his wrath and malice. Let him afflict us, as Job was smitten, in flocks and herds, in children and person. Such trials to a Christian people, strengthen faith, and animate hope. Such trials blast not a free people with the paroxysms of despair; but summon forth into being, the unconquerable energys of patriotism. Such trials to an educated people, open the way to hidden springs of knowledge and improvement. Such trials to a peaceful people, only enhance their love of peace; for the grief-stricken heart flees to retirement and tranquility. At the overshadowings of such afflictions, I should never tremble for my country, much less should I despair; for the spirit of the martyr and confessor would arise, and shine, more and more, unto the perfect day. But let the arch fiend, in the delirium of ferocious malignity and ruthles envy, strip us of the religion of the reformers; of our freedom, our education, our love of peace. Let him erase from our memory, the recollections of a free and noble ancestry, the prospect of a future, enrich'd and endeard by all that is precious in glory,

and lovely in virtue. Let him sweep from our land, as with the besom of destruction, the temples of the Most High, the seats of science, the courts of justice, and the halls of legislation. Let the palsy of death rest on the tongue of the priest and teacher, of the orator, the patriot, the Statesman. Let the angel of peace walk no more abroad, thro' all our borders, dispensing the mild blessings of national tranquility, and scattering the treasures of her love, by the fireside of home, and in the circles of friendship. Let such a day come, and the blackness of despair shall be our portion. Then, indeed, would be fulfilled in us, the visions of prophecy. "Let all the inhabitants of the land tremble, in the day of darkness and of gloominess, of clouds and of thick darkness." "I will cause the sun to go down at noon, and I will darken the earth in a clear day; and I will turn your feasts into mourning, and all your songs into lamentation, and I will make it as the mourning of an only son." But thanks be to God, faith believes and hope rejoices, that such a day will never come for us. The mind holds fast the conviction, the heart cleaves to the persuasion, that we shall never be otherwise than free, educated, Christian, peaceful.

EXTRACT

*From the Speech in the Senate of South Carolina, on the
Tariff and State Sovereignty, December, 1828.*

I have heard, with pain and sorrow, the opinion, that in the present crisis, it well becomes South Carolina to approach her sister states, and the National Government, with the sword in one hand, and the Olive Branch in the other: that she walks in the paths of honor and duty, when she offers the alternative of War or Peace. I may admire the chivalry and frankness of the sentiment, but I cannot deprecate too much a feeling so unnatural, so indiscreet, so unwise. We are, and I trust we shall ever continue to be, one family, bound together by the ties of a common ancestry, eminent for the cultivation of peace at home, and only glorious in foreign wars. Not one of these States has ever yet shed the blood of a brother, notwithstanding the collisions of interest, and the exasperation of angry passions. This, perhaps, is the most solemn and important lesson which the rest of the world can learn from us: And shall we not profit by it ourselves? Be it, then, our unchangeable feeling, our irrevocable purpose, as it is our holiest duty and highest interest, that the sword never shall be drawn against the national government or a sister state. Let the people of this country, in the east and the west, in the north and the south, engrave this sentiment on the table of their hearts, and reverence it as a religious truth. Let them resolve, and call God to witness the vow, that the voice of a brother's blood shall

never cry from the ground against them. To live and to die in this sentiment, is recommended by interest, advised by wisdom, and commanded by duty. Let us take an illustration from the circle of domestic life. What son can think, without horror, of unsheathing the sword against a father, however unjust and even tyrannical? What brother can brook the thought, that he could ever be driven, by any extremity of injury or cruelty, to shed his brother's blood? Nature, religion, public and private duty, the social feeling, the peace of families, have ordained these irrevocable laws. Even the barbarous code of false honor, though it spares the friend, the neighbor, the acquaintance, no more than the stranger and the enemy, has respected the sanctuary of a household. And shall not this family of states reverence the commandments of a holier and nobler law, to them the only true law of honor and virtue, of enduring happiness, peace and improvement? Let them banish, then, forever from their intercourse, the language of the warrior, and all the thoughts and feelings, and associations, which are crowded together in that single expression—WAR. Is one of them insulted by a thoughtless unfeeling brother? Let him remember that violence must aggravate, but cannot cure the evil. Are some the victims of selfishness and injustice? They would do well to consider that angry words and intemperate conduct can avail nothing, and may produce greater injuries. Are any the sufferers by a brother's usurpation or abuse of authority? What can threats and denunciations do, but to exasperate the guilty against the innocent? Let the nations of Europe employ war, and its ministers of wrath to chastise the insolent, to exact justice from the unjust, and to humble tyranny; but let the people of each state, under every temptation of trial, arising from the national government, or other states, rely only on the arguments of wisdom and moderation, and on the eloquence of friendship and forbearance. Our country

is emphatically a land of regulated liberty, of laws and principles. Our government is pre-eminently the government of the people, the offspring of mutual concessions and common interests. There is, in the great body of the citizens of every state, a fund of good sense, of equity and candor, which, in the course of years, will assuredly do that which is right. Let us never distrust, much less despair of them. What though, for a season, we may be reviled, or injured, by sister states, or be oppressed by the power of the general government? What though we may see, in our judgment, with absolute certainty, that we are the victims of sectional prejudice, or local interests, of fraud, intrigue, and corruption? Let us never distrust our country, nor despair of the republic? On the contrary, let us cling fast to the hope, that Americans will, at the last, respect truth and reason, and yield to manly, temperate, candid remonstrance, and brotherly expostulation. Let us, then, before we approach the sanctuary of our parent government, banish the feelings of anger from our hearts, the language of menace from our lips, and the expression of resentment from our countenance. Before we address the august assembly of sister states, let us remember that we cannot honor and respect them too highly, nor act ourselves with too much dignity, self-reverence and moderation. Before we enter the sacred presence of our country, let us cast far away the sword, and speak to her only in the spirit of faith and of hope, of peace and of love.

EXTRACT

*From the Address at the Dedication of the Depository for
Bibles, &c. April, 1829.*

Let me rather turn to the excellent founder of Sunday-schools, and offer to the excellent Robert Raikes, the homage of virtuous admiration and gratitude. Compar'd to him, what are the heroes of ancient and modern times, the illustrious statesmen, the founders of empires! Who that comprehends the true dignity of man, his solemn responsibility to God, and his fellow men, the blessedness of doing good, the beauty of holiness, the pure, elevated, noble wisdom of love to God and man, would for a moment compare with Robert Raikes, Alexander or Cæsar, Alaric or Attila, Wolsey or Richelieu, Charles the XII. or Bonaparte! To illustrate this, let us draw a parallel between the benevolent author of Sunday-schools, and the lawgiver of Sparta, and the founder of Rome.

Lycurgus exclaim'd as he rode thro' the country of Lacedæmonia, that it look'd like the patrimony of brothers. It was, indeed, the patrimony of a family; but that family was degraded and brutalized by institutions, whose sole object was the destruction of their fellow creatures. Sparta regarded peace, the natural condition of man, as disgraceful; war, his unnatural state, as honorable. The Spartan had no feelings, no sentiments, but those of a soldier; no conception of glory, but as military fame: no happiness or duties at home, but in

warlike education, no joy or ambition abroad, but in the camp, the march, or the battel-field. To receive his wounds in front; to die sword in hand; to be carried homeward upon his shield, were the limit of his desires, the highest satisfaction, of which he was capable. The character of man was stretchd on the iron bed of Procrustes; that of woman was degraded, and her tenderness, delicacy, and loveliness, were broken as on the wheel of a ruthless tyranny; while the infant, if unfit for the bloody work of destruction, was cast out to perish in the fields. Under such institutions, *the Spartan was a savage*, scarcely more elevated than the Indian of North America. Such were the boasted institutes of Lycurgus; and what a commentary on the character of them and their author, is found in the fact, that he should have cheated the people, by a miserable trick, into their perpetual observance.

Let us now turn to the founder of the Roman monarchy. In him, we behold a man, who slew his brother with his own hand, who violated the sacred laws of hospitality, who inveigled by fraud the Sabine women into his power, and seized them by force. What other morality, indeed, could have been expected of a fratricide, the captain of robbers, and murderers, and outlaws! Such was the man who laid the foundation of Rome, called in the boastful language of her people, the Eternal City. And what were her institutions, from beginning to end, but those of war? What was her sole employment, from the cradle to the grave, but rapine and murder? She died, as she had lived—by the sword; and as she had carried fire and carnage, with unrelenting fury and insatiable ambition, into all the neighboring countries, she perished at last, not in the lists of chivalry, with the gallant, the civilized, and the polished, but by the hands of barbarians, who rolled backward over the Alps upon her beautiful Italy, the deluge of blood, which had overflowed Helvetia

and Germany, Gaul, and Belgium, and Britain. Such has been the fate of evry people, with scarcely an exception! How just and awful ar the judgments of God! for all of them arose and flourishd by rapin and bloodshed. Shall I be told that Rome carry'd her arts with her arms, and civiliz'd the independent states, which she enslav'd? What then shall we say to the thief and assassin, who should act in like manner? Shall we regard it as a merit, that after slaying the parent, they hav educated the child out of his father's property? After invading the peace of a family, laying waste its heritage, seizing all its property, and murdering or imprisoning its natural protectors, is it matter of commendation, that they should restore and improve agriculture and the arts, out of its own wealth, more especialy since they deliverd that family to the charge of oppressiv strangers? Such were the principles, and such the conduct of kingly, of republican, of imperial Rome. Romulus, then, was the founder of a state, *whose whole life of twelve hundred years, was devoted to carnage and rapin.* Lycurgus was the author of a petty scheme of violence and destruction; Romulus of a vast system of selfishnes and ambition, of fraud, bloodshed and ruin. Each had the merit, and only the merit of creating a nation of murderers and plunderers.

EXTRACT

From an Address before the Richland School, December, 1829.

There is one consideration of vast importance in determining the best character of a scheme of education: and it bears directly on the question of the comparative merits of the Christian and classical standards. It is this. The spirit of the Gospel is essentially the spirit of peace and humility, of love and forbearance. It is an amiable, conciliating, philanthropic spirit. It is full of moral dignity, and beauty, and courage. It is essentially the spirit of duty, the spirit of God himself. But what is the spirit that lives and moves thro'out the classical models? It is the spirit of war, foreign and civil, the spirit of ambition, and pride, of hatred, contempt, and oppression. It is a blood-thirsty, unforgiving, intolerant spirit. Take from the Iliad or the Æneid its military scenes, and achievements, and heroes, and the poem is in ruins. Take the like from the Scripture Epic of Milton, and the great, the mighty whole is scarcely more impaired than "Jerusalem Delivered," by discarding the Episode of Olindo and Sophronia. Take the like from the classic historians, and the sun-bright history of Greece and Rome "in dim eclipse, disastrous twilight sheds." But take the same from the history of Europe, since the Reformation, and especially from the history of England, and of these United States, and *that* remains which we look for *in vain* among the Ancients, *political, constitutional, commercial, literary, and religious* history, the history of *principles* and *institu-*

tions, of society and government. WAR is the *very soul* of poetry and history in the classics. Does it not then become us to abandon them, as fit means of instruction for youth; unless we mean practically to deny the incomparable superiority of the *peaceful* spirit of the New Testament? Can we doubt that the warlike spirit, which has desolated Europe for eighteen hundred years, in spite of the religion of Jesus, is to be ascribed, in a good measure, to the extravagant admiration of the classics, to the imitation of Greek and Roman, instead of Christian heroes, and to the unchristian character of general education? Christianity has warr'd in vain against military ambition and military glory; since evry educated man has been thoro'ly imbu'd with the military, that ruling spirit of Greece and Rome. Banish this spirit, and we shall see and hear less of war and more of peace, less of heroes and more of philanthropists, less of warriors and more of statesmen, less of fals glory and honor, and more of tru, less of the spirit of the French revolution, and more of the spirit of our own. I rejoice that the spirit of the age, and the spirit of our own country especialy, ar becoming more and more rational, peaceful, Christian. Let this great change in education be made, and we may rest assur'd, that the rulers and politicians of all nations will be

“ ————— bent on higher views,
 To civilize the rude unpolished world,
 And lay it under the restraint of laws;
 To make man mild and sociable to man;
 To cultivate the wild licentious savage
 With wisdom, discipline and liberal arts;
 Th' embellishments of life —————.”

EXTRACT

*From the Oration before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of
Yale College, Sept. 1830.*

Nor, gentlemen, while we remember our fellowship, and our common parentage, let us forget our common inheritance, our country. We cannot honor our country with too deep a reverence; we cannot love her with an affection, too pure and fervent; we cannot serve her with an energy of purpose or a faithfulness of zeal, too steadfast and ardent. And what is our country? It is not the East, with her hills and her valleys, with her countless sails, and the rocky ramparts of her shores. It is not the North, with her thousand villages, and her harvest-home, with her frontiers of the lake and the ocean. It is not the West, with her forest-land and her inland-isles, with her luxuriant expanses, cloth'd in the verdant corn, with her beautiful Ohio, and her majestic Missouri. Nor is it yet the South, opulent in the mimic snow of the cotton, in the rich plantations of the rustling cane, and in the golden robes of the rice-field. *What are these but the sister families of one greater, better, holier family, OUR COUNTRY?* I come not here to speak the dialect, or to give the counsels of the patriot-statesman. But I come, a patriot-scholar, to vindicate the rights, and to plead for the interests of American literature. And be assur'd, gentlemen, that we cannot, as patriot scholars, think too highly of that country, or sacrifice too much for her. And let us never forget, let us rather remember with a religious awe that *the union of these States is indispensable to our Literature*, as it is to our national

independence and civil libertys, to our prosperity, happines, and improvement. If, indeed, we desire to behold a literature like that, which has sculptur'd, with such energy of expression, which has painted so faithfully and vividly, the crimes, the vices, the follys of ancient and modern Europe: if we desire that our land should furnish for the orator and the novelist, for the painter and the poet, age after age, the wild and romantic scenery of war; the glittering march of armys and the revelry of the camp; the shrieks and blasphemys, and all the horrors of the battel field; the desolation of the harvest, and the burning cottage; the storm, the sack, and the ruin of citys: If we desire to unchain the furious passions of jealousy and selfishnes, of hatred, revenge and ambition, those lions, that now sleep harmles in their den: If we desire, that the lake, the river, the ocean, should blush with the blood of brothers; that the winds should waft from the land to the sea, from the sea to the land, the roar and the smoke of battel; that the very mountain-tops should become altars for the sacrifice of brothers; if we desire that these, and such as these—the elements to an incredible extent, of the literature of the old world—should be the elements of our literature, then, but then only, let us hurl from its pedestal the majestic 'statue of our union, and scater its fragments over all our land. But, if we covet for our country the noblest, purest, loveliest literature, the world has ever seen; such a literature, as shall honor God, and bless mankind; a literature, whose smiles might play upon an angel's face, whose tears "would not stain an angel's cheek;" then let us cling to the union of these States, with a patriot's love, with a scholar's enthusiasm, with a Christian's hope. In her heavenly character, as a holocaust self-sacrific'd to God; at the height of her glory, as the ornament of a free, educated, peaceful, Christian people, *American literature will find that THE INTELLECTUAL SPIRIT IS HER VERY TREE OF LIFE, AND THAT UNION, HER GARDEN OF PARADISE.*

EXTRACT

From the Sunday School Jubilee Address, Sept. 1831.

It is but a few years, since we beheld the most singular and memorable pageant in the annals of time. It was a pageant more sublime and affecting than the progress of Elizabeth thro' England, after the defeat of the Armada; than the return of Francis 1st. from a Spanish prison to his own beautiful France; than the daring, the rapid march of the conqueror at Austerlitz from Frejus to Paris. It was a pageant, indeed, rivald only in the elements of the grand and the pathetic, by the journey of our own Washington thro' the different States. Need I say, that I allude to the visit of Lafayette to America? But Lafayette returned to the land of the *dead*, rather than of the *living*. How many who had fought with him, in the war of '76, had died in arms, and lay buryd in the grave of the soldier or the sailor! How many, who had surviv'd the perils of battel, on the land and the ocean, had expir'd on the death-bed of peace, in the arms of mother, sister, daughter, wife! Those who surviv'd, to celebrate with him the jubilee of '25, were stricken in years, and hoary-headed, many of them infirm in health, many the victims of poverty, or misfortune, or affliction. And, how venerable that patriarch company, how sublime their gathering thro' all the land, how joyful their welcome, how affecting their farewell to that beloved

stranger! Yet a little while, and he and they shall be gathered to their Fathers, in the fulness of years. The pageant has fled; the very materials that gave it such depth of interest, are rapidly perishing: and a humble, perhaps a nameless grave, shall hold the last soldier of the revolution. And shall they ever meet again? Shall the patriots and soldiers of '76, the immortal band, as history styles them, meet again in the amaranthin bowers of spotless purity, of perfect bliss, of eternal glory? Shall theirs be the Christian's heaven, the kingdom of the Redeemer? The heathen points to his fabulous elysium, as the paradise of the soldier and the sage. But the Christian bows down, with tears and sighs, for he knows that not many of the patriots, and statesmen, and warriors of Christian lands, are the disciples of Jesus.

But we turn from Lafayette, the favourite of the old and the new world, to the peaceful benevolence, the unambitious achievements of Robert Raikes. Let us imagine him to have been still alive, and to have visited our land to celebrate with us this year of Jubilee. No national ship would have been offered to bear him, a nation's guest, in the pride of the star-spangled-banner, from the bright shores of the rising, to the brighter shores of the setting-sun. No cannon would have hailed him in the stern language of the battle field, the fortunate champion of freedom in Europe and America. No martial music, would have welcomed him in notes of rapture, as they rolled along the Atlantic, and echoed thro' the valley of the Mississippi. No military procession would have heralded his way thro' crowded streets, thick set with the banner and the plume, the glittering sabre and the polished bayonet. No cities would have called forth beauty and fashion, wealth and rank, to honor him in the ball-room and theater. No states would have escorted him from boundary to boundary, nor have sent their chief magistrates

to do him homage. No national liberality would hav allotted to him a nobleman's domain and princely treasures. No national gratitude would hav haild him, in the capitol itself, the nation's guest, because the nation's benefactor; and hav consecrated a battel ship, in memory of his wounds, and his gallantry.

Not such would hav been the reception of Robert Raikes: in the land of the pilgrims, and of Penn, of the Catholic, and the Cavalier, and the Hugonot. And who does not rejoice, that it would be impossible *thus* to welcome this primitiv Christian, the Founder of Sunday Schools. His heralds would be the preachers of the gospel, and the eminent in piety, benevolence and zeal. His procession would number in its ranks, the messengers of the cross and the disciples of the Savior, Sunday School teachers, and white-rob'd scholars. The temples of the Most High would be the scenes of his triumph. Homage and gratitude to him, would be anthems of prais and thanksgiving to God. Parents would honor him as more than a brother: children would reverence him as more than a Father. The faltering words of age, the firm and sober voice of manhood, the silvery notes of youth, would bless him as a Christian patron. The wise and good would acknowlege him evry where, as a national benefactor, as a patriot even to a land of strangers. He would hav come a messenger of peace, to a land of peace. No images of camps and sieges, and battels, no agonys of the dying and wounded, no shouts of victory, or processions of triumph would mingle with the recollections of the multitudes who welcomd him. They would mourn over no common dangers, trials and calamitys; for the road of duty has been to them, the path of pleasantnes, the way of peace. Their memory of the past would be rich in gratitude to God and love to man: their enjoyment of the present would be a prelude to heavenly bliss; their prospects

of the future, bright and glorious as faith and hope. No associations with this world would awaken the sigh of regret or the tear of repentance: and all their sympathys with an eternal state would be purify'd and ennobled by the contemplation of saints, and seraphs, and archangels.

Such was the reception of Lafayette, the warrior; such would be that of Robert Raikes, the Howard of the Christian Church. And which is the nobler benefactor, patriot, and philanthropist? Mankind may admire and extol Lafayette more than the Founder of Sunday Schools: Poetry and Eloquence, Painting and Sculpture may celebrate his virtues, and History enrich her gallery of paintings with the story of his achievements. The statesman and the philosopher may delight to estimate his influence on the fortunes of the American Republic, and of the Gallic Monarchy, and to trace thro' them his control over the destinys of the world. But religion, philanthropy, and enlightend common sens, must ever esteem Robert Raikes the superior of Lafayette. His are the virtues, the services, the sacrifices of a more enduring and exalted order of being. His counsels and triumphs belong less to time than to eternity. The fame of Lafayette is of this world, the glory of Robert Raikes is of the Redeemer's everlasting kingdom. Lafayette has livd chiefly for his own age, and chiefly for his and our country. But Robert Raikes has livd for all ages and all countrys. Perhaps the historian and biographer may never interweav his name in the tapestry of national or individual renown. But the records of evry single church honor him as a patron: the records of the universal church, on earth and in heaven, bless him as a benefactor. The time may come, when the name of Lafayette shall be forgotten, or when the star of his fame, no longer glittering in the zenith, shall be seen pale and glimmering on the verge of the horizon. But the name of Robert Raikes shall never be forgotten, and the lambent

flame of his glory is that eternal fire, which rushd down from heaven to devour the sacrifice of Elijah. Let mortals then admire and imitate Lafayette, more than Robert Raikes. But the just made perfect and the ministering spirits, around the throne of God, hav welcomd him as a fellow-servant of the same Lord, as a fellow-laborer in the same glorious cause of man's redemption, as a co-heir of the same precious promises and eternal rewards.

EXTRACT

*From the Letter to J. C. Calhoun, R. Y. Hayne, &c.
February, 1832.*

There is still another great duty laid upon my people and all their public servants—to cultivate THE SPIRIT OF PEACE. How little does he comprehend the character and destiny of American institutions, who has not learned, THAT WAR IS FOREVER BANISHED FROM MY LAND. *Here the sword shall never be unsheath'd to shed a brother's blood.* If the government, ordained by all to bless and protect each, be unjust and oppressiv to some, RESISTANCE BY ARMS would partake of the guilt of murder, of the folly and madness of suicide. No controversy between the nation and the states, or between the states themselves, *shall ever be settled by the sword.* In such a cause, the warrior would be stained with the double guilt of the rebel and the fratricide. His art, with all its chivalry of spirit, and all its splendor of equipment, would be a loathsome and hideous spectacle. The blood that he sheds, would be unquenchable fire to his soul: an ineffaceable brand of horror on his name. PEACE IS THE UNCHANGABLE, UNIVERSAL LAW OF MY LAND. It must be indelibly stamped on the hearts of every ruler, and of all my people. The public man, in whom this cardinal maxim *is not an article of inflexible faith, is a reproach to his age and a dishonor to his nation.* Never shall HE wear the noblest wreath of the American ruler, *that of the Christian patriot and statesman.*

The last great duty of my children is pre-eminently such. It is the golden rule of life, the whole duty of the good citizen; for it is the very fountain of light, security and happiness. It binds every private individual, thro'out my land, as with the sanctity and force of a brother's ties. It binds every ruler as with adamantin bonds, when, in the presence of his country, he calls on the God of truth, to attest his sincerity. LOVE ONE ANOTHER, is that golden rule. Love one another with a frank, constant, elevated affection: with an attachment, undisturbed by jealousy or selfishness, by levity or passion. Love one another fervently, in spite of injuries, provocation and injustice. These are equally the lot of communities and individuals: and he is unwise, who does not know that in such case, *the obligation of love becomes stronger and more sacred*. He is eminently unwise, who does not know that the love, which can then forbear and forgive, is the only safeguard of equal rights and interests, a fountain, utterly inexhaustible, of mutual blessings and common enjoyments. *Without it, my people cannot be united, free, prosperous and happy*. Whoever, then, whether a private citizen or a public man, shall teach or encourage, in word or in deed, even the least of my children *not thus to love one another*, may be fit for the turbulent republics of antiquity; but his heart is far from me, and alien to the regulated freedom, the noble confidence, the frank and magnanimous wisdom, which become Americans. *He is a foreigner in the land of his birth: a stranger at the very hearth-stone of his fathers*.

Such, my sons, are the great landmarks of duty to all my children. You are among the eminently favored of those children: favorites of nature, in the wealth of intellectual endowments: favorites of fortune, in the auspicious incidents of your public career: favorites of your country, in the gratitude she felt, and the applause she bestowed. I respect your sin-

cerity, I honor your zeal, I acknowlege your talents, patriotism and services. Grant that you hav acted honestly, fearlesly, disinterestedly. Grant that the people of your immediate home hav been neglected, injurd, oppressd : and that folly or ignorance, fraud or corruption, or all of them combin'd, hav been the prolific causes. Grant that you hav reasond, and expostulated, and protested in vain : that my people themselvs hav been slow to listen, and still slower to believ : that the majority of their rulers hav heard with indifference, or turnd away in disdain. Had you respected the landmarks of wisdom and patriotism, I hav set before you, *what then would hav been your duty ?* That duty lay like a path-way of light, amidst those landmarks. He who ran might read. Even the wayfaring man could not err therein. That duty was an alternativ. You ought to hav acknowlegd that majority of patriots and statesmen, who differd from you, to be *as probably right as yourselvs* : and as the power and responsibility were *theirs not yours*, it was your part, with the humility which belongs only to the truly wise, great and good, to acquiesce in theirs, *as the authoriz'd, if not the better judgment*. Or, if you believd that the subject had not yet been sufficiently discussd, and still was not thoro'ly understood, either by your fellow citizens or your fellow rulers, then was your duty equally plain. *Perseverance in opposition was that duty* ; but perseverance in the tru spirit of patriot statesmen : resolute, yet calm and dignify'd ; uncompromising, yet respectful and conciliatory ; argumentativ and eloquent, but without a look or a word of anger, indignity or menace. These were the immortal weapons, which became me and you : this the noble warfare, which would hav honord the glorious dead, would hav vanquishd the living, and hav challengd the gratitude and admiration of posterity.

Tell me not that you hav lov'd me with all the energy of passion, with all the purity and fidelity of a martyr's faith. Tell me not, that you hav dedicated on my altar, all the afektions of the heart, and all the powers of the understanding. Tell me not, that on that altar, you ar ready to sacrifice fortune and happines, power and distinction, yea, life itself. **MINE IS THE ALTAR OF PEACE AND LOVE.** The hand that is not ever ready to clasp a brother's hand, brings an impious gift. The lips that hav cursd, and denounc'd, and threatend a brother, ar touchd with no live coal from that altar. The soul that is the habitation of suspicion, and wrath, and contumely, has upon it the plague-spot. **IN WHAT SPIRIT HAV YOU LOVD?** Let your words and your actions, and all their host of followers, giv the answer. When the troubled thoughts, which now dwell in your souls, were entering there, O! that some guardian angel had cast his scroll before you to rebuke the severity of your judgment—'Arise executioner?' Tell me not of your motivs. I arraign them not. **I JUDGE THE TREE BY ITS FRUITS.** Could fountains of sweet waters hav sent forth the bitter streams, that travers the land, scatering dismay, and jealousy, and hatred, amidst the paradise of my people? **TELL ME, AR THESE THE ACHIEVMENTS OF A CHILD'S FIDELITY, OF A BROTHER'S LOVE?**

O my sons! what a lot was yours, how fortunate, how enviable! O what an opportunity hav you lost, of ranking yourselfs among the noblest and best of men! To you was offerd the crown of disinterested magnanimity, of calm, elevated, comprehensiv wisdom; of a patriot devotion, worthy of Washington himself. In an evil hour, my sons, my sons, you dashd it from you for ever. Yours was the power to heal, to save, to bless. The past of your lives attested at once your capacity, your glory, and your virtue. The present was rich in the confidence and gratitude of all my chil-

dren. The respect, the love, the admiration of all had invested you with an authority, venerable for its purity and intelligence, powerful in its disinterestedness and benevolence. *That authority was invincible in your hands, HAD YOU BEEN COURAGOUS AND FAITHFUL TO THAT TRUST.* That authority was potent to expose the sophistry of the cunning, and the arts of the selfish; to vanquish the unjust, and break the rod of the oppressor. But all its power lay **IN THE LAW OF LOVE.** *Ye knew it not;* for the fruits of your deeds plead trumpet-tongued against you. *Ye knew it not; but eras'd that law from your hearts.* *Ye knew it not; but hav struck from the souls of thousands of my people THAT LAW OF LOVE, and hav written there THE LAW OF VIOLENCE."*

EXTRACT

From a Letter to the People of South Carolina, December, 1832.

But, I beseech you, mistake me not. I approve no such cours. Had I the power and the right to bind the Union, I would hav them say to Carolina, "We hav resolv'd to take away evry possibility that a drop of blood may be shed in a contest between yourselfs and the union. We shall, therefore, remove evry soldier from the state, and abandon the fortifications in your harbor. In your safe-keeping, for we at least will trust your faith and honor, ar all our munitions of war. On this station will be kept, as usual, only the customary naval force, and even that shall be remov'd, if you request it. Between us there shall be no other law but that of peace and reason. We will not, in any event, employ the navy, much less the army, or even the militia of your sister states against you. Let the nation lose millions of revenu, rather than a drop of your blood should be shed, in its collection. We cannot yield our opinion to yours; for a vast majority of the people and of your sister states approve ours and condemn yours; *but let the Union perish before its cement shall be the blood of brothers.* We shall go onward, in what appears to us the path of duty to the Union, and even to yourselfs. But if you interfere, we shall not resort to force. Our instructions to our officers will be, in such a case, to employ none against your authority. If you continu in the Union, we ar willing to trust

to your good sens, and your justice, for indemnity. If you continu not, we ar willing to bear the loss, rather than use violence to prevent it. Cost what it may, *we never will employ against BROTHERS the weapons of an ENEMY.* We giv you a year to reflect. We beseech you to do it, in calmnes and moderation, in the spirit of peace and love. We conjure you to do it, by all that is holy in liberty, commanding in duty, and precious in the recolections of our common history." At the end of that year, I would hav the Union ask you to meet in Convention. To that assembly I would hav them send a deputation of the wise and venerable men of a former age; one from each of the other states in the Union. These should come to you in the garments of mourning, and with the deep and solemn feeling of the priests and pontiffs, whom the Romans sent to deprecate the wrath of Coriolanus. I would hav them address your delegates in that spirit which breath'd the pathetic sentiment, "Daughters of Jerusalem, weep not for me, but weep for yourselvs and your children." I would hav them ask, ar you prepar'd to yield your opinion to that of all your sisters. If you replyd that you were not, I would hav them pronounce, in the sublime and affecting language of freemen and brothers, your divorce from the marriage bond of the Union.

Then, had I authority to speak for the sister states, and the national government, I would hav their delegates to say to Carolina, in grief, not in anger, "Depart in peace. Never shall American blood be shed by us in civil contest. You hav shown that you know not the character of the Union: that you bear to it no love: that you estimate its value, not by the precious privileges and glorious associations which dignify and adorn it; but by the ledger and the price current. You hav shown, by your ordinance, that you understand not, or count as nothing, the cardinal principles of American

freedom: that you can violate "deliberately, palpably and dangerously," your own and the constitution of the Union: that you can set at nought the ancient landmarks of legislative power, and the independence of the judiciary, the sanctity of contracts, and the purity of the trial by jury. You have shown, that in the name of Liberty, you can smite and dishonor her: that with her praise on your lips, you have put her to shame by your deeds: **THAT YOU HAVE CEASED TO BE AN AMERICAN REPUBLIC.** Depart then in peace: with the blessings and the grief, not the curses and wrath of your sisters. Depart until you shall again become worthy of the society of free states, of a place in the sisterhood of American Republics."

Such would be the sentiments which I should utter, had I power to speak for the rest of the American family. But, it is among rulers, as among individuals. Few have the wisdom to acknowledge or the courage to act on the noble and lovely principles of Christian peace. The battleship and the tented field, the sword and the cannon, the science and the stratagems of war, are at once the symbols of power, and the proofs of courage, the logic of statesmen and the eloquence of patriots. The very dead, who lie in their gory beds at Lexington and Bunker, at King's Mountain and Eutaw, the victims of foreign bayonets, are invoked to bless fratricide: and "the chivalry of the south," becomes a watchword to kindle the pride and inflame the passions of brother against brother. And is it to the sordid elements of pride and passion, of selfishness, jealousy and prejudice, that the American statesman is willing to appeal? Can he consent to make the sword the arbiter, in any event, under any circumstances, between the states themselves, or between one of them and the Union? God forbid that a drop of blood should ever be shed in such a cause. I would have the Union say to South Carolina, "If your people prefer a separate existence,

let them hav it: if they would rather enjoy foreign dependence on natural enemys, (for that is inevitable) than a brotherly dependence on their own kindred, be it so: if they prefer to the republican government of the Union, the anti-republican ordinance of their convention, let them be gratify'd." But who believes that the Union will act thus? With the same elements of pride and passion, of selfishnes, jealousy and prejudice, which inflame you, can you doubt that the national rulers, elevated by the consciousness of superior power, will take up the gauntlet which you hav cast at their feet?

For myself, I trust, that I hold with an inflexible conviction the sentiment, that the character of the *warrior, in any point of view, is UNCHRISTIAN, and in CIVIL contest, is absolutely and unchangably ANTI-REPUBLICAN*. Above all, in our American republics, so incomparably superior in their elements and structure, to all other governments, ancient or modern, I hold the appeal to arms, on disputed questions of any kind, to be ingratitude to Heaven, treachery to the cause of regulated government, and actual hostility to the highest interests of freedom. It is the duty of the American family, and their safety and happines demand it, *that the sword never should be drawn among themselvs*. Let them resolv inflexibly, that this shall be the **GREAT LAW** of their social compact: that the law of violence and blood shall be forever blotted out from the tables of their law: and the golden rule of love, the test of a Christian people, the highest fountain of peace and happines, the highest security of freedom herself, the tru glory of confederated republics, shall be written there in its stead. All acknowlege the truth, and admire the beauty of these sentiments. And yet, of that **ALL**, how few hav the courage and the wisdom, with a calm and single-hearted resolutenes of purpose, to take *the only Christian, the only Republican ground*, the sword shall

NEVER be drawn by brother against brother, or by brothers against the family government of brothers!—Who is so blind as not to see, that the great danger of the American states lies *in the law of violence*? Who does not know that the sword among freemen is the assassin's dagger to liberty? The blood of martyrdom shed on the scaffold, is the very dew of Heaven to perishing liberty; but the blood of civil contest, in a republic, is to her as consuming fire from the bottomless pit. What but the prospect, what but the preparation for *an appeal to the law of violence*, could have led your convention to invade the state and national constitutions so palpably and deliberately: and to substitute the treacherous beacons of tyranny, for the eternal landmarks of freedom? These infractions are the more dangerous and hostile to freedom, because they are a highway for military power. Already in the vista you may behold its standard unfurled. Its battle-shout is wafted in no faint murmur to your ear, and liberty stands aghast at the scene. It is a vision of brothers murdered by brothers, of the widow and the orphan, mourning over fathers and sons, kindred and friends, slain by each other. Shall it be but a vision? It must be such, if you will it. But if you stand by, and speak not the will of a free, enlightened, Christian, peaceful people, it will be your own history, the very next year.

For myself, I protest in the name of the religion of peace; in the name of our sister republics; in the name of liberty thro'out the world; in the name of Washington, Franklin and Jay, against this fratricidal violence, against **THE LAW OF THE SWORD**. I adjure you by the hopes of the noble army of martyrs, on the scaffold of tyranny and at the stake of persecution, to banish forever the law of the sword. I adjure you by the bitter repentance in the eternal world, of the tens of thousands who have perished in the battle-shock of civil wars, to banish it forever. I adjure you by the countless

spirits of her children, whether of the darkest or the brightest ages of liberty, to banish it forever. I adjure you in the name of the God of our fathers, who hath given you the noblest inheritance, the most glorious prospects, ever conferr'd on his children, **TO BANISH FOREVER THE LAW OF VIOLENCE, THE LAW OF THE SWORD.**

I at least hav resolv'd, and may God giv me strength to abide by that holy purpose, that come what may, I shall never bear arms in a civil contest. Property, personal liberty, life itself, ar my country's. They ar in her power. I hav lov'd: I hav honord: I hav servd her. Let her make me a pauper; let her cast me down into the dungeon of her wrath; let her drag me on the traitor's hurdle to the scaffold of her avenging justice; but never can she blot out from my soul a brother's love; never shall she brand that soul with a brother's blood.

EXTRACT

From a Letter on Peace.

It seems to me most strange, how a Christian can reason as you do on the subject of Peace. You admit that Peace principles, as expounded by me, are the pure and obvious teachings of the Gospel; and yet you lay them aside in favor of calculations of human expediency. Do Christian principles justify such a course? Is obedience or disobedience to be determined by such a test? What are we but the children of God? Is not the Father wiser than the child? What are we but the subjects of God? Is not the Ruler wiser than the governed? And yet you justify the child and subject in breaking the plain, express command of an all-wise and all benevolent parent and sovereign, on the supposition that man is wiser than God, that man is better able to decide what is best for himself, than God. Again, you acknowledge the power of God; you acknowledge his faithfulness. He is able and willing to protect you against a million of men in arms. You cannot deny that, if he pleased, he could have protected Holland or Switzerland against the combined naval and military force of Napoleon and Alexander, of Austria, Prussia, and England. Now, if he commands obedience, what right have you to doubt, if you obey, that he will protect you, PROVIDED it be consistent with his view of his own government, in relation to yourself? Does not your error lie in assuming, that he will not protect you, if you do obey: and is not this based on a still more fatal error, that you have a right

to calculate on, and even to stipulate for protection, as the condition of obedience? Now this cannot be maintained for a moment. How do you know, but that your suffering, as the consequence of your fidelity to him, may be an important point in his moral government. Do you not prejudge the whole matter, without either sufficient knowledge or any right to judge? Again, is it not manifest, that you, and so do all who argue on your side, assume as a fact, what no one but a prophet could know, that *if all Christians were faithful* to the Sermon on the Mount, the result would be, that “the whole of the civilized and humanized world would be subjected to the brutal passions of a few armed banditti.” Now whether a Christian believes that this would be the result of his fidelity or not, is perfectly immaterial to the obligation of obedience. The world is God’s, and he alone has a right to dispose of all its events, both great and small, both public and private. Now, we will grant your conclusion to be true, that such would be the result of obedience; and what follows? That we should be disobedient? Not so; but just the reverse, that we should be more sternly and zealously faithful, because we cannot doubt if bonds and imprisonment, if persecution or torture, if ignominy and death are to be our lot, God has so willed, in his wisdom and goodness, for our purification and perfection, and for the welfare of his church. Can a Christian doubt, much less deny this? What is your argument but this? God has clearly required obedience in this particular; but if I obey, I shall subject myself to the loss of life, liberty, or property, or of all of them? Are not life, liberty, property, his, and not yours? Are they not granted to you, subject to his revealed will? Has he not a right to resume them at any time, and in any manner he pleases, even under circumstances of the greatest pain and terror, and even degradation to yourself? You cannot deny this. Did the primitive Christians or the Protestants reason as you do,

when they submitted to confiscation and the jail, persecution and death, in thousands and tens of thousands, rather than be disobedient? They followed the letter of the commandment against all human arguments and calculations. They trusted to a faithful God, because, come what might, they knew that he had a right to obedience without any conditions or calculations on their part.

But let us change the view of the matter. You assume that, if all good men were to conform to the Peace Principles of the Gospel, the civiliz'd world would be the victim of an armed banditti. Now, I assert precisely the reverse. Let us examine your proofs and mine. You instance the case of the Peruvians. But did the warlike Mexicans fare any better? Did all the *martial* tribes of North America fare any better? Besides, the Peruvians were *Heathen*.—They had not the promises of the Gospel of Peace. And knowing as we do, that God has seen fit to draw a broad line of distinction between the Heathen and the Christian, the Pagan who has not the privileges of the Christian faith, cannot expect its rewards. We cannot, then, reason consistently from the case of the Heathen to the case of the Christian. Peace with the Peruvian, was a matter of custom or national character, so far as it really prevailed. With the Christian it must be a matter of principle, and of submission to the will of God. But I am not content with this reply only. Allow me to ask for an instance of a Christian people who ever repos'd their trust in God on Peace principles, and had reason to repent it? You cannot name an instance; at least I remember none. On the contrary, let me ask your attention—1st, To the case of the Jews, who were commanded (the males) to appear three times a-year at Jerusalem. Yet tho' surrounded by enemies, we know that advantage was never taken of this defenceless state of the land. God had promised protection; and the people trusted, obeyed, and never had reason to re-

pent that obedience. 2nd, To the case of the Quaker Colony of Pennsylvania, which was unmolested by the Indians for 70 years; whilst all the ARMED colonys were continually at war with them. 3d, To the Quakers of New England, who remaind in their cottages, cultivated their fields, and went about the country unarmd and unmolested, amidst all the terrors and massacres of Indian wars. 4th, To the Quakers of Ireland in 1798, who were literally in the lion's den of Darius, and the fiery furnace of Nebuchadnezzar; yet, like Daniel, were sav'd by faith. O, what a lesson, what a rebuke to the Christian of human calculation and human expediency! If you hav never read Thomas Hancock's noble and affecting account of the Christian faithfulness of the Friends in 1798—under the most pathetic and trying circumstances, let me recommend it most earnestly to you. I causd copys to be placed in the Sunday School Librarys, as well as in the Library of the Theological Seminary. I can hardly giv a better proof of the high regard that I hav for the book, than by mentioning, that I hav employd an agent in Philadelphia, to place a copy in the Library of evry Sunday School in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. I had already done the same in Charleston, and shall follow up the good work next, with all the citys of the second class; such as Providence, New Haven, Albany, &c. You hav conceded *my theory* to be right; of cours *yours* must be wrong. Mine is the *Christian*, yours the *Heathen* theory. And now for the facts. I hav given mine, and what ar they but Christian experience? You hav given yours, and what ar they but Heathen experience? and that too, the experience of a military, tho' comparativly effeminate people, who stood in the same relation to Pizarro and his Spanish chivalry, as Darius and the Persians to Alexander and the Macedonians. The Peruvians were not Quakers, without arms or fortifications or military instruments, but the revers.

Had they even been a Christian people, they would not have been entitled to protection on the ground of faithfulness to the Peace principles of the Savior, because they were unfaithful, having always rely'd on arms and fortifications and the art of war for their defence. Is not the truth this? that there never has been a nation, which has acted on Peace principles.* You cannot show a single one in the whole history of the ancient and modern world, of Pagan, Jewish, Mahometan, and Christian communitys, which has not been, thro' the whole course of its existence the persecutor, oppressor, and tormentor of others, in all the forms of war; which has not been itself in like manner persecuted, oppressed and tormented from the cradle to the grave; and which has not eventually perished by the sword of the more fortunate, skilful, or powerful in arms. There is, then, no experience *against peace*, for not a single nation has ever been peaceful. All the experience of history is against war, for all nations have been warlike. History teaches us, not that the peaceful are the prey of the warlike, but that the warlike have always been the victims of the warlike. And while nations continue to act the part which they have ever acted, since the opening of the grand historical Tragedy of War, must not things remain the same? You will answer yes, because you say, "I fear that wars cannot and will not cease, till the will of God on this point shall be manifested by miracles, which shall constrain the obedience of man."—And has not the will of God been manifested on this point? You admit it, because you acknowledge that Peace principles are "the divine teachings of the Savior, in the Sermon on the Mount." And has not that will been manifested by miracles? What was the life of the Savior and his Apostles, after entering on his pub-

* Perhaps I ought to exempt the Quaker colony of Wm. Penn, which, thro' not strictly a nation, had for the purposes of this argument a species of national existence.

lic ministry, but a series of miraculous proofs of the truth of his religion, of the faithfulness of God, and of the beauty, value, and authority of Peace principles? And are miracles still called for, "to constrain the obedience of man?" Is not the answer to that call, like the answer of Abraham to the rich man? They have the Sermon on the Mount and the examples of Christ, and his Apostles and Disciples, for two hundred years. If they will not hear them, neither would they be persuaded though they beheld miracles. Besides, you will observe that God has never employed miracles, but as proofs of the divine authority of the Teacher, and of the truth of his revelation. He never has employed them to accomplish a revolution in society or government. On the contrary he has uniformly acted on man, as the subject of government, and susceptible of the influence of moral considerations. What but the faithfulness of his servants, unaided by miracles, has accomplished the vast amount of good which they have done in Protestant countries within the last three hundred years, through the medium of religion and education, government, science, and literature? Let Christians be faithful to the cause of Peace and they may expect even a greater blessing on their labors. At all events, it is their duty to give the example. Paul or Apollos may sow the precious seed of gospel love, but God only can give the increase. Let the thirteen hundred and twenty-four thousand communicants of these United States be faithful subjects of the Prince of Peace, and will you need miracles? Do you ask miracles to constrain *their* obedience? Have they not dedicated themselves as servants of the Prince of PEACE, to do *his* will and not *their* own? Have they not vowed fidelity to the Sermon on the Mount? Let them be faithful, and they need no miracles. Let them be unfaithful, and they deserve none.

Yours, Truly,

THOMAS S. GRIMKE.

*Petition of Thomas S. Grimké to the Legislature of South
Carolina, Dec. 1832.*

The Petition of Thomas S. Grimké

SHEWETH,

That your petitioner is above the age of forty-five, and was therefore exempt, according to the militia laws heretofore prevailing, except in extraordinary cases. As however the whole system is now to be re-organized, and those above forty-five are to be also called out, he begs leave to lay before you his peculiar case, and to ask of the liberality and justice of his native state, an exemption from all militia duty.

The ground on which your petitioner rests his application, has nothing to do with political opinions, at this or any other period. He places his request exclusively on *religious* ground; unconnected with any *party* politics. Having been led, about a year since, to consider the question of the lawfulness of war, he came to the conclusion, after a careful examination of the subject, that *WAR*, under any circumstances, in any form, and at any time, is *unlawful in a Christian*, and absolutely irreconcilable with the spirit of humility and forbearance, of peace and love, not only taught, but commanded in the Gospel. His conscience having been thus satisfied, and his understanding convinced, he has not hesitated to declare those sentiments and to publish them, as opportunity offered, not doubting in the least, their truth and obligation. For the sincerity of these opinions, your petitioner can only refer to the best testimony which man can offer to his fellow man, the uniform tenor of his public and private life. To

the same he would ask leave to refer, to show that he is not influenc'd by any unworthy motiv, in making this request; but solely by scruples of conscience, and by a strength of conviction, which is built on the doctriens of the New Testament. He may be allow'd to add, in corroboration of the honesty of those scruples, and the strength of that conviction, what might appear surprising to others, that he knows not his own heart if he would return a blow, however insolent or unprovok'd; and nothing, but the loss of self-command, he verily believes, could ever induce him *to take another's life to save his own.*

Your petitioner trusts that the prayer of his petition may be granted; that the same spirit, which has respected the scruples of those who affirm, but will not swear, and of those who regard Saturday as their Sabbath, and are therefore excus'd from jury duty on that day, may respect his scruples, on a far more solemn and important subject, *the right to take life and the obligation to bear arms.* To grant his petition will be an act of magnanimity, and of justice to the rights of conscience: and can be no disadvantage to the public; as your petitioner knows of no other person in the state who is of the same opinion. This, he frankly admits, may be a strong argument to prove that he is in error, but is it not a still stronger one to establish the strength of his conviction and the sincerity of his scruples? That he thus exposes himself in the cause of conscience to the ridicule and contempt, to the misapprehensions and misrepresentations of prejudice and passion, of courage, pride, and honor, may be an argument of folly and weakness, but will be received, he trusts, as conclusiv to show that he values such considerations but little, in comparison of what he conceives to become him, under the obligations of Christian duty, independence and frankness.

In presenting this request to the Senate, your petitioner conceives that he is doing an act of justice to the state and to himself; to the state, because he knows that no exemption could be granted in his case, but by the legislature; and to himself, because he is bound, if the ordinary means of petition will avail him, to secure what he regards as a sacred right and duty.

EXTRACT

*From an Oration before the Washington Society,
July 4, 1833.*

The last great duty of Americans, is, to reverence and cultivate the essential, vital spirit of American institutions. How lamentably have we erred in this respect, "groping in the dark" as Franklin said of the Convention; and seeking for light and models, among the institutions of ages, and nations, far remov'd from us in time or character. How insensible have we shown ourselves to the spirit of American Institutions! Instead of studying, developing and perfecting them, we have been seduc'd from our allegiance to that spirit, and treading the paths of European precedent, have sought for our tree of life in the classic gardens of "those finish'd historys, which," it is said, "still enlighten and instruct governments in their duty and their destiny." Can we better improve the most memorable anniversary in our own, or any other national annals, than by devoting the residu of this day to meditation on the true character of that spirit? And to whom shall this last great duty be assign'd?

Fellow-Countrymen, Fellow-Citizens! this *last* duty is assign'd to you. Yours is the noblest, the most precious heritage, that free men have ever possess'd. Yours is indeed, the Promis'd Land, foretold by the prophet pen of Philosophy, or seen thro' a glass darkly, in the visions of Poetry. Yours

is a realm, more spacious in extent, more various in character, and richer in resources, than the statesman-patriot of any other age or country ever call'd "his own, his native land." Your's was an infancy, marvelous beyond that of any other people: a youth, such as the republics of Ancient and Modern Europe seek in vain, among the records of their own historians: a manhood, earlier, more dignify'd, more commanding, than the annals of any other nation presents to our view. Shall yours be the lot of a premature old age, imbecil, degraded, the object of mockery, contempt and indignation? Or shall it be that serene, that beautiful old age; that virtuous, majestic and glorious old age, little less than immortal youth, which shall be the destiny, **ONLY OF A FREE, EDUCATED, PEACEFUL, CHRISTIAN PEOPLE?** Is there a heart in all this holy temple that does not breathe its fervent aspirations to the Father of Lights, to the God of all mercys, "May such be the old age of our country!"—That such may be the lot of our children to the latest generations, depends on **YOU, MY BELOVD AND RESPECTED COUNTRYMEN!** You must meditate often and anxiously on the spirit of American Institutions. That spirit is Freedom, Education, Peace, Religion. These are the four Cardinal virtues of our American Republic: their concentrated essence is the spirit of our institutions.

We ar, we must continu a free, educated, peaceful Christian people. But freedom is not with us what freedom was in the ancient democracys. The liberty of those ancient States, was the inertnes of palzy, or the shocking features of apoplexy. It was licentiousnes and anarchy, the fierce contest between patrician and plebian, or between a jealous and ever-endangerd people on the one hand, and powerful, corrupt, ambitious rulers on the other. Their portrait is sketchd by the pencil of a poet, but with the fidelity of history:

“ Who that would ask a heart to dulness wed,
 The waveless calm, the slumber of the dead?
 No! the wild bliss of nature needs alloy,
 And fear and sorrow fan the fires of joy.”*

Not such is American freedom. Her spirit is Religion, Peace, Education. It is tranquil, sedate, rational, dignify'd. May the Galvanic convulsions of Athenian and Roman liberty, never be the lot of our country! Nor is Freedom with us, the freedom of European States. There, the great landmarks are, the supremacy of the members and the subordination of the head; exemption from the misgovernment of their hereditary Rulers; and security against Tyranny. But with us, the parts are subjected to the whole: representation is pure, simple, equal: an independent judiciary is a shield of defence, against executive violence, legislative errors, and popular prejudice. We have nothing to dread from tyranny and tyrants, nothing seriously and permanently from the ambition of rulers; every thing from the abuse of self-government. Let the people only realize the true spirit of American Institutions, considerate, tranquil, prudent as it is, *and their spirit must be the spirit of their rulers.* LET THE PEOPLE DO THEIR DUTY TO THEMSELVES, THOUGHTFULLY, CALMLY, DISCREETLY, AND THEIR RULERS WILL NOT, DARE NOT BE DISOBEDIENT TO THE SPIRIT OF THEIR MASTERS. Let the devotee of European liberty, perishing in the battle field against tyrants, on the scaffold of civil contest, or in the prison of faction, breathe forth his indignant spirit, in the aspiration of the Tuscan patriot inscribed on his dungeon walls,

“ Exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor.”—ÆN. 1. 4, v. 6.

* Campb. Pleas. Hope, p. 2, v. 17,

But, while the spirit of American Institutions shall endure, our eminent patriots may indeed be called to their rest, in their own homes, as by divine appointment, even on the birthday of American Independence.* But never, never shall they die on the battle field of brothers, never in the bastille of tyrants, never on the scaffold of the rebel or the traitor. O my country! mayst thou cling, with an enduring trust as thou hast so lately done, to the spirit of American Institutions! "Thy faith hath made thee whole." Thou hast touched the garment of that spirit, wise, peaceful, Christian; and hast been healed of thy plague. The fountain of thy blood has been stayed. And in the very depth of that midnight darkness, which lately shrouded our land; when fear came upon us, and trembling; when a spirit passed before our faces, but we discerned not the form thereof; who shall deny, rather, who can doubt, that the effectual fervent prayer of many a private Christian, thro' all our borders, ascended to heaven for the peace of brothers?

"His prayer, his praise, his life to vice unknown,
In sweet memorial, rose before the throne;
These charms, success in that bright region find,
And called an Angel down to calm our mind."

PARNELL'S HERMIT, v. 180.

And who, with the past examples of American history, and the testimony of Washington and Franklin, can doubt, that Providence, by a special interposition saved us then from ourselves? Who shall say, that the prayer offered up in that very Convention, whose unchristian, whose unrepblican spirit (as we believed it to be) struck us with grief, and a amazement, and almost with despair, was not instrumental

* Thomas Jefferson and John Adams died July 4, 1826, and James Monroe, July 4, 1831.

in fulfilling that remarkable declaration of the sacred writers, quoted by Franklin, "surely the wrath of man shall praise thee, the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain?"—Whilst we lay, as it were, helpless and despairing, and seemd to wait for some angel to trouble the waters for our healing, the prayer for light and help, ascended from the midst of that very assembly. And it was heard. The blessing of heaven descended, silent and unseen, as the dew of evning. The spirit of American Institutions prevaild, and we were sav'd. O my countrymen! let us never doubt the sincerity of that prayer! Let us accord with willing hearts, the meed of respect and gratitude, to those who propos'd, to those who offerd up, to those who joind in that prayer. Let us believ, that in the dark hour of temptation and trial; of temptation to dishonor their parent, to smite their country; of trial to the strength and sincerity of their love and duty, many a spirit that would hav yielded at her bidding, life, liberty, property; yea, the aged parents that bore him, and the wife and the children of his fire-side, struggled in an agony of intercession, intense and solemn as death-bed supplications. One of the most eminent of that Convention, in talents, energy and influence, one of the boldest and most zealous of the men, whom we beheld, with mingled aw, astonishment and indignation, has yielded his spirit, within a few days, to his Father and our Father, to his God and our God.—Let us believ, for his sake and our sakes, that out of the depth of his soul, as he stood on the verge of the gulf of Civil War and Revolution, went forth an impassiond prayer for light and counsel. Peace be to his ashes! Let his talents and eloquence, as a writer and speaker, be rememberd, for they honord Carolina. Let his principles, so deeply condemnd by us, be recolected, as warning beacons; but without scorn, ridicule or bitterness. Let the errors of his political life, (for such we must esteem them,) be forgiven, as we trust to

be ourselves forgiven; and be forgotten, for the sake of our common country.

Will you my fellow-citizens, yield me your attention yet a little while longer, that I may illustrate still farther, the spirit of American Institutions? Patrick Henry said, in the Convention of Virginia, "Guard with jealous attention, the public liberty. Suspect every one who approaches that Jewel. Unfortunately, nothing will preserve it but **DOWN-RIGHT FORCE**. Whenever you give up that force, you are inevitably ruined."* And the question has been asked, with triumphant confidence, as tho' but one reply could be given, "What have the people ever gained but by Revolution?" and we have been told, "Revolution has no terrors for me." The sentiments of Patrick Henry, belonged to the jealousy and anxiety, the confusion, alarms and doubts, which naturally sprang up with, and survived the revolution. They are unworthy of our age: they are a reproach to the spirit of American Institutions: they are foreigners in our Union and with our Constitution. To the question, "what have the people ever gained but by Revolution," I answer, boldly, if by **REVOLUTION** be understood the law of the Sword, **LIBERTY HAS LOST FAR MORE THAN SHE EVER GAINED BY IT**. The Sword was the destroyer of the Lycian Confederacy and the Achæan League. The Sword, alternately enslav'd and disenthral'd Thebes and Athens, Sparta, Syracuse and Corinth. The Sword of the Macedonian cut his way to the Council of Amphictyon, thro' the ranks of freemen, and expelled Lacedæmon to make room for Philip. The Sword of Rome, conquer'd every other free state, and finish'd the murder of liberty in the ancient world, by destroying herself. What but the Sword, in modern times, annihilated the Republics of Italy, the Hanseatic towns, and the primitive indepen-

* 1 Eloq. U. S. p. 78.

dence of Ireland, Wales and Scotland? What but the Sword partitiond Poland, asasinated the rising liberty of Spain, banishd the Hugonots from France, and made Cromwell, the master, not the servant of the People? What but the Sword of Republican France, cut down the libertys of the Batavian Confederacy, and trac'd in letters of blood on the eternal snows of Switzerland, "the Law of the Sword, is the Law of violence to the peaceful, of slavery to the free?" And what but the Sword, of the same Republican France, destroy'd the independence of half of Europe, delug'd the Continent with tears, devourd its milions upon milions, and clos'd the long catalogue of guilt, by founding and defending to the last, the most powerful, selfish and insatiable of Military Despotisms.

The Sword, indeed, deliverd Greece from the Persian Invaders, and expell'd the proud Tarquin. The Sword emancipated Switzerland and Holland; restor'd the Bruce to his throne, and brought Charles to the scaffold. The Sword hewd in pieces the giant power of the oppressor Napoleon; cut asunder the chains, that bound the Spanish Colonys to the Mother Country: and redeem'd the pledge of the Congress of '76, when they plighted to each other, "their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor." And yet, what would the redemption of that pledge have availd, towards the establishment of our present government, if the spirit of American Institutions, had not been both the birthright and the birth-blessing of the Colonys? Religion, Education and Popular Institutions, a deep sens of the valu of civil and political liberty, of the rights of conscience, of the Independence of the People, of the responsibility of Rulers, and of the tru nature of the Social Compact, were the mother-milk of our colonial infancy. The Indians, the French and the Spaniards, even England herself, warrd in vain against a People, born and bred in the houshold, at the domestic altar of Liberty

herself. They *were* freemen, because they were worthy to be such, before the Sword of Revolution had cut the Gordian knot of colonial dependence. *They never had been slaves, for they were born free.* The Sword was a herald to *proclaim* their freedom, but neither *created* nor *preservd* it. A century and a half, had already beheld them free in infancy, free in youth, free in early manhood. Theirs was already the spirit of American Institutions: the spirit of Christian freedom, of a temperate, regulated freedom, of a rational civil obedience. For such a People, the Sword, the law of violence, did and could do nothing, but sever the bonds which bound her colonial wards to their unnatural guardian. They redeemd their pledge sword in hand; *but the Sword LEFT THEM, AS IT FOUND THEM unchang'd in character; Freemen, in thought, and in deed, INSTINCT WITH THE IMMORTAL SPIRIT OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS.*

But what has the Sword ever done, what can the Sword ever do, to change the slave into a freeman? The fit subject of Despotism or Monarchy, baptiz'd in blood, no more becomes a Freeman, than the Pharisee, plung'd in the waves of Jordan, came forth a Christian. The very materials of the Warrior's Sword, ar the materials of the Tyrant's chains, of the Atheist's Guillotine. The Sword may rescu the slave from the dungeon, and cut asunder the "iron that enterd into his soul." The Sword may deliver him from the tyrannical misrule of another; but, can it confer on him the capacity for self-government?—And what is Liberty without this?—What is it, but the fickle tempestuous democracy of Athens: the selfish and all-destructiv ambition of Rome; the very whirlwind and hurricane of the French Revolution? The Sword cannot giv to the slave the virtues, that public and private life demand of the Freeman. It cannot kindle the sens of duty, and the spirit of usefulness; it cannot clothe him with the calm and enlarg'd wisdom, the moral courage,

the self-denial and self-command, without which, Liberty is a ferocious and remorseless demon, "a reproach and a by-word down to future ages." The Sword cannot elevate and expand the soul of the slave, and fill it with high and holy thoughts of Country and Brethren, of Union and Constitution, of the majesty of the Laws, and the obligations of civil obedience, of the authority of public sentiment and the supremacy of its moral power. What but the spirit of American Institutions can work the change? What but this is able to cast out the unclean spirit, which fits the Slave to be the Maniac of a Reign of Terror, or the base satellite of Imperial Ambition? What—but Education, Religion, Peace—is endued with power to make liberty a blessing, and not a curse? The spirit of American Institutions has ruled our Country for two centuries, and, what has it not done for us? The Sword has had the dominion of the Earth, for nearly six thousand years; and, what has it accomplished for the human race? Millions upon millions give the answer from the world of spirits. The Sword can never change the Slave into a Freeman; for it cannot work miracles. It cannot breathe into him, the breath of life; and Liberty is Life.

EXTRACT

From an Address deliverd before the Charleston Temperance Society.

One more ilustration, and I hav finishd. I hav said, that Christianity came to restore the simplicity of primitiv times, and to establish the supremacy of principle over precedent.—Such was the glorious object of its Founder. But who, that contemplates the original character of the system, and realizes the beauty, simplicity and purity of its doctrins, rites and morals, can fail to be struck with amazement, in perusing the history of the Christian Church? The wildnes and extravagance of the Oriental Schools: the subtle metaphysics and sophistical logic of the Western philosophy, deformd and degraded the grandeur, simplicity and harmony of Christian doctrins. The gorgeous rites, the complicated ceremonial, and the endles variety in the temple service of the Jewish and heathen priesthood, succeeded to the plain and artles worship of the primitiv church. And, instead of the Morals of the Gospel, so pure, so practical, so lovely, were substituted experimentaly, a code of Morals, that dishonord the Gospel, and theoretically, the metaphysics and casuistry of the schoolmen. What a vast revolution had thus been wrought in the Christianity of the Apostolic Age! And what a mightyer revolution still remains to be acomplishd, before the Christianity even of our day, shall be carry'd back to the standard of the primitiv age! And yet, if we fix our eys intently on the simplicity of the Gospel, and

then transfer them to the dark ages, or even to the comparatively luminous æra of Julius and Leo, what a contrast is there!—Again, if we realize the simplicity and grandeur of primitiv Christianity, and then turn to the Christian Church, as it now is, even after all the advantages of the Protestant Reformation, how far as a whole, does it seem to be remov'd in doctrin, disciplin and worship, from the simplicity and purity, the grandeur, harmony and beauty of the Gospel! Who can believ, that the Christian communitys of our day, ar to be reproduced in the Christian communitys even of the next century? Who believs, that war and dueling; the gambling hous, lottery, and the brothel; the licentiousnes of masquerades theaters and Operas; the frauds of diplomacy, and the corruption of elections; the blasphemy of the profane, and that byword, Custom-hous Oaths; the unchristian morality, which justifies the distillery and the licens'd trafic in ardent spirits; the banishment of the Bible from the education of Children: and the dedication of half their time to Pagan authors? Who believs that these can survive another century, at least in our country? I at least believ, with a strong faith, with a fervid hope, and rejoice in the belief, that they will not, that they cannot survive. Our country has already set a noble example in her institutions, for the admiration and imitation of the world. She has vindicated, establishd and ilustrated the great rule of Christian Morals: Principle is supreme, immortal, unchangable—Precedent is mutable, subordinate, perishable. She has examind and rejected the political systems of ancient and modern Europe. She has dissolv'd forever the unnatural alliance between Church and State. She has reformd, by the standard of justice and common sens, the antiquated and absurd regulations of feudal jurisprudence. She has introduc'd simplicity, economy, responsibility into the administration of public affairs. She has consecrated the trial by

Jury, the freedom of the Press, and liberty of conscience. She has ordaind, both in theory and practice, that rulers ar but the servants of the People. She has dedicated the Representativ system, as the best safeguard of the public good. She has plac'd the supreme power in the hands of the People: and has given them the light and security of a written Constitution. And what ar all these achievments but the triumph of reason, common sens, truth, over the prejudices and superstitions, the opinions and practices of milions, for more than twenty centurys? What ar they but the victory of Principle, the subjugation of Precedent? for the scepter of custom is broken, the charm of his despotic authority is forever dissolv'd. And what is the Temperance Reform, but a glorious manifestation of the same great rule of Christian Morals, in accordance with the simplicity and purity of the Gospel? It has given a memorable ilustration of the dignity of virtu, the eloquence of Truth, and the supreme Authority of Principle. It has gone forth, not in the pride of human opinion, nor yet with the sanctions of human power; but in the name of humanity and wisdom, in the spirit of Christian humility, justice and love. It has gone forth, resolv'd to conquer; for it believs with inflexible faith, in the all-subduing power of Truth. It has gone forth, and it shall conquer, for the Temperance Reformation is unchangably, essentially, permanently the cause of Christian Morals.

EXTRACT

From an Address on the Power and Value of the Sunday-school System, March, 1834.

It is impossible not to perceive how deeply, extensively, and durably such a combination of causes must affect the entire character of education and literature. If it were not for the magic influence of habit, and the venerable authority of ancient prejudices, we should look with grief and astonishment on the existing system of education. Acknowledging the Bible, as the fountain of light and truth, as the guardian angel of this world, and the guarantee of eternal life; as containing the most venerable and authentic history; the purest and loftiest morals; eloquence the most dignify'd, commanding and natural; poetry the most sublime, pathetic and beautiful; how should we mourn over the blindness or infatuation, the error of judgment, or the perverted taste, which could banish such a book from the daily education of Christian children? Would it not seem to us little less than ingratitude to the Author of a gift so precious, to see it rejected, and the Pagan historian, moralist, orator and poet, eulogis'd as of unrival'd excellence, and adopted as daily companions to fashion the minds and hearts of Christian youths. If we could free ourselves from the despotic authority of great names, and the tyranny of long establish'd customs, with what sentiments should we look on the astonishing fact, that while the Christian clergy and professing Christians acknowledge the **HEROIC VIRTUES OF CLASSIC ANTIQUITY** *to be not only irreconcilable with, but absolutely hostile to the MEEK*

AND HUMBLE VIRTUES OF THE GOSPEL, *they should* UTERLY EXCLUDE THESE, *and should* EXTENSIVELY INCORPORATE THOSE into their systems of education.

Let us banish for a moment the idea that the Bible is a divine book. Let us regard it as a human composition. Let us take the testimony of the statesman, philosopher and scholar to its extraordinary merits; and should we not expect as a matter of course, to find it interwoven universally, inseparably, with the texture of every system of education? Ar not the Pentateuch, Joshua and Judges, Samuel and Kings, the Gospels and Acts, superior in the truth and value of the facts, in the dignity, gravity and interest of narrative, to the most celebrated of the classic historians? Who would compare the laws of Lycurgus and Solon, of Romulus and Numa, to the institutions of Moses: or the philosophy of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, of Cicero and Epictetus, of Seneca or Antoninus, with the moral code of Jesus of Nazareth? Does the eloquence of Demosthenes or Tully, does the poetry of Homer or Virgil, of Pindar or Horace, rival the grandeur and magnificence, the pathos, energy and beauty of Moses and Job, of David and the Prophets, of Paul and the Apocalypse? Can we doubt, then, if the Bible were a HUMAN book, we should find it carefully and effectually embody'd in every scheme of instruction? And because it is the book of life and happiness, of duty and usefulness, is it therefore excluded? Yes, we behold the astonishing fact, the best and noblest of all books, is proscrib'd and banish'd from its rightful empire, the minds, consciences and hearts of Christian youth. What but ancient prejudices and the slavish habit of not thinking for ourselves, could reconcile us to such inconsistency, to such violation of duty, common sense, and pure enlightend taste? But we know that the children of the Sunday-school, who are to be both the people and the rulers, the parents and the teachers a quarter of a century hence, will never tolerate such a reproach to the

Christian character of **THEIR** age. Brought up in the school of gospel truth, purity and love, they will regard it as little less than a denial of their master, to banish the Bible from the whole circle of dayly education. The very reason why Christians now exclude it, because it is a *divine* book, will be to them the unanswerable argument for adopting it. Superior to the narrow minded, narrow hearted prejudices and jealousys of sectarian religion, they would bring to the question inflexible faith that such a book could do nothing but good. Theirs will be the enlarg'd wisdom, the enlightend benevolence, which will acknowlege in spirit and in truth, in thought, word and deed, that the New Testament is *the only genuin moral constitution of society, and its principles the only safe and wise foundation of civil and political institutions*. In the same spirit, they will acknowlege that *the Bible contains the wisest and noblest, the most various and precious elements of all education* and all literature. This will be their theory, and correspondent to it will be their practice. They will believ, what all our systems actually and uterly deny, both in theory and practice, that **THE SENS OF DUTY, AND THE SPIRIT OF USEFULNES**, *cultivated on the Christian model, ar far more valuable than science and learning: and that the AFECTIONS regulated by the same standard, ar incomparably more precious than DISCIPLIN OF MIND AND REFINEMENT OF TASTE*. Duty, usefulnes and the afections will be regarded by them, as the foundation and cement of all education. These will be the primary objects; science, taste and learning the secondary.

But this influence of the Sunday-school will extend far beyond the school and college. It will diffuse itself thro' the whole circle of literature. The scholars of the Sunday-school ar to be the critics and poets, the orators, historians, and philosophers of future years. Can we doubt it? when we look at the wonderful progress of the system, within the last ten years, in our own country: and when we see that the

causes which have carry'd it onwards, with such unexampled velocity and power, as durable as Christianity itself. Shall not then the character of all literature undergo a mighty revolution? Must not the whole department of fiction be chang'd in its elements and structure: and be especially distinguish'd by elevated sentiment and pure morals, the spirit of usefulness and refinement in taste and manners. Will not the orator seek in the Scriptures, the best and noblest motives to influence the hearts of men: and draw from the inexhaustible treasures of divine truth, a strain of argument, a tone of morals, and a style of illustration and sentiment which may be sought, but never can be found in the classic page. Shall not the historian, regarding the Bible as the only true foundation for the annals of mankind, resort to its records, as a more simple and dignify'd, a more impartial, grave and interesting exhibition of human character in nations and individuals, than Greece or Rome has ever produc'd? And shall not the statesman and philosopher find in the Scriptures, the fountains of a deeper philosophy; of wisdom more enlarg'd and profound; of a more just, humane and rational policy; and a view of the moral and intellectual capacities of man, of his power, affections and destiny more animating and consolatory, than the writers of classic antiquity ever even imagin'd? The manhood of the Sunday-school system shall then behold a mighty revolution in every department of literature. Nor is it too much to predict, that none will be found in that day, to dishonor their talents, taint their moral purity, and waste their time, in preserving the trash and licentiousness of Swift, Dryden and Sterne; or in swelling out a body of English poetry, with the vulgar and indecent vers of Sommerville, Butler and Prior. The Christian critics and editors of that day will either abandon the whole mass of such writers, as irreclaimably vile and corrupt, or they will apply to them the caustic and the knife, with the skill and unsparing severity of the sur-

geon, when dealing with shattered limbs, or the malignant cancer.

Let us contemplate the literary influence of the Sunday-school system in two other important points of view. The first is that which relates to the periodical press. I speak not of reviews, and magazines, and other journals of a similar description; but of our daily and weekly newspapers. Is not the day coming, when Sunday-school scholars shall be the editors of all our gazetts? I at least doubt it, as little as I doubt that the tide of population will roll onward out of the Vally of the Mississippi across the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. And when the Sunday-school pupils of that day shall be the owners and directors of our daily papers, do we believ that they will tolerate the falshood, prevarication and concealment, the bitter and contemptuous spirit, the slander, intolerance and ridicule, which brand so deeply and extensivly the character of our political journals? Many of them ar edited by Christians, all ar edited for a Christian community: and yet you might as well look into Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke and Hume for Christian principles, as into their pages for the spirit of the Gospel. There you may find the turbulence and licentiousnes of the Athenian populace; the ferocity and arrogance of Roman democracy; and the very genius of Cavalier and Puritan, breathing out threatnings and slaughter. But, in the political newspapers of our country, ar seldom, if ever display'd the spirit of love and humility, of forbearance and forgivnes, which breathe so sweetly thro' the pages of the Evangelists.

The other point of view, in which I propose to consider the influence of the Sunday-school system over literature, relates to it as reflecting the character of a PEACEFUL people. The readers of a future day, train'd up in the Sunday-school, will not be satisfy'd with a literature constructed on *Pagan* models, breathing the spirit of heathen institutions, morals and manners: and deriving its power over the mind and

heart, from war and violence in such a variety of forms. They will demand a literature, in accordance with the beauty of holiness, with the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit, and with that love to God and love to man, which are the very sunlight of the Gospel. They will demand a literature, which shall breathe glory to God and good will to man: whose privilege it shall be to honor God, whose duty it shall be to bless mankind: in which shall be displayed all the variety of Christian graces, illustrated and relieved by the contrast, not of vices and crimes, but of the heathen heroic virtues of war and the warrior. They will demand, and enjoy in conformity with the spirit of that age, what the world has never seen, *a pure CHRISTIAN literature, preeminently the literature of PEACE.*

THE END

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Dymond, Jonathan

An Inquiry into the accordancy of war with the principles of christianity
and an examinatiion of the philosophical reasoning by which it is depended
with observations on the causes of war and some of its effects

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